Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, September 26, 2011

European Public Order/Public Dignity Laws

Two problematic laws, one in England, one in France.

First, Religion Clause blog discusses a situation in Lancashire, in which the police told the owner of a private business, the Salt and Light Coffee House, that the display of various Bible verses on a TV screen at the back of his cafe violates an ordinance which prohibits, among other things, "distress[ing]" or "alarm[ing]" displays.

Second, Paris has enacted a law which prohibits prayer in the streets.  As detailed here, it seems that the issue is not so much the general obstruction that any unregulated public gathering would pose, but the specifically objectionable act of public religious expression as such, which, according to the report, "hurts the sensitivities of many of our fellow citizens" and is undignified.  

No lying, ever: Redux

We had a lively discussion (as did others) a few months ago about Chris Tollefsen's (and others') argument that "lying" is never morally permissible.  In this post, at First Things, Tollefsen (and Alexander Pruss) return to the conversation, with their "Case Against False Assertions."  Tollefsen and Pruss are responding, in particular, to Janet Smith, who took a different view here.

I replied to Tollefsen's earlier argument here.  I continue to think that the position "it is always wrong to intentionally deceive another" is not plausible, and I don't think the position is made much more plausible with qualfications that distinguish, say, strategic (deceptive) feints on the battlefield from "assertions."  To think this is not to think (I think!) that it is permissible to "do evil that good might result"; it is to think that to deceive is not necessarily to "do evil."

October 4: Hosanna-Tabor Event at St. John's

On October 4 (next Tuesday), the Center for Law and Religion and the Catholic Law Student Society at St. John's University School of Law will co-host an event devoted to Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, a case by now well known to MOJ readers.  The Supreme Court hears oral argument on October 5, so the event could not be more timely.  I will be talking about the case -- one of the most important religious liberty cases to come before the Court in at least two decades -- and the doctrine of the ministerial exemption generally.  There will then be a period of questions, discussants to include my colleagues David Gregory and Mark Movsesian as well as Mr. Peter J. Johnson, Jr., president of Leahy & Johnson, P.C.

The event will occur in the 4th floor Atrium at 5:30 pm.  It is free, and all are welcome.  If you are in the area, please stop by to say hello.

UPDATE: Just after I posted this, I noticed this article about the case.  Likely there will be many similar pieces in the coming days.  In my view, this article is misleadingly titled.  The case is not about religious institutions' power to "declare" that their employees are exempt from "federal protections."  It is about whether and in which circumstances (if ever) the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, limits the reach of anti-discrimination law.  It may or it may not; but in either case, little turns on anybody's individual declarations (though conceivably if an institution explicitly waived its rights, that might be relevant).

Sunday, September 25, 2011

John Coughlin's "Canon Law"

This morning I've been reading around Fr. John Coughlin's terrific Canon Law: A Comparative Study With512BUjBvXsL__SL500_AA300_ Anglo-American Legal Theory (OUP 2011).  Fr. Coughlin sets up a comparison of three approaches to canon law: antinomianism, legalism, and one based in the rule of law, and he defends the last of these against the other two.  One of the worthwhile things about Fr. Coughlin's methodology is that, as the title indicates, the book offers a comparative perspective with 19th and 20th century philosophy of law (represented in the highly various tradition beginning with John Austin and proceeding through to Hart, Raz, Finnis, and also Rawls). 

Particularly interesting in this respect is Chapter Four, in which Fr. Coughlin compares theories of property ownership in canon law and liberal philosophy.  After an illuminating discussion tracing historical views in each tradition, he says:

Continue reading

Friday, September 23, 2011

"Civil Rights", "Religious Wrongs", and the Ministerial Exception

Prof. Vivian Berger argues here that "religious rights" can be "civil wrongs", and so urges the Court to reject the ministerial-exception claim in the upcoming Hosanna-Tabor case.  I agree with the first sentence of Prof. Berger's piece:

On Oct. 5, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in a very significant case that pits a Lutheran parochial school's assertion of First Amendment rights against the claims of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a fired teacher, Cheryl Perich, of violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).

