Since Advent 2011 those of
us who celebrate the Church’s divine liturgy in the Roman rite have made use of
a new English translation, one that is more faithful to the original Latin text. For the most part, I have appreciated these
changes in that they have helped to restore a greater sense of reverence and
dignity to the Mass – a sense that was at times lacking in the celebration of
the Novus Ordo with the English translation
that appeared shortly after the Council.
There are, however, a few
instances in which the more sparse language of the 1970 translation resonates
in a way that is lost in the more accurate, though more formal and ornate language
of the new translation.
Take for example the
epiclesis to Eucharistic Prayer III (A side by side comparison is available
here). At this point in the Mass the
Church prays to the Father for unity – that those who share in Christ’s Body
and Blood will be filled with the Holy Spirit and “become one body, one spirit
in Christ.” In the subordinate clause
that precedes this, the language of the two translations is somewhat different. Whereas the new translation asks the Father
to look “upon the oblation of your Church . . . recognizing the sacrificial victim
by whose death you willed to reconcile us to yourself” the 1970 translation
simply asks the Father to “see the victim whose death has reconciled us to
yourself.”
“See the victim.”
This simple declarative
phrase urges God the Father to see our offering – Christ himself. But it is not simply a prayer to the
Father. It is also an exhortation to the
faithful to see Jesus, to see the Crucified One, to see the price of their
redemption.
“See the victim.”
Notwithstanding the
mainstream media’s calculated lack of interest in the trial of Kermit Gosnell
(a lack of interest catalogued in the links contained here), the horrors
exposed in the conviction of the Philadelphia abortionist have broken through –
in part through the use of social media (see here), in part through the integrity of some
journalists who shamed their peers out of a silence that seemed inexplicable
apart from ideology (see here, here, and here). Though Kermit Gosnell (don't call him "doctor" – that’s not what you call murderers behind bars) was apparently
dumbfounded (here) that he was convicted for simply trying to finish the job of
ensuring “fetal demise” (Grand Jury Report p. 4), Gosnell has been found guilty
of first-degree murder three times over.
“See the victim.”
Of course for there to be a
crime there must be a victim. Here there
were several victims: an adult woman who sadly chose abortion and was given a
drug overdose by a quack and his untrained staff, and of course several babies
who were delivered only to have their spinal cords “snipped” even as they
struggled for life. They did not
suddenly become “babies” in the act of being born, if by “baby” we mean “human
being.” “Baby” is a term we typically
(though not uniformly) reserve for human off-spring who can interact with
others outside the womb. Sadly, the
first interaction with adults that these children experienced was to die a
savage death – to suffer as victims sacrificed on the altar of “choice.” But their status as human beings long
preceded their deaths and their births.
It began when they began, seven or eight or nine months prior.
It is not in the interests
of those who profit from child murder to see any child victim where “fetal
demise” is secured. Thus, in an attempt
to spin the Gosnell verdict in a kind of legal jujitsu, NARAL’s president Ilyse
Hogue issued a statement (here) placing blame for the Gosnell affair on attempts
to regulate abortion. According to
Hogue, the lessons to be learned from the Gosnell trial are that the
“unrelenting efforts” of “anti-choice” politicians “to deny women access to safe
and legal abortion care, will only drive more women to back-alley butchers like
Kermit Gosnell.”
The maneuver fails, of
course, in that Hogue’s claim is exactly wrong.
Gosnell was allowed to operate with impunity for decades not because of
an abundance of regulation but because of the near total absence of any
government oversight – an absence that the abortion industry has tenaciously
worked to secure.
What is absent from the
NARAL statement – shamefully but predictably absent – is any acknowledgement of
the victims – of the children murdered by Gosnell. And the reason for this is obvious – because
NARAL and its partners in the crime of in
utero child murder (like the National Abortion Federation and Planned
Parenthood) have the same blood on their hands.
They may not preserve their victims in jars, like trophies, as Gosnell
did, but the same blood of the innocents stains their hands, and their balance
sheets, and the whole country, making a mockery of the rule of law.
“See the victim.”
If there is any good that
can come from the tragic loss of life brought to light in the Gosnell trial it
is this: the humanity of the child-victim of abortion. This humanity is clear whether the child is
delivered through a botched abortion and then killed by “snipping” or murdered
while still developing in his or her mother’s womb.
