Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

The 'now that's real religious persecution' argument

Here's an argument that I have seen repeatedly and that I have some trouble understanding.  It goes something like this: currently in the United States, one is hearing lots of nattering and complaining from various quarters that religious liberty is threatened.  But if you look at other parts of the world, that's where you will really see grave threats to religious liberty -- people's churches being burned to the ground, people facing prison time for speaking their mind about religion, people being beaten and compelled to sign statements renouncing their religious beliefs, and many other horrors.  That's "what a real war on religion looks like," in the words of the latest exponent of this style of argument, Amy Sullivan, in this TNR column, which references something that John Allen wrote. 

The people making this kind of argument might be saying that those who champion religious liberty ought to be focusing on very grave threats to it.  That is undeniably true.  It is extremely important that we all do so, exactly because those sorts of threats are often far away and therefore less immediate for us.  But they might also be saying that the best measure of the condition of religious liberty in the United States is by comparison with its worst violations abroad.  We shouldn't worry about religious liberty here, because after all, look at how bad things are out there. 

If that is the claim, it strikes me as unpersuasive.

ADDENDUM: A commenter points out that nobody would make similar sorts of comparative claims about other areas of the law where the legal protection abroad is substantially less than in the US.  This is an interesting point.  It might be that religious liberty is susceptible of this sort of comparative claim in the United States for a variety of reasons.  Possibilities: (1) the belief that claims of threats of religious liberty are being asserted in a partisan or selfish or unfair way (it is much less common to hear this claim made about, e.g., the 4th Amendment); or (2) the (growing?) belief that religious liberty -- unlike, say, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government -- is not (or is no longer) as independently powerful a right as other fundamental rights.

"Schools that Work": The Cristo Rey schools

A nice piece, by Samuel Casey Carter, on the Cristo Rey schools.  A bit:

Cristo Rey has done at least three things most urban schools fail to do: It operates on a financially sustainable business model; it educates to a high standard students whom the public-school system has left behind; and it encourages its students to develop real-world skills that will help them succeed in college and then on the job after they graduate.

Remembering the Blessed Teresian Martyrs of Compiègne

On July 17, 1794, the 16 Blessed Teresian Martyrs of Compiegne were guillotined by the Committee of Public Safety for various crimes against the French Revolution and its "Civil Constitution of the Clergy." 

  

UPDATE:  Thanks to a correspondent, here's a link to a powerful bit from the Finale of Poulenc's opera, Dialogues of the Carmelites. 

More on the "I Do" Divide: A short response to Eric Bugyis

Eric Bugyis has a post, here, that, in my view, reflects a misunderstanding of what I wrote, and intended, in my recent post, "Marriage, Class, Opportunities, and Outcomes."  He writes:

[I]f one reads past the headline, the picture becomes significantly more complex, and Garnett’s takeaway: “It’s not just that marriage might be ‘confined’ to the fortunate classes; it’s also, it seems, that mobility into those classes (or not) is connected to the decisions that people make — and that people’s parents make — about marriage and childrearing,” becomes less tenable (to the extent that it is not meant to be trivial).

I did, of course, "read the past the headline" and appreciate that the "picture" is "complex", and I am confident that my short reaction is both tenable and nontrivial.  Bugyis seems to have assumed quickly that I was offering a "values-oriented" interpretation of the stories described in the piece, perhaps in an exercise of "sanctimonious" or "self-congratulatory affirmation."  While I admit to thinking that "values" are implicated in the choices people make about marriage and child-rearing, I think his assumption here is unfair and uncharitable, and, in any event, unfounded.

My point -- which I certainly didn't hold out as the only "takeaway" from DeParle's piece and which I don't think was too hard to get -- was that (we know that) it is a good thing for children to be raised in intact, two-parent families, and therefore (here's the relevance of the "Dan Quayle" reference) it is not a good thing for us to celebrate the kids-without-marriage choices of celebrities and others who are able, by virtue of their economic advantages, to protect themselves and their children from the consequences that often attend, for those who lack such advantages, those choices.  (To say this is not to imagine that educational and economic opportunities and situations do not put some people in a better position to make the better -- i.e., better-results-yielding -- choices instead of the worse -- i.e., worse-outcomes-yielding -- ones.)   I would not have thought that this was more an empirical claim -- coupled with a critique of the more fortunate sector to which, I admit, I belong -- than a "sanctimonious" or "self-congratulatory" point.