Otherwise, I'm afraid I think her arguments miss the mark.  Just a few points:  First, Prof. Berger says that "Hosanna-Tabor illustrates a recurring tension between two bedrock guarantees: the religion clauses of the First Amendment and the civil rights laws."  But, these are not, as I see it, two similarly "bedrock" guarantees.  That is, the Constitution of the United States forbids governments from interfering with religious freedom (in certain ways); it does not forbid non-governmental employers from discriminating on the basis of age or disability nor does it require Congress to exercise its own powers to forbid such discrimination.  Please don't (intentionally or negligently) misunderstand my point here:  Of course our laws against employment discrimination by private employers are important and promote the common good.  But this case is about a particular constraint -- i.e., the First Amendment -- on the government; any nondiscrimination laws -- even ones we really and rightly like -- must, in order to be valid (let alone "bedrock"), comply with that constraint.

Next, Prof. Berger asserts that "[e]ven if redressing Perich's injury might incidentally burden the church's rights to choose employees who engage in important religious work and to control its religious message, the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination ought to trump these."  Obviously, the words "incidentally" and "compelling" are doing a lot of work here.  But, again, injury done to the church's religious-freedom rights would hardly be incidental in this case, and it is far from clear that the means being employed -- i.e., applying nondiscrimination laws to second guess religious institutions' decisions about who should be their teachers, ministers, and leaders -- is necessary to the substantial advancement of the government's compelling interest. 

Third, Prof. Berger concludes with this:

In sum, the Court should reject Hosanna-Tabor's overbroad position and render unto Caesar what is Caesar's by affirming Perich's right to freedom from retaliation — which is enshrined in laws inspired by constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

I agree entirely that the Court should, in this case, keep Caesar to what is Caesar's.  But, the point is, there are "things that are not Caesar's."  These things include "the authority to decide who should be a minister."

The President calls for more politics from (some) pulpits?

To paraphrase Glenn Reynolds, "they told me that if I voted for John McCain we'd see the Administration using sympathetic clergy to push its agenda . . . and they were right!"

(Hee Hee.)  I do not believe, of course, that there should or could be a clear line excluding "politics" from the "pulpit:

. . .  [T]he First Amendment does not constrain — in fact, it protects — "political" preaching and faith-filled activism. Yes, our Constitution preserves a healthy separation between the institutions of religion and government. This wise arrangement protects individual freedom and civil society by preventing the state from directing, co-opting or controlling the church. It imposes no limits, though, on conversations among religious believers — whether on Sunday morning, around the water cooler, or at the dinner table — about the implications of their faith for the controversies of the day. Our First Amendment protects religious freedom, individual conscience and church independence from government interference; it requires neither a faith-free public square nor politics-free sermons. . . .

The Catholic Health Association weighs in, too

Following up on my last post, about the USCCB's comments:  Here is the letter (HT: Distinctly Catholic) filed by the Catholic Health Association (an institution that, readers will recall, was instrumental in the passage of the A.C.A.).  This bit, from Sr. Carol Keenan's letter, strikes me as especially powerful:

. . . Through its ministries the Church serves millions of people each year, regardless of their faith or lack of faith. As the late James Cardinal Hickey said, "We serve [them] not because they are Catholic, but because we are Catholic. If we don't care for the sick, educate the young, care for the homeless, then we cannot call ourselves the church of Jesus Christ. . .

Our country has acknowledged and respected the rights of conscience since its founding, and our society's commitment to pluralism lies at the heart of our diverse and vibrant nation. Jefferson’s promise to the Ursuline sisters that their work could continue according to their own rules is reflected now in the many federal and state laws protecting individuals and organizations from being required to participate in, pay for, or provide coverage for certain services that are contrary to their religious beliefs or moral convictions. Requiring our members to cover contraceptive services, including sterilization and drugs with an abortifacient effect, would put them in an untenable situation. Consistent with the principle underlying existing conscience protections, the proposed religious employer exemption must be expanded to allow Catholic hospitals and health care providers to continue their ministry in fidelity to their religious beliefs and values.

