Sunday, November 6, 2011
Optimism is a Brain Defect
At our retributivism conference on Friday, Luis Chiesa pressed the provocative point that we ought to take seriously the possibility of causal determinism and incompatibilism in punishment theory. Taking such views seriously would mean toying with the possibility that there is no free will and therefore no culpability for wrongful acts -- indeed no 'wrongfulness' at all. Luis's argument seems to depend on a prediction about the moral attractiveness of our punishment practices if we accept these possibilities. Agreeing with these possibilities might threaten the whole enterprise of retributivist punishment, along with much else.
I appreciated Luis's learned presentation, though I don't agree with him about these matters. On the other hand, here, finally, is a deterministic finding that I can get behind (h/t Tom Smith).
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/11/optimism-a-brain-defect.html
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relatedly, perhaps, it's long been known that there's a strong connection between giving an accurate representation of one's skills, abilities, standing, and the like and being depressed. I think the direction of causation isn't clear- for many people, having an accurate conception of their skills and social standing is probably depressing, for example, but it also seems that being depressed might just make people not have the overly-positive self-image that many, perhaps most, people have.
As for Luis's paper, I think it's a very hard subject to get one's mind around. Of course, there's a long tradition, popular w/ some here, I suspect, that holds that wrongfulness and moral accountability doesn't depend on being able to do otherwise than one did. I don't find that an attractive or plausible view at all, but it has a long pedigree, of course.