Cardinal Newman: To believe in a Church is to believe in the Pope

"I say the Pope is the heir of the Ecumenical Hierarchy of the fourth century, as being, what I may call, heir by default. No one else claims or exercises its rights or its duties. Is it possible to consider the Patriarch of Moscow or of Constantinople, heir to the historical pretensions of St. Ambrose or St. Martin? Does any Anglican Bishop for the last 300 years recall to our minds the image of St. Basil? Well, then, has all that ecclesiastical power, which makes such a show in the Christian Empire, simply vanished, or, if not, where is it to be found? 
I wish Protestants would throw themselves into our minds upon this point; I am not holding an argument with them; I am only wishing them to understand where we stand and how we look at things. There is this great difference of belief between us and them: they do not believe that Christ set up a visible society, or rather kingdom, for the propagation and maintenance of His religion, for a necessary home and a refuge for His people; but we do. 
We know the kingdom is still on earth: where is it? If all that can be found of it is what can be discerned at Constantinople or Canterbury, I say, it has disappeared; and either there was a radical corruption of Christianity from the first, or Christianity came to an end, in proportion as the type of the Nicene Church faded out of the world: for all that we know of Christianity, in ancient history, as a concrete fact, is the Church of Athanasius and his fellow Bishops: it is nothing else historically but that bundle of phenomena, that combination of claims, prerogatives, and corresponding acts, some of which I have recounted above. There is no help for it then; we cannot take as much as we please, and no more, of an institution which has a monadic existence. We must either give up the belief in the Church as a divine institution altogether, or we must recognize it at this day in that communion of which the Pope is the head. With him alone and round about him are found the claims, the prerogatives, and duties which we identify with the kingdom set up by Christ. We must take things as they are; to believe in a Church, is to believe in the Pope. 
And thus this belief in the Pope and his attributes, which seems so monstrous to Protestants, is bound up with our being Catholics at all; as our Catholicism is bound up with our Christianity. There is nothing then of wanton opposition to the powers that be, no dinning of novelties in their startled ears in what is often unjustly called Ultramontane doctrine; there is no pernicious servility to the Pope in our admission of his pretensions."
           Bl. John Henry Newman 
           Letter to the Duke of Norfolk 
           1875

Ross Douthout on Liberal Christianity: You'd Think the New York Times Could Do Better

On July 14, Ross Douthout wrote a column in the New York Times about “the collapse of liberal Christianity.” In particular, he focused on the Episcopalian Church which he claimed had followed retired Bishop John Shelby Spong in adopting every liberal idea ever promulgated by a liberal theologian. Spong famously denied the existence of miracles in general and the physical Resurrection of Jesus in particular. He denied the existence of a traditional God and the coherence of praying to an imaginary God who cares about what happens in the world. Douthout blames the decline in Episcopalian membership and the decline in liberal Christianity on the acceptance of liberal beliefs. He sees little difference between liberal Christianity and secular liberalism.

There is a lot that is wrong with this picture. First, there is no reason to believe that the leaders of the Episcopal Church are as theologically liberal as Spong. Indeed, Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, has stated that Spong’s core theological beliefs “represent a level of confusion and misinterpretation that I find astonishing” (although Williams’ own views are more nuanced than those typically understood by parishioners). See here. I can find no evidence that the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, Katharine Jefferts Schori shares Spong’s theology. In reading some of her sermons, it is clear to me that she has a quite different conception of Divine caring and human prayer. See here. I am fortified by a post by Matthew L. Skinner (an Associate Professor of the New Testament at the Luther Seminary in St. Paul) on Taryn Mattice’s Facebook page that says, “Ross Douthat is starting to drive me crazy with his consistent sloppiness as a commentator on the American religious scene. It's easy to make fun of Spong, but to strongly associate him with the recent actions of the Episcopal Church USA is... just stupid.”

Douthout’s suggestion that the decline in liberal Christianity is caused by its liberalism is marred by the triumphalist implication that the Pope of his Roman Catholicism has been wise to steer the conservative course. Douthout does not discuss the staggering exodus of Anglo-Catholics from the Catholic Church. According to Putnam and Campbell in American Grace, the decline of Anglo-Catholics in Roman Catholicism is about the same as that experienced in mainline Protestantism (this decline is significantly disguised by Latin American immigration). They say that the second largest religious group in the United States is composed of those who have left the Catholic Church. And consider those who are left behind. They are notoriously polarized. But the majority of Roman Catholics seem to reject the authority of the leadership. The majority of Catholics in the pews reject most of the stubbornly conservative teachings of the Pope and the Bishops. They stay in the Church despite these teachings, not because of them (others, of course, stay because of them). Perhaps it is just me, but I think the crisis of authority within the Catholic Church is far more serious than the turmoil in the Episcopalian Church.

