Constitutional Questions About Crusaders and Werewolves

I wanted to ask a few more questions about methods of adjudicating an Establishment Clause claim related to the issue of symbolism that I posted about yesterday, but I should first make clear that none of this discussion goes at all to the merits of the decision to change the name of the military unit from Werewolves to Crusaders.  As Patrick O'Donnell rightly points out in a comment, there are all sorts of reasons to decide that as a matter of policy, this was not a wise decision -- a point that I recognized in the comments and which I recognize here.  Others will have much more to say about the policy issues, but the questions I ask now relate to constitutional methodology, not to the wisdom of a military unit calling itself "Crusaders."

Here are the facts as reported in the complaining letter: the Marine unit used the name "Werewolves" from its inception in World War II until 1958.  In 1958, it changed its name to "Crusaders," and the letter states that the reason it made this change is that the unit flew "F-8 Crusaders."  It continued to use the name "Crusaders" for 50 years.  In 2008, a Lieutenant Colonel decided that in advance of a deployment to Iraq, the name "Crusaders" would be abandoned in favor of "Werewolves" because "[t]he notion of being a crusader in that part of the world doesn't float."  Most recently, the decision to return to "Crusaders" was made, and one report states that the reason was a return to the traditions of the unit.

I've framed my thoughts as questions; the questions may suggest my skepticism about the capacity of current approaches to the Establishment Clause to pass on this sort of issue.  But in light of the push-back to my original post and in the interests of (amply justified, in my case) modesty, I thought to ask questions, rather than offer any definitive opinions.  They follow the jump. 

As to the name "Crusaders":

1. Was use of the moniker "Crusaders" always unconstitutional?  Was it unconstitutional in 1958, when the change was first made?  Was naming the fighter jet "F-8 Crusader" also unconstitutional? 

2. Or, was the term (as applied to the jet and the unit) constitutional in 1958?  Did it remain constitutional for the 50 years that the term was used, and even after the unit stopped flying F-8 Crusaders? 

3.  If 2, did the moment the name "Crusaders" stopped being constitutional occur in 2008, when the name was changed (back) to "Werewolves"?  Or did it only become unconstitutional when the name was again changed back to "Crusaders" most recently?

4.  If the term was always unconstitutional, what is the reason?

5.  If the term only became unconstitutional in 2008 (when it was abandoned) or in 2012 (when it was reclaimed), what is the reason?

5A.  A possibility is that it is unconstitutional in 2012 because of the motivation for re-adopting it.  If that is right, which motivations are unconstitutional?

5A1.  Suppose the motivation was expressly to promote the Christian religion.  Under current tests, that seems to me to fail the requirement that government action must have a secular purpose.

5A2.  Suppose the reason for the change back to 'Crusaders' was instead the perception that the initial change had been motivated by political or social pressure, and that the decision to re-adopt 'Crusaders" represented a statement that the military will not be pressured to change its traditions.  I am less certain whether that would be a secular purpose, but it seems to me that it might.

5A3.  Suppose the reason for the change back to 'Crusaders' was instead the desire to recapture some of the early traditions of the unit.  That motivation is complicated by the fact that the original name was 'Werewolves,' but it seems to me that that reason for the change has a secular purpose.

5A4.  Suppose the reason for the change back to 'Crusaders' was instead the desire (as I speculated in the earlier post) to associate the unit with the marshal bravery and ferocity of the Crusaders, quite apart from the Crusaders' religious motivation.  That also seems to me to evince a secular purpose.

5A5.  Suppose the reason for the change back to 'Crusaders' was mixed: the reasons above (or perhaps other reasons) were mixed together.  Does that render the name change unconstitutional as a matter of secular purpose?

5B.  Is the reason the name is unconstitutional the effect of 'Crusaders' on (average) people -- in that the name has the effect of promoting or disparaging religion?  If that is the reason, was it also a reason to hold the name unconstitutional in 1958?  Or is the 54 year difference material as a matter of constitutional law.  Has the meaning of the name changed so as to make it constitutionally concerning in that span, and what accounts for the change?  Assuming that it has changed, how do we operationalize that change in constitutional law?

5B1.  If the effect of the name is the constitutional key -- how the name makes people feel -- then what do we do with mixed effects?  Do we determine which effect is primary?  How do we judge this?  Do we take a poll?  Do we use common sense?

5C.  Another component of the standard Establishment Clause test involves the question whether government action excessively entangles it with religion.  But this is a passive symbol.  It is a name.  So it seems to me that at the very least, use of the name 'Crusaders' is not an excessive entanglement.

As to the name "Werewolves":

1.  Several comments to my original post question my speculation that "Werewolves" are "religious."  But the definition of "religion" for constitutional purposes is a matter of great uncertainty.  Werewolves are supernatural creatures of great evil, and there are connections to animistic religions which have a plausible claim to constitutional status. It therefore seems to me that it would not take much to make a claim that werewolves, or their equivalent, are components of religious traditions. 

2.  If you disagree, what ought to qualify as "religious" for constitutional purposes?  What should the test be? 

3.  For the sake of argument -- and since the religious status of werewolves is unlikely to be resolved in any comment thread that develops -- assume that werewolves are indeed features of some religions, and that some people might take offense at the government's use of the term "werewolves" on religious grounds.

4.  If werewolves do have this status, then what distinguishes the use of the name "Werewolves" from "Crusaders" inasmuch as concerns the Establishment Clause.  Is it the motivation of the use of the term?  Or is it the effect of the term on the feelings of people who are part of the unit, or on the general public? 

5.  If it is the latter, could that effect change over time?  What would be evidence of a sufficient change to make a constitutional difference?  What would someone have to say about the term's effect on him or her to make the EC charge cognizable?

Looking forward to your thoughts.