Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Coke on the Common Law

Today is the 460th anniversary of Sir Edward Coke's birth.  Coke is widely known in part for his role in the prosecution of the Gunpowder Plot.  But Coke was also an astute student of the law.  Here's a memorable passage from Coke's report of Bonham's Case, which involved the question whether a London physician could be prevented from practicing medicine and imprisoned pursuant to the newly formed charter of the Royal College of Physicians -- and later ratified by an act of Parliament -- which altered the common law practice.  The "censors" of the College had acted as both party and judge in the case, contravening the ancient rule.  As those more learned than I have observed, Bonham's Case has almost nothing to do with the contemporary power of judicial review and everything to do with the power of the common law to control the unfettered will of decision-makers -- to restrain the rule of men by the common law, not to unleash it:

The censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties . . . . And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.  

West on Waldron on the Rule of Law

Robin West has written an interesting critique of Jeremy Waldron's take on the rule of law. (HT: Solum)  The abstract:

This article presents four major objections to Jeremy Waldron’s claim that for “Rule of Law” to exist it we must move beyond basic formal requirements that laws be general and knowable rules we can all comply with, towards substantive requirements that when the law imposes its censorial and punitive will upon us, it is applied in a way that acknowledges our intelligence and respects our individual dignity. After challenging Waldron’s claim, the author suggests that if Rule of Law theorizing is intended to capture our ideals of law, then the three paradigms of Rule of Law scholarship that Waldron has usefully identified and distinguished — formal, procedural, and substantive — need to move beyond identifying the Rule of Law as a means to counter the pernicious abuse of power by a too-fierce state besotted by its own political will, and acknowledge the ways in which the law expresses the will of the state to protect weaker parties harmed not by the state but by powerful private entities.