Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

Corporate Exercise of Religion and Other Thoughts on the RFRA Claim in the Mandate Litigation

There has been a curious silence in the news and on the blogs about the preliminary injunction in Newland v. Sebelius.  True, there are some unique issues involving the nature of the plaintiffs, but the case may indicate the direction that courts which get over the ripeness hump and do reach the RFRA claim might tend (and, as in all things, ripeness will come with time).  Here are two questions that interested me.

First, on the issue of substantial burden, I was struck by the fact that Judge Kane did not really answer the question at all.  He seemed to assume the substantial burden -- or perhaps to hold the "difficult questions" about substantial burden in abeyance.  One of those difficult questions, he said, was: "Can a corporation exercise religion?"  Three reactions:

  1. The answer to this question, posed in this way, must be yes.  The Catholic Church is a non-profit corporation, and it certainly can exercise religion -- the free exercise component of the holding in Hosanna Tabor would make no sense if it and other religious non-profits could not.  Indeed, some folks have made something like the claim that corporate free exercise, rather than individual free exercise, is the foundational right. 
  2. Though the doctrine is controversial, we do say that corporations have rights of free speech.  See Citizens United.  If a corporation can speak in a way that is protected by the Speech Clause, why can it not exercise religion in a way that is protected by the Free Exercise Clause?  And by extension, why can it not suffer substantial burdens on its free exercise under RFRA?
  3. Still, there is an interesting issue about who is exercising religion when what we've got is a publicly traded corporation.  Suppose the shareholders do not care at all about the religious issue that the corporation has taken a stand on.  What does it mean to say in that circumstance that the corporation is exercising religion?

Second, I was surprised at the court's skepticism with respect to the question of compelling interest.  The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because the government did not show that its interest in the mandate was compelling.  The reason: the many exceptions created by both Congress and HHS itself.  "[T]his massive exemption completely undermines any compelling interest in applying the preventive care coverage mandate to Plaintiffs."  More reactions:

  1. The court did not need to reach out and decide the question of compelling interest.  Here the court really could have just assumed that the mandate advanced a compelling interest and moved right to least restrictive means.  That the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the compelling interest issue is noteworthy.
  2. Perhaps the most interesting thing of all to me: (richly deserving the hot pink highlight) note that the court decided the question of compelling interest by making the argument which I have claimed could ground a free exercise challenge as well.  That is, that because the regulation contains hundreds of exceptions, it is not generally applicable and therefore falls outside the Smith framework (I have called this the individualized assessment exception to Smith, but for a much more thorough treatment of it, you will need to wait for my book, Tragedy & History: The Quality of Religious Liberty, due out in the spring (sorry for this and all future plugs, of which there will be many)). 
  3. Of course, as a practical matter, courts may just avoid the constitutional question and just focus on RFRA.  But to the extent that any do reach the free exercise question, the fact that the individualized assessment argument is already in the air as applied to the RFRA claim might be important.

Good Democrats and Bad Republicans

Kudos to those Democratic members of the House of Representatives who broke ranks with their party leadership to join the vast majority of Republican members in voting against late-term abortions.  As for the seven or eight Republicans (see here:  http://www.redstate.com/mdannenfelser/2012/08/01/meet-the-8-republicans-who-support-late-term-abortions/) who joined Nancy Pelosi et al. in an effort to protect late-term abortions, the quicker they are defeated by pro-life Republicans in a primary or by pro-life Democrats in a general election, the happier I will be.  (I know, I know, there are unusual circumstances in which support for a pro-abortion candidate even over a pro-life candidate is indicated in order to prevent control of the chamber from shifting from pro-life hands into pro-choice hands, but you get my point.) It is, to me, a scandal that Republicans (fortunately, not many, and the number has diminished over the years) who would never dream of voting for a tax increase will support and protect the legal freedom to kill unborn children. Within bounds, questions of the proper level of taxation are essentially prudential in nature.  That is not to say that they are unimportant.  Nor is it to claim that questions of basic liberty and justice are never implicated in tax policy.  But there is no more central or critical moral-political principle than the principle of the profound, inherent, and equal dignity of each and every member of the human family, and, corresponding to that principle, the right of every human being---irrespective of age, size, location, stage of development or condition of dependency---to the basic protection of the laws. That is a principle and a right that Republicans and Democrats alike should honor, however much they may (reasonably and responsibly) disagree on questions of taxation, economic and environmental policy, how best to fight poverty and promote upward social mobility, and prudential questions of every description.  (Again, this is not to suggest that prudential questions are unimportant or do not often implicate issues of basic liberty and justice.)  Now, someone might ask:  "Why condemn a few Republicans when the vast majority of Democrats have thoroughly embraced the abortion license and will defend it politically at almost any cost?"  Well, yes.  As an ex-Democrat, I'm appalled that the party to which I once gave my allegiance has thrown itself into the abortion abyss.  When I was growing up in West Virginia, for me and my family, the Democratic Party was the "protector of the little guy."  Alas, that was a long time ago, and a very different Democratic Party.  But now that I'm a member of the other party, I'll leave it to my pro-life friends who've stayed in the Democratic Party to fight to turn around that enormous ocean liner.  I wish them the very best.  For my part, I want to make sure that the Republican Party beomes ever more fully and firmly the protector of (what the late Henry Hyde called) "the littlest guy of all."