The USCCB weighs in on the "religious employer" exemption to the contraception-coverage mandate

Anthony Picarello and Michael Moses -- both of whom are strongly committed to, and learned regarding, religious freedom -- have submitted, from the USCCB's Office of General Counsel, a detailed and comprehensive comments-letter regarding the Administration's proposed "interim final rule" (??) on "preventative services", that is, to the proposed requirement that employee-health-care plans include coverage for contraception and sterilization procedures.  Among other things, the letter highlights the "religious-gerrymander" dimension of the mandate (i.e., the fact that the effect of the mandate, though not targeted explicitly at Catholic institutions, is almost entirely on Catholic institutions) and notes that, putting aside the First Amendment, the mandate-with-very-narrow-exemptions probably violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

I am unable to identify reasons -- other than indifference (or worse) to the religious-freedom interests of Catholic institutions -- for the Administration to resist the call by the USCCB (and others, like CUA's Prof. Stephen Schneck, who is a supporter of the A.C.A. as a general matter) for a more accommodating exemption.  

Thursday, September 22, 2011

The Death Penalty and the 2012 Presidential Election

If current trends continue, next year’s presidential race promises to be a close one.  The president’s natural advantages of incumbency likely will be offset by a weak economy and low public approval ratings, thereby creating an opening for a strong challenger.

Most agree that the focus will be on a handful of battleground states.  Among these states could be several in the Midwest -– Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and perhaps even my home state of Minnesota.

There is something else distinctive about the “purple” states I’ve listed above:  All but Ohio have abolished the death penalty.  And, in Ohio, there is a strong tradition of clemency granted to those on death row, the chief justice of the state supreme court has called for a review of the administration of the death penalty, public opposition is growing, and only half a dozen executions are scheduled for all of 2012 (each of which is likely to draw considerable and controversial attention in Ohio).

Now in the typical presidential race, the death penalty never becomes a salient issue or provides a distinctive basis for choosing between the candidates.  There are very few federal death penalty statutes and very few federal death penalty sentences.  There have been only three federal executions since 2001 and none since 2003.  Moreover, not since Michael Dukakis in 1988 has any Democratic nominee for president opposed the death penalty, thus taking the issue off the table.

Election Year 2012 could be different –- not because a majority of Americans are opposed to the death penalty (that sadly is not yet true) or even because President Obama and his eventual Republican challenger will have meaningfully contrasting positions on federal executions.  Instead, as a more subtle and sub-surface factor, an aggressively pro-death penalty candidate, like Texas Governor Rick Perry, could face a small but steady erosion of support in key states, perhaps just enough to tip the election to President Obama.

Consider states like Iowa and Minnesota, in each of which I’ve spent about a decade of my adult life.  Neither state is a high crime state, despite long since have abandoned executions as a form of punishment.  While Republicans in each state occasionally make noises about restoring the death penalty, it tends to be a rhetorical device to signal toughness on crime, not a serious policy proposal.  With some exceptions, Iowans and Minnesotans across the political spectrum are more or less satisfied not to have a death penalty and pleased that their state governments are not spending tens of millions on death penalty cases (in contrast with states like Texas and Illinois).

Proudly pointing to hundreds of executions in one’s home state may be an applause line before a partisan Republican audience, especially in the South.  But in states like Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio, on which the presidential election is likely to hinge, that record induces queasiness in a not-insignificant number of Republicans and even more Independents.

First, Republican and Republican-leaning voters, especially in the upper Midwest, are not uniformly in favor of the death penalty.  Republicans and Independent from Catholic and other perspectives often question or reject the death penalty as a morally legitimate tool of criminal justice.  To be sure, given his unacceptable views on protection of life for the unborn, President Obama is unlikely to be the beneficiary of Catholic and other pro-life voters who are uneasy with an aggressively pro-death-penalty Republican nominee.  But some of these voters might simply withhold support from a Republican candidate who is too readily and energetically associated with executions.

Second, in tight budgetary times, Independents who otherwise would trend Republican might look askance at a candidate who has made the financially foolish decision to spend millions of dollars on each execution, rather than choosing to devote those increasingly precious dollