Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, April 6, 2012

Clive Bell on Impressionism's Paganism

The New Republic will from time to time reprint old essays on various subjects.  Here is a 1923 piece by the formalist art critic Clive Bell, whose ideas about the nature of aesthetic experience have always seemed to me nearly universally wrong.  That notwithstanding, I found his discussion in this piece of the connection between impressionism and paganism to be illuminating — one of the most concise explanations for why I have always disliked impressionism with such great intensity.  A bit:

The cultivated rich seem at last to have discovered in the impressionists what the impressionists themselves rediscovered half by accident. They rediscovered paganism—real paganism I mean—something real enough to be the inspiration and content of supreme works of art. Paganism, I take it, is the acceptance of life as something good and satisfying in itself. To enjoy life the pagan need not make himself believe that it is a means to something else—to a better life in another world for instance, or a juster organization of society, or complete self-development: he does not regard it as a brief span or portion in which to do something for his own soul, or for his fellow creatures, or for the future. He takes the world as it is and enjoys to the utmost what he finds in it: also, he is no disconsolate archaeologist spending his own age thinking how much more happily he could have lived in another and what a pagan he would have been on the banks of the Ilissus. No, paganism does not consist in a proper respect for the pagan past, but in a passionate enjoyment of the present; and Poussin, though he painted bacchanals galore, would have been quite out of place in the world of Theocritus. Your true pagan neither regrets nor idealizes: and while Swinburne was yearning nostalgicly for “the breasts of the nymph in the brake,” Renoir was finding inspiration for a glorious work of art in the petticoats of the shop-girls at the Moulin de la Galette.

Thursday, April 5, 2012

Lynn Trial Concludes a Second Week

Philadelphia's trial of Msgr. William Lynn and Fr. James Brennan has continued this week. Two more jurors were released for unknown reasons. However, the court, presumably anticipating such occurrences, had several alternate jurors available.

The case is unlike many other child sexual abuse cases in that many internal documents are being presented which are disturbing. The prosecution is using this evidence to establish that Msgr. Lynn conspired to endanger the welfare of children. They assert that he was made aware of sexual crimes of priests and then he either failed to act or acted by reassigning these priests in a way that put children at risk. The defense continues to argue that such documentation illustrates an effort by Lynn to do something to respond to the problem, but his effort was thwarted by deceased Cardinal Bevilacqua. The case is still in the government's case in chief, so which side is successfully utilizing these documents is yet to be determined. Guilt of Msgr. Lynn and his codefendant aside, there is a larger picture being painted by the documents. The documents are beginning to paint a disturbing picture of the institutional response by the Archdiocese. Several documents presented suggest a paramount concern and priority of liability issues, a deception of parishioners, and a response which fails to put the protection of children first, if at all. Such was also portrayed in the 2011 grand jury report as well as the 400 page 2005 grand jury report.

The case, however, in other ways is like many other child abuse cases. Jurors heard from victims this week. The victims told of the abuse, the fear of reporting, and then the less than compassionate response from church officials when they did disclose. Similarly, one victim testified of experiencing the well documented effects of sexual abuse: going from a straight A student to one with problems. The victim's credibility was challenged because of some troubled events in his life. This reflects a common scenario in such sex abuse cases. If the allegations are true, victims experience an ironic second victimization. The initial victimization of child sexual assault can have devastating effects on the victims' lives, increasing their risk of depression, substance abuse, eating disorders, and other conditions. Then, in an ironic twist, often when the children have enough courage to disclose the abuse in a court, defendants tell the fact finder to not believe them because the witness has had such a troubled life. Essentially, the defendants cite the reason he targeted the victim or the after effects of this trauma as the very reason to disbelieve the victim. Whether such is the case here, or the accuser indeed is not credible, has yet to be determined. This week's testimony, however, reminds us that while some of the legal issues in the case are unique to it, the personal and tragic story of child sexual abuse is not.

Coverage of the case is international. It has also been slanted in some areas. With these updates I have tried to pull from different sources. Below are some sources including Sunday's New York Times editorial which illustrate some of what I have discussed. The case will resume next week.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/opinion/a-monsignor-goes-on-trial.html

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/120201744.html?c=r

http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/29/2721290/woman-helpless-trapped-at-rectory.html#storylink=mirelated

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/priests-accuser-to-return-to-the-stand-in-clergy-abuse-trial-under-way-in-philadelphia/2012/04/05/gIQAHQfFxS_story.html

 

Second Week of Lynn Trial Comes to a Close

Philadelphia's trial of Msgr. William Lynn and Fr. James Brennan has continued this week. Two more jurors were released for unknown reasons. However, the court, presumably anticipating such occurrences, had several alternate jurors available.