The identity the child in utero or ex utero – his or her empirical status as a human being – does not
change with a change in location. To say
otherwise would be to claim that one’s humanity depended upon being born in a
free-state or a slave-state, or being transported from one to another and back
again (see here). Location may be a
relevant fact under a corrupt and morally indefensible legal regime, but the
law should reflect the reality that most people intuit and that science
confirms.
The entity developing in
the womb is a human being, not a clump of undifferentiated cells – as the
hucksters who peddle “choice” would have the public believe (see here). Rather the developing child – whether in utero or ex utero – is a human being – one of us!
The purveyors of abortion
fear that the Gosnell trial will actually urge the public to take notice of
this fact. Those who purport to take
Catholic social teaching seriously should work to see that it remains ever present
in the public eye – that the first question asked of those do the bloodletting
(and are paid for it) should be “Is the being whose ‘demise’ you seek a human
being?”
The children whom Gosnell
murdered and for which he has been convicted – as well as the thousands of
other children who died at his hands and the millions more who have died at the
hands of other abortionists ask for only one thing: They ask to be seen for who
they are.
“See the victim.”
(here)
"Gosnell's Crimes Not Uncommon" is the title of Prof. Mark Rienzi's piece in USA Today. Here's a bit:
. . . While murder rates for almost every group in society have plummeted in recent decades, there's one group where murder rates have doubled, according to CDC and National Center for Health Statistics data — babies less than a year old. . . .
. . . Gosnell's actions are readily explainable by a culture that embraces, and in some quarters celebrates, abortion as a constitutional right. Gosnell made his living by performing legal abortions, many of them late in the pregnancy. Is it really all that surprising that he might not have seen a significant moral difference in performing the abortion a few inches inside the birth canal rather than somewhere outside?
The law can be a potent moral teacher, which is a good thing. Laws against slavery and discrimination have helped reduce prejudice. Laws requiring accommodations for people with disabilities have helped them gain visibility and greater acceptance in society. . . .
It would be naive to think that our abortion laws do not carry a similar teaching power. . . .
Somehow, five days a week---week in and week out---
Public Discourse, the on-line journal of the Witherspoon Institute, manages to post an illuminating and engaging essay on a significant issue in our public life. Yesterday it was Matthew Franck's powerful reflection on abortionists in contemporary culture as "providers of necessities" (as Lincoln said of slave-sellers) who are at the same time "utterly despised." Today it is a tightly argued piece by Charles Capps on meeting the practical needs of unmarried domestic partners (whether their relationship is platonic or otherwise) without "defining out of existence the only legal category whose purpose is precisely to integrate the kind of act that can result in conception with the kind of environment best suited for a child’s development."
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/05/10094/
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
Abortionist Dr. Kermit Gosnell, who was convicted yesterday of first degree murder of three babies, has agreed not to appeal a sentence of life in prison in return for the prosecution's agreement not to seek the death penalty. Having publicly opposed the death penalty for Gosnell, I am entirely content with this way of bringing the appalling episode to a close. Are we through with Gosnell now? Can we "let him rot in prison," as some have said and "just forget about him"? Not in my view.
For those of us who seek to be disciples of Jesus, our obligation is clear: It is to love Kermit Gosnell and pray for him. He will spend the remainder of his life in jail, as he certainly should---his punishment is just. But he remains a human being, made in the image and likeness of God. He is our (very wayward) brother. We are his fellow sinners. We must never suppose that it is beyond the power of the divine Author of life to move his heart to repentance and conversion.
And let us redouble our efforts on behalf of the victims---mothers and babies alike---of the hundreds and even thousands of abortionists who will continue to ply Dr. Gosnell's grisly trade. Let us pray not only for Gosnell, but for all who deal in death, even as we work tirelessly in the political and cultural spheres to fight the abortion power and care for pregnant women in need and their inestimably precious children.
When it rains, it pours (interesting church-state scholarship, that is). Following up on my post about Paul Horwitz's new paper, here's another great offering on the same general topic, by John Inazu, called "The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version):
Significant discussion about the “freedom of church” has recently emerged at the intersection of law and religion scholarship and political theology. That discussion gained additional traction with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor v. E.E.O.C., which recognized the First Amendment’s “special solicitude” for religious organizations. But the freedom of the church is at its core a theological concept, and its potential integration into our constitutional discourse requires a process of translation. The efficacy of any background political concept as legal doctrine will ultimately stand or fall on something akin to what Frederick Schauer has called “constitutional salience.”
The existing debate over the freedom of the church obscures these insights in two ways. First, its back-and-forth nature suggests that translation succeeds or fails on the level of individual arguments. Second, its current focus on a mostly Catholic argument neglects other theological voices. The kind of cultural views that affect constitutional doctrine are less linear and more textured than the existing debates suggest. This paper adds to the discussion a Protestant account of the freedom of the church: the New Revised Standard Version. Part I briefly sketches the process of translation that any theological concept encounters in the path to constitutional doctrine. Part II summarizes the current debate in legal scholarship about the freedom of the church. Part III introduces the New Revised Standard Version through three prominent twentieth-century theologians: Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Stanley Hauerwas. Part IV assesses the possibility of translation, and Part V warns of the theological limits to translating certain theological concepts. The New Revised Standard Version reinforces some of the normative claims underlying the Catholic story, but it does so through a Protestant lens that is somewhat more familiar to American political thought. It also differs from the Catholic account in two important ways: (1) by characterizing the church as a witnessing body rather than as a separate sovereign; and (2) by highlighting the church’s freedom in a post-Christian polity.
I'm really honored that a scholar as prolific and interesting as Inazu has taken such care to respond to some of my own efforts -- and to press my arguments and claims, and to make me re-think my own views.
Much to my own (and, I'm sure, my dean's and my editor's!) disappointment, I'm a few years behind on my "Freedom of the Church" book project. On the bright side, the book will be much better for having the benefit of Inazu's and Horwitz's criticisms and improvements.
Paul Horwitz has posted a must-read paper called "The Freedom of the Church Without Romance." It's an important piece, by an important scholar, on an important subject. In it, Paul engages -- carefully, critically, fairly, challengingly -- with some of my own efforts to think through the "institutional" dimension of religious freedom. Here's Paul's abstract:
This Article is part of a symposium issue titled "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era." Freedom of the church, roughly, connotes the independent nature or sovereignty of the church. The most dramatic moment in its development was the eleventh century Investiture Controversy, with its confrontation between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV at Canossa, but it has a long prior and subsequent history. Recently, with the renewed scholarly interest in the institutional rights of churches and religious organizations and the Supreme Court's decision affirming the "ministerial exception" doctrine in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the idea of "freedom of the church" has taken on new champions--and critics.
This Article, from an author who has written supportively about freedom of the church and/or religious institutionalism in prior work, takes a deliberately unromantic look at freedom of the church. It evaluates it through two useful disciplinary lenses: history, and the economics of religion. Both historical and economic analysis of the concept of "freedom of the church" suggest the following conclusions: (1) The concept should be treated carefully and with a full awareness of its mixed history, without undue romanticism on the part of its champions, or a confident conclusion on the part of its critics that it is no longer necessary. (2) Whatever the concept of "freedom of the church" means today, the present version is decidedly diminished and chastened, a shadow of the medieval version. Supporters of freedom of the church should welcome that fact. Freedom of the church persists, and may have continuing value, precisely because it has become so domesticated. (3) There are solid historical and economic grounds for some form of freedom of the church or religious institutional autonomy. In particular, religion's status as a credence good, whose value and reliability is certified by religious agents such as ministers, strongly suggests that state interference with religious employment relations can be dangerous to a church's well-being and long-term survival. (4) The history and economics of religion also teach us something about the optimal conditions for freedom of the church--the conditions under which it is likely to do the most good and the least harm. In particular, they suggest that champions of freedom of the church ought to welcome religious pluralism and a strong non-establishment regime.
The Article closes with some speculation about why there has been a recent revival of interest in freedom of the church, including the possibility that its resurgence, even if it is fully justified, also involves an element of rent-seeking by religious institutions.
There are two broader underlying suggestions as well. First, there are good reasons to support some version of freedom of the church, but it deserves a more critical and nuanced examination by friends and adversaries alike. Second, legal scholars writing on church-state issues have paid far too little attention to the literature on the economics of religion.