Scholarly Impact and Catholic Legal Education (Part Two)

Yesterday, I began a three-part series of posts on why scholarly work of the highest quality and national scholarly impact by faculty are especially important to Catholic legal education.

The first point, which I made in yesterday’s post, is that a meaningfully Catholic law school must be an intellectually engaged law school.  Intellectual excitement and depth cannot be sustained without a faculty also engaged in the quintessential intellectual activity of scholarly research and writing. 

My second point goes not only to Catholic legal education, but Catholic higher education in general:  Through our scholarly excellence and prominence, we witness to society the vibrancy of intellectual discourse by persons of faith.

Throughout American history -- and with increasing tendency today –- persons of devout religious faith have often been discounted in academic and other elite cultural circles, sometimes regarded as intellectually inferior.  As but one pertinent example, those who study reputational-based rankings of law schools (such as the U.S. News ranking which gives considerable weight to reputational surveys) have observed a “religious law school discount.”  A law school that is religiously affiliated is likely to be downgraded an ordinal ranking level or more -– due to poorer survey scoring by academic peers -- when compared to otherwise equivalent law schools on objective measures such as student profile, employment statistics, faculty scholarly impact, etc.  The strongest counterpoint to this "religious law school discount" is to prove the falsity of the anti-intellectual stereotype by encouraging our colleagues to perform even better than scholars at our peer institutions without a religious affiliation.

If Catholic legal education (or Catholic education in general) is to be acknowledged as intellectually fit, then faculty at Catholic institutions must be intellectually engaged.  By sharing our legal scholarship with others, and (hopefully) receiving deserved accolades for our work, we thereby enhance the intellectual reputation of Catholic legal education.

A half century ago, Monsignor Tracy Ellis provoked Catholic higher education through a speech and monograph titled, “American Catholics and the Intellectual Life.”  Monsignor Ellis indicted Catholic colleges for failing to build a strong scholarly culture, leading to the disrepute of Catholic higher education.

My recently departed law school Dean Tom Mengler -- departed, that is, to become President at St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, not that other kind of departure -- wrote thoughtfully about Monsignor Ellis in a piece published two years ago in the Journal of Catholic Social Thought titled “Why Should a Catholic Law School Be Catholic?” (here)

Monsignor Ellis blasted away at the anti-intellectualism of the American Catholic and the mediocrity –- especially the scholarly mediocrity –- of American Catholic colleges and universities. Ellis wrote that the lack of an intellectual and scholarly tradition within Catholic higher education [was] a kind of self-imposed ghetto mentality* * *.  [In the early twentieth century, Catholic colleges] emphasize[d] what Ellis called a narrow vocationalism and anti-intellectualism.

* * * By all accounts, Ellis’s tiny book had enormous impact on Catholic higher education. Just a few years after Ellis‟s book was published, Father John Cavanaugh, formerly Notre Dame’s president, credited Monsignor Ellis with upgrading scholarship at Catholic universities across the country.  At most of the major Catholic universities – throughout their academic departments, including within the law schools – scholarship suddenly became a more important focus.

We are the heirs of Monsignor Ellis’s intellectual legacy.  And the need for a vibrant scholarly culture in Catholic higher education remains as compelling.  As I’ll turn to with the third point later this week, the additional challenge today is to ensure that our scholarly excellence includes a critical mass of distinctly Catholic or Catholic-inspired work to influence the larger society for the good.