The case is unlike many other child sexual abuse cases in that many internal documents are being presented which are disturbing. The prosecution is using this evidence to establish that Msgr. Lynn conspired to endanger the welfare of children. They assert that he was made aware of sexual crimes of priests and then he either failed to act or acted by reassigning these priests in a way that put children at risk. The defense continues to argue that such documentation illustrates an effort by Lynn to do something to respond to the problem, but his effort was thwarted by deceased Cardinal Bevilacqua. The case is still in the government's case in chief, so which side is successfully utilizing these documents is yet to be determined. Guilt of Msgr. Lynn and his codefendant aside, there is a larger picture being painted by the documents. The documents are beginning to paint a disturbing picture of the institutional response by the Archdiocese. Several documents presented suggest a paramount concern and priority of liability issues, a deception of parishioners, and a response which fails to put the protection of children first, if at all. Such was also portrayed in the 2011 grand jury report as well as the 400 page 2005 grand jury report.

The case, however, in other ways is like many other child abuse cases. Jurors heard from victims this week. The victims told of the abuse, the fear of reporting, and then the less than compassionate response from church officials when they did disclose. Similarly, one victim testified of experiencing the well documented effects of sexual abuse: going from a straight A student to one with problems. The victim's credibility was challenged because of some troubled events in his life. This reflects a common scenario in such sex abuse cases. If the allegations are true, victims experience an ironic second victimization. The initial victimization of child sexual assault can have devastating effects on the victims' lives, increasing their risk of depression, substance abuse, eating disorders, and other conditions. Then, in an ironic twist, often when the children have enough courage to disclose the abuse in a court, defendants tell the fact finder to not believe them because the witness has had such a troubled life. Essentially, the defendants cite the reason he targeted the victim or the after effects of this trauma as the very reason to disbelieve the victim. Whether such is the case here, or the accuser indeed is not credible, has yet to be determined. This week's testimony, however, reminds us that while some of the legal issues in the case are unique to it, the personal and tragic story of child sexual abuse is not.

Coverage of the case is international. It has also been slanted in some areas. With these updates I have tried to pull from different sources. Below are some sources including Sunday's New York Times editorial which illustrate some of what I have discussed. The case will resume next week.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/opinion/a-monsignor-goes-on-trial.html

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/120201744.html?c=r

http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/29/2721290/woman-helpless-trapped-at-rectory.html#storylink=mirelated

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/priests-accuser-to-return-to-the-stand-in-clergy-abuse-trial-under-way-in-philadelphia/2012/04/05/gIQAHQfFxS_story.html

 

A student's thoughts on subsidiarity

I've asked students in my "Catholic Social Thought and the Law" seminar to share their thoughts through (among other things) blog-posts.  I posted one such post a few days ago.  Here's another: 

Our recent discussion in class regarding subsidiarity resulted in my attempting to diagram the concept, with my final effort appearing at the top of this blog post.  Let me (attempt) an explanation, at least insofar as I understand it.  First, the axes: The horizontal axis indicates the source of organizational governance; moving from left to right we move from predominately privately-controlled organizations, such as Bowling Leagues or the Church, through intermediate organizations, such as small business, fraternal organizations (such as the VFW) to multinational corporations, which are all subject to varying degrees of both private and public governance.  At the extreme right is the government – the ultimate source of “public” control insofar as it regulates society and is, in turn, regulated by society. The vertical axis is a rough approximation for the scale of a group: small groups (Bowling Leagues) sit slightly above the individual level, while large groups span the entire distance, denoting the individual components, and the individual effects the large group has on a person, as well as the collective impact upon society. Note that within larger groups are shaded boxes—my attempt to denote hierarchical elements (in the case of the Church) or management structure (corporations or businesses).

Generally, groups exist within the “mediating soup” constituting society; they represent the methods by which individual citizens interact socially, politically, economically, and spiritually with one another. There are two exceptions to this rule, according to my illustration: First, the State, owing to its exclusive lock on the legitimate use of coercive power, is both a part of and distinct from society in general. At the same time, no citizen may legitimately escape the power of the State—as illustrated by the “Into the Wild” stick figure, a reference to the book and movie of the same name (in which the protagonist essentially tries to escape the bonds of humanity, only to realize [spoiler alert!] at the very end that humans are truly, unavoidably social beings). He is outside of society, but is not outside the power of the State, at least as a theoretical matter. Note also that the State is ultimately limited (unlike the Church, discussed below) in its power to only regulating society (in its broadest sense – the “here and now,” physical existence of humans).

The second exception is the Church, which is literally within and “above” society – a reference to its focus on Salvation in addition to building God’s Kingdom on earth.   Jacques Maritain’s “Man and the State” references a similar concept in the context of Religious Freedom: “While being in the body politic—in every body politic—through a given number of her members and her institutions, the Church as such . . . is not a part but a whole; she is an absolutely universal realm . . . above the body politic and every body politic.”  This is precisely the image of the Church I have sought to convey, with more or less success. It comports nicely with the idea of subsidiarity, in that it leaves room for individual, small group and other hierarchical elements to exist, while denoting the special characteristics inherent in the Church.

Subsidiarity picture
This image represents a sort of ‘snapshot’ of society at a point in time. If we added a time element, the shapes would shift and move amoebically according to social trends—for example, the “quasi-governmental organization” arm might reach out and overlap with the Social Services of the Church (one need only think of the current controversy regarding conscience clauses in healthcare service provision). 

"Confusion about Discrimination"

I have a short essay, here, at Public Discourse, about the application of Vanderbilt's "nondiscrimination" policy, and about discrimination -- and when and why it is, and is not, wrong -- called "Confusion about Discrimination."  A bit:

. . . We believe that “discrimination” is wrong. And, because “discrimination” is wrong, we believe that governments such as ours—secular, liberal, constitutional governments—should take steps to prevent, discourage, and denounce it. We are right to believe these things. The proposition that it is not only true, but “self-evidently” true, that all human persons are “created equal” is foundational for us. The principle of equal citizenship holds near-universal appeal, even though we often disagree about that principle’s particular applications.

At the same time, it is not true that “discrimination” is always or necessarily wrong. Nor is it the case that governments always or necessarily should or may regulate or discourage it—say, through its expression and spending—even when it is wrong. “Discrimination,” after all, is just another word for decision-making, for choosing and acting in accord with or with reference to particular criteria. We do and should “discriminate”—we draw lines, identify limits, make judgments, act on the basis of preferences—all the time. As Alexander has put it, “All of us well-socialized Westerners know that discrimination against other human beings is wrong. Yet we also realize, if we think about it at all, that we discriminate against others routinely and inevitably.” The practice is ubiquitous and unremarkable: We don’t blame someone for drinking Brunello rather than Boone’s Farm or for preferring The French Laundry to Arby’s.

It is an obvious point, but still worth making: It is not “discrimination” that is wrong; instead, it is wrongful discrimination that is wrong. . . .

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

A Plethora of MOJ'ers on the HHS Mandate

In a "special edition" of the Murphy Institute's Hot Topics:  Cool Talk series, we assembled a Gold Star panel of not just one (Tom Berg), not just two (Susan Stabile), not just three (Rob Vischer), but four (me, if you count my brief words of welcome) MOJ'ers to offer reflections on the question:  "Does Government-Mandated Contraception Coverage Violate Religious Freedom?"  As an added bonus, we included one of our adjunct professors, law faculty fellow and Murphy Institute chaplain, Fr. Dan Griffith.  You can watch the entire program here.

Paradise Lost, Book 1, Lines 242-263

Some poetry for this Wednesday before Easter.  Many may be familiar with the end, but perhaps will have forgotten the more memorable lines preceding it.

Is this the Region, this the Soil, the Clime,

Said then the lost Arch-Angel, this the seat

That we must change for Heav’n, this mournful gloom

For that celestial light?  Be it so, since he

Who is now Sovran can dispose and bid

What shall be right: fardest from him is best

Whom reason hath equall’d, force hath made supreme

Above his equals.  Farewell happy Fields

Where Joy forever dwells: Hail horrors, hail

Infernal world, and thou profoundest Hell

Receive thy new Possessor: One who brings

A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time.

The mind is its own place, and in itself

Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n.

What matter where, if I be still the same,

And what I should be, all but less than hee

Whom Thunder hath made greater?  Here at least

We shall be free; th’Almighty hath not built

Here for his envy, will not drive us hence:

Here we may reign secure, and in my choice

To reign is worth ambition though in Hell:

Better to reign in Hell, than serve in Heav’n.

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

More thoughts on the HHS mandate, religious freedom, and commerce

I came across this post, by Matt Bowman, in which he is critical of the "Catholic Left" for "defend[ing] President Obama’s rule coercing Christian businesses to offer coverage of abortion-inducing drugs, contraception and sterilization."  I agree with Bowman that neither the Catholic Left, Right, nor Center should defend this rule, because it is a bad rule. 

Bowman's more specific criticism is directed at those who, as he sees it, have drawn an unjustified line between the religious-conscience rights of religious institutions, on the one hand, and those of commercial-business employers, on the other.  As he points out, Catholic teaching is that -- as the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace puts it -- "lay business leaders must 'integrate the gifts of the spiritual life, the virtues and ethical social principles into their life and work[.]'" 

Bowman does not provide links to the writings of those whom he criticizes, but he does "name names," and I think he has in mind, inter alia, this post by Michael Sean Winters, at Distinctly Catholic.  Winters wrote, discussing the Bishops' recent Statement on Religious Freedom and the HHS Mandate: 

[T]he bishops’ position is muddied by their continued call for an individual exemption to the mandate, not just for religiously affiliated employers but for secular employers who invoke a religious justification for their exemption claim. This is the worst part of the document, and so I will quote it in full: 

    A violation of personal civil rights. The HHS mandate creates still a third class, those with no conscience protection at all: individuals who, in their daily lives, strive constantly to act in accordance with their faith and moral values. They, too, face a government mandate to aid in providing "services" contrary to those values -- whether in their sponsoring of, and payment for, insurance as employers; their payment of insurance premiums as employees; or as insurers themselves -- without even the semblance of an exemption. This, too, is unprecedented in federal law, which has long been generous in protecting the rights of individuals not to act against their religious beliefs or moral convictions. We have consistently supported these rights, particularly in the area of protecting the dignity of all human life, and we continue to do so. 

    This is frankly shocking. Were the drafters of this task unaware that these words could be used -- actually such arguments were used! -– by segregationists? They cited the biblical story of Ham to justify their stance, and I suppose a biblical citation counts as a religious claim.

I've corresponded privately with both Matt and Michael Sean, setting out my questions about (and disagreements with aspects of) both posts.  As I told Matt, I think it is a misreading of commentators on the "Catholic Left" to characterize their views in this way (as Matt does):  "[W]e know they couldn’t care less about business ethics. They insist business women and men have no conscience, that the government is justified in coercing them, and that the Bishops are heretics for defending those consciences. It is nonsensical to speak of business ethics and deny that business people have consciences."  I am, I admit, very frustrated with those who seem unjustifiably invested in denying, or even doubting, what I think is clearly established, namely, that the current Administration is insufficiently sensitive to, and appreciative of, religious-freedom.  (In some cases -- for me, the Hosanna-Tabor brief and the attacks on the D.C. school-voucher bill stand out -- this insufficient sensitivity looks disturbingly like hostility.)  And, I am tired of partisan-seeming accusations that critics of the HHS mandate are merely partisan.  Still, I do not think that the people Matt mentions in his post are actually saying what he says, above, they are. 

Matt also writes, "Commonweal’s spokespersons almost daily ridicule the Bishops’ defense of business ethics as a 'Taco Bell exemption' that is unworthy of Catholic support. Their sneer smacks not only of elitism but racism, as if food service from an ethic background is unworthy of a true Christian calling."  I agree that it is quite wrong to dismiss the Bishops' (or anyone else's) principled defense of broader religious-freedom exemptions in this way, but I do not think it is fair, or helpful, to suggest that misguided dismissals are racist.  There are way too many misplaced accusations of racism in our politics as it is. 

Michael Sean's statement that the Bishops' emphasis on the dignity of individuals' religious consciences (as well as the institutional integrity of religious institutions" is "frankly shocking" is well off the mark, too (and so is dissonant with the many solid posts he has done in recent months on religious-freedom matters), and I think it is bad form (and wrong) to associate this emphasis with the arguments of segregationists.  (Yes, of course it's true that, throughout history, bad people have misused good arguments and misappropriated sound principles for bad ends.)  The Bishops are entirely right -- and entirely in the spirit of Dignitatis humanae, to remind readers that the right to religious liberty belongs to all, and always -- even when persons are engaged in "non-religious" activities like doing business and buying insurance.  This is not misguided individualism, it's a Declaration of the Second Vatican Council.