Diana Butler Bass maintains (see here thanks to Taryn Mattice for the link) that what is really going on is a loss of faith in all forms of institutional religion. I think the real story is quite complicated. Some leave churches because they are too liberal and some because they are too conservative; some leave because there has been change regardless of left/right tilt; some leave because of institutional stodginess, corruption, or beaurocracy.  And many stay. The sociology of religion defies simplicity and does not lend itself to the partisan posturing of Roth Douthout.

Most galling to me of all the Douthout claims is the assertion that the Episcopal Church (and liberal Christianity) offers little not afforded by secular liberalism. I wonder if anyone could walk into a Episcopal Church on a Sunday morning and mistake it for a secular gathering. Does Douthout really think that the sacramental life of a church is a meaningless charade? In this connection, consider Rowan Williams in response to Spong again, "I have never quite managed to see how we can make sense of the sacramental life of the Church without a theology of the risen body; and I have never managed to see how to put together such a theology without belief in the empty tomb. If a corpse clearly marked ‘Jesus of Nazareth’ turned up, I should save myself a lot of trouble and become a Quaker."

Does Douthout think that the faith experience and commitments of a congregational community are secular? Yes, there are secular aspects. But Douthout’s glib dismissal in comparing liberal Christianity and secular liberalism is journalistic malpractice.

Monday, July 16, 2012

Marriage, class, opportunity, and outcomes

This New York Times piece, by Jason DeParle, called "Two Classes in America, Divided by 'I Do,'" strikes me not only as a must-read, but as a must-engage and must-take-to-heart.  It's not a new observation, i.e., that the less-traditional "lifestyle" choices that are increasingly available when it comes to cohabitation, single parenting, divorce, etc., tend to have worse results for poor people than for the better-off.  A bit:

[S]triking changes in family structure have also broadened income gaps and posed new barriers to upward mobility. College-educated Americans like the Faulkners are increasingly likely to marry one another, compounding their growing advantages in pay. Less-educated women like Ms. Schairer, who left college without finishing her degree, are growing less likely to marry at all, raising children on pinched paychecks that come in ones, not twos.       

Estimates vary widely, but scholars have said that changes in marriage patterns — as opposed to changes in individual earnings — may account for as much as 40 percent of the growth in certain measures of inequality. Long a nation of economic extremes, the United States is also becoming a society of family haves and family have-nots, with marriage and its rewards evermore confined to the fortunate classes. . . .

It's not just that marriage might be "confined" to the fortunate classes; it's also, it seems, that mobility into those classes (or not) is connected to the decisions that people make -- and that people's parents make -- about marriage and childrearing.  The supermarket glossies coo about this or that celebrity having a baby outside of marriage, but "a large body of research shows that [children of single parents] are more likely than similar children with married parents to experience childhood poverty, act up in class, become teenage parents and drop out of school."

Maybe the piece should be called "Dan Quayle was right"?  In any event, for the lawyers (and everyone else!):  Can can law do, if anything, about the challenges identified in the piece?

UPDATE:  An interesting reaction to the DeParle piece, here, at Get Religion.

Friday, July 13, 2012

Wisconsin Supreme Court Plurality Dismisses Breach of Contract Claim Under the Ministerial Exception

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has dismissed a breach of contract claim against St. Patrick Congregation, a Roman Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Wisconsin.  The reasoning is...complicated.

The plaintiff had entered into a one-year contract with the Church as "Director of Faith Formation," and the terms of the contract provided that dismissal was to occur only for "good cause" as determined by the Church.  It was undisputed that the plaintiff was a "ministerial employee," but the plaintiff sued for her expectation damages (that is, she had already been paid for services rendered) when the Church terminated her.

The Church did not defend on the issue of whether the termination was for good cause.  It instead moved to dismiss under the First Amendment and Article I section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution (“The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; ... nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted....”), on the basis that the plaintiff was a ministerial employee and that the Church is a religious institution.

