Bacon's "Of Judicature"

Here's a wonderful passage by Francis Bacon from his neat essay, "Of Judicature," which on the surface purports to take some swipes at the Catholic Church, but appears to me to be much more about the role and character of judging.

Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.  Else will it be like the authority claimed by the church of Rome, which under pretext of exposition of Scripture doth not stick to add and alter; and to pronounce that which they do not find; and by shew of antiquity to introduce novelty.  Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident.  Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue.  Cursed (saith the law) is he that removeth the landmark.  The mislayer of a mere-stone is to blame.  But it is the unjust judge that is the capital remover of landmarks, when he defineth amiss of lands and property.  One foul sentence doth more hurt than many foul examples.  For these do but corrupt the stream, the other corrupteth the fountain.  So saith Solomon, Fons turbatus, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens in causa sua coram adversario [MOD rough translation: "A righteous man falling down before the wicked is as a troubled fountain or a corrupted spring."]  The office of judges may have reference unto the parties that sue, unto the advocates that plead, unto the clerks and ministers of justice underneath them, and to the sovereign or state above them . . . .

[F]or that which may concern the sovereign and estate.  Judges ought above all to remember the conclusion of the Roman Twelve Tables; Salus populi suprema lex ["The supreme law is the health of the people."]; and to know that laws, except they be in order to that end, are but things captious, and oracles not well inspired.  Therefore it is an happy thing in a state when kings and states do often consult with judges; and again when judges do often consult with the king and state: the one, when there is matter of law intervenient in business of state; the other, when there is some consideration of state intervenient in matter of law . . . . Let judges also remember, that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne; being circumspect that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.  Let not judges also be so ignorant of their own right, as to think there is not left to them, as a principal part of their office, a wise use and application of the laws.  For they may remember what the apostle saith of a greater law than theirs; Nos scimus quia lex bona est, modo quis ea utatur legitime ["We know that the law is good, provided that it is used lawfully."]