It is one thing to say -- I think it isn't contrary to Catholic teachings on business ethics and economic justice to say -- that, as a matter of tactics and political realities, the best course for defenders of religious freedom, in the present moment, is to focus on exemptions for religious employers and institutions (where "freedom of the church" questions, scandal questions, and institutional-witness questions are in play).  It's another to say, and it's wrong to say (but I don't think Winters or the Commonweal bloggers really mean to say) that, as a matter of principle, employers or individuals engaged in commercial enterprises may not or should not seek religiously-grounded exemptions from otherwise generally applicable laws.  To be sure, some of these employers or individuals will lose, and will have their requests denied -- but Dignitatis humanae does not say that the human-dignity-based right to religious freedom, which every person enjoys, will always warrant an exemption from a general law.  Whether an exemption is required, or justified, depends on the extent to which the law in question actually serves the common good, and the extent to which an exemption would undermine it. 

One problem, in the context of the current debate, is that the HHS preventive-services mandate is unjust.  It does not serve the common good, and so concern for the common good does, it seems to me, not justify denying exemptions to individuals or to non-religious entities.  We can imagine cases, though, where the general law in question is not unjust, and in such a case, the public authority might be justified, all things considered, in giving an exemption to some (say, religious employers) and not others (say, commercial employers).  This would not be because, as a theological matter, business and ethics are somehow separate, but instead because not all requests for exemptions can be granted. 

Anyway, like I said, I've been talking about these matters with both Winters and Bowman, and I'm sure each will disagree with some of what I've said here.          

Strip searches and human dignity

Should folks who are committed to a robust conception of human dignity be troubled by yesterday's Supreme Court ruling in Florence?  To the extent that strip searches are inherently degrading, should they require a reasonable suspicion of contraband, or is this a matter solely up to the judgment of law enforcement?  As the Church teaches, "the political community pursues the common good when it seeks to create a human environment that offers citizens the possibility of truly exercising their human rights and of fulfilling completely their corresponding duties." (Compendium para. 389)  It seems to me that a commitment to human dignity requires recognition of a right to be free of invasive and degrading searches, and we should be concerned that such a right can be overcome by any arrest, for any crime, under any circumstances.  That said, I am not a criminal procedure expert, so I'll leave it to others to chime in on how this aligns with our jurisprudence in the area.

Bernard Harcourt comments on the ruling's underlying "police state logic":

Now, of course, Kennedy is right that . . . security risks exist. There are (extremely rare) cases of arrestees carrying contraband (drugs) on or in their bodies. It occurs in extremely few cases, but it does happen. One recent study of 75,000 new inmates over a five years period found 16 instances where a full body search revealed contraband. (As Breyer explains, “The record further showed that 13 of these 16 pieces of contraband would have been detected in a patdown or a search of shoes and outer-clothing. In the three instances in which contra¬band was found on the detainee’s body or in a body cavity, there was a drug or felony history that would have justified a strip search on individualized reasonable suspicion,” Breyer’s dissent at page 8. Truth is, we do not know if there are any such cases where there was no prior reasonable suspicion that the person was carrying contraband, but let’s put that aside).

I’m fully prepared to assume, with Kennedy, that there will be such cases. But the question is, do we then embrace a “police-state logic” and give the jailors the license to strip search everyone? Do we close off constitutionalism because of the very existence of a security risk, no matter how small? Or do we engage in some kind of political balancing of those security risks against other political values?

Notice that Kennedy’s police-state logic would allow for full cavity searches as well. Kennedy reports: “A person booked on a misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct in Washington State managed to hide a lighter, tobacco, tattoo needles, and other prohibited items in his rectal cavity. San Francisco officials have discovered contraband hidden in body cavities of people arrested for trespassing, public nuisance, and shoplifting.”

Race, religion, and the media

Does Christianity get less sensitive treatment from the media than Islam does?  Well, yes, but there's a good reason for that.  According to the head of the BBC, in an interview a few weeks ago, other faiths have a "very close identity with ethnic minorities." Get Religion comments here.