The case was dismissed but the rationale is kind of a mess.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has 7 members.  3 Justices would have decided the case under the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions, relying on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC and the ministerial exception: "any inquiry into the validity of a religious institution's reasons for the firing of a ministerial employee will involve consideration of ecclesiastical decision-making."  Note that this reasoning extends the holding of Hosanna-Tabor, which expressly reserved the issue whether contractual or tort claims were covered by the ministerial exception ("We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.").  My own view, for what it's worth, is that the language in this opinion is too absolute and not context-specific enough.  This contract was for a very limited term.  The plaintiff was seeking expectation damages -- and we are not even told how much.  More inquiry would have been warranted, as the situation was factually different than Hosanna-Tabor.

1 Justice concurred, but would have avoided the constitutional questions altogether.  He would have decided the case on the terms of the contract, which vested sole authority in the Church to decide what constituted good cause.

1 Justice concurred, observing that Hosanna-Tabor was not directly on point but that its dicta (and similar lanaguage in a Wisconsin case) "put Wisconsin courts on high alert when they are asked to enforce a contract by a religious organization in a manner that the religious organization contends is a violation of its constitutional rights."  But ultimately he would have relied on the contractual language to resolve the dispute in the Church's favor.

2 Justices dissented, arguing that Hosanna-Tabor was inapplicable to a breach of contract case like this one.   The plaintiff's common law contract claims "do not implicate free exercise concerns," the dissent wrote.  State regulation of hiring and firing is a different issue than the resolution of a private contractual term (this distinction seems tenuous to me: wouldn't a court be "regulating" or "mandating" by resolving this dispute?).  And as for the Establishment Clause and the issue of excessive entanglement, the dissent pointed out that we simply don't know the extent to which a court would need to entangle itself with the Church's affairs to resolve this breach of contract case, because the case is only at the dismissal stage.  Excessive entanglement concerns are "speculative" at this point.  Here, I think the dissent makes an entirely reasonable point: dismissal of a breach of contract claim without any inquiry at all is a sweepingly context-insensitive approach, in my view.

The case is DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 2012 WL 2849271 (Wis. July 12, 2012).

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Oaths

 

Lawyers and most laity are familiar with oaths. Lawyers take them upon admittance to the bar and the practice of law. Those of us who have served in the military of the United States have sworn by them because or actions would be done in the solemn execution of the duties entrusted to us. For those who have served in certain other public offices, an oath is taken reminding the office holder of his or her duties to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in accordance with it. The President of the United States takes an oath of office as do Federal judges and Members of Congress. Upon my being hired by a federal regulatory agency in 1974, I had to declare in front of a public officer an oath of similar consequence. When a citizen is called as a witness in a judicial proceeding, he or she must first declare an oath swearing the evidence given shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—and in some jurisdictions complemented with the phrase “so help me God!” These oaths are a part of our lives when we consciously and mostly freely elect to do something where the oath is an integral element of the action pursued.

In virtually all of these circumstances, the objective of the oath is to serve as a reminder that the declarant has assumed a responsibility by assuming the office or activity which he or she is about to undertake in furtherance of others and often the common good. The solemnity surrounding the brief but vital moment in which the oath is taken is a powerful reminder to the declarant that he or she is doing something voluntarily in the exercise of freedom. In the religious context, those of us who are called to religious life in the men’s and women’s institutes of consecrated and religious life offer a kind of oath when we make our profession of vows—be them simple or solemn. These vows remind the vowvant of the responsibilities of the Evangelical Counsels which we embrace because we choose to accept them. Prior to a man’s ordination into the diaconate he must make two kinds of oaths—the first being the Proclamation of Faith and the second being the Oath of Fidelity, both mandated by the Church’s law. In a way, at Sunday and other certain Masses that require it, we as the faithful of the Church make an oath declaring in what we believe when we pray: “Credo in unum Deum… etc.”

Of course, oaths can be manipulated by those who may have clandestine motives. I am working on a research paper now that largely involves statutory construction of the legislation used in the indictment and trials of Sir Thomas More and John Cardinal Fisher. As one reads the underlying legislation dealing with the Act of Succession and pertinent statutes that followed, the oaths were required of everyone to compel office holders and subjects alike to comply with the will of King Henry VIII. These oaths were not exercises of free will; rather, they were mandated by the state to demand full compliance with legally questionable legislation that compromised the legitimate and natural rights of persons.

Recently, some voices in the world of matters Catholic have raised concerns about some of the faithful being required to take oaths if they are performing or are to perform some function or exercise some office in the name of the Catholic Church. For example, Fr. John Coleman, S.J. movingly presents his concerns about oaths mandated by the Oakland, CA diocese for those persons who are members of the Catholic Association for Gay and Lesbian Ministry and are or would like to be engaged in works in this diocese. [HERE] In his discussion of this oath, Fr. Coleman reminds his readers of the circumstances surrounding the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee in the early 1950s and the famous question posed to those brought before the Congress: are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? The Washington Post has also published a recent article presenting the concerns of some CCD teachers in the Arlington, VA diocese who are resigning their teaching posts rather than take the oath that they are being asked to make as teachers entrusted with the religious instruction of youth. [HERE] There is much sympathy surfacing for those who refuse to take these kinds of oaths. But should there be?

Unlike the historical circumstances mentioned in concerns registered by Fr. Coleman and the Post article, the oaths being complained about in the two dioceses (and others around the country) are being mandated for people who are pursuing or will pursue some kind of apostolic service in the name of the Church. If a person is elected to public office, he or she must expect to take an oath that makes a statement of record of one’s fidelity to the office and the sovereign. If one is serving the country in military or civil service, he or she must expect to take an oath that again demonstrates fidelity to the life of service to which one is responding. It logically follows that if one voluntarily elects to serve the Church in some public ministry or apostolic service, one might reasonably be expected to declare his or her fidelity to the teachings of the Church that he or she is about to serve or is serving. Prior to my diaconal ordination, I did. And when I was proposed as an Ordinary Professor of and Ecclesiastical Faculty, I had to do the same again. It needs to be clear that these oaths about which Catholics are now raising concerns and objections are not being imposed on the unwilling; rather, they are being required of those who have offered themselves to serve the Church and to uphold with fidelity what the Church teaches.

I agree with Fr. Coleman and those who contributed to the Post article that oaths are important matters and not to be taken lightly. But I also recognize that they are an expected part of ways of life and service that we as Catholics and as Americans are accustomed to proclaiming when we decide to serve the common good in some fashion that mandates fidelity—be it to the Constitution or to the Church. When we make this fee election to serve, we also need to recall that our commitment to serve must be done in good faith, and our offering a proclamation of this commitment in the making of an oath is not an unreasonable requirement that serves as a testament of our commitment. As Robert Bolt’s Thomas More reminds us, when a person takes an oath, he holds his own self, the essence of his being, in his hands; but if the person opens his hands “he needn’t hope to find himself again.” More concludes by stating that some people aren’t capable of this, yet he “loathes to think” that he would be such a person. Taking an oath is important and one enters the taking of the oath conscious of what it implies. But there is a preliminary matter that must be first acknowledged: does the person want to do something, does the person freely choose to pursue a path that will inevitably require an oath? If so, then this individual should not quarrel with the oath that will follow the path he or she has chosen in the exercise of liberty.

 

RJA sj

 

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

What is the Place and Impact of Justification?

As Rick has kindly noted, Steve Smith has posted several interesting thoughts about religious liberty over at CLR Forum.  One issue that we are considering together is the question of whether the special constitutional protection for religious liberty can be justified today, and what that justification might be.  Steve has lots of important and thoughtful writing on this question.  But there is a specific question I wanted to put to MOJ readers and writers.  Please forgive the wind-up.

Steve notes Doug Laycock's excellent recent piece titled, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion.  In that article, Doug (as Steve explains) describes important sources of resistance to religious liberty as coming from the gay rights movement as well as increasing numbers of non-believers.  Because religious people are often seen as the enemy by these groups, religious liberty is also seen as something to be opposed.  Steve points out that the perception by Doug Laycock that religious liberty is under threat ought to carry weight for those who might otherwise be skeptical about similar claims made by other folks.

But my question actually has to do with a somewhat different issue.  Steve says that the sorts of real problems described by Doug are an indication that devising new, contemporary justifications for religious liberty is not merely an academic exercise, but that it is made urgent by the very real problems we face today.  I've got a little comment to Steve's post wondering about this.  Is it true that what is needed are new justifications for religious liberty -- new philosophical defenses, updated for the problems and opinions of today?  If the aim is to persuade those who disagree deep, deep down about all sorts of fundamental questions that religious liberty actually is important, is a new theoretical justification what is required?  Or are the fundamental disagreements that we have at bottom matters of intuition, identity, group loyalty, and emotion, and therefore often largely impervious to and unconcerned with the type of high-conceptual discourse that is so central to the academic enterprise?  Or is it something in between, or perhaps different altogether?  Again, if the issue is persuasion, what is the most effective method of achieving it?   

UPDATE: Paul Horwitz has some interesting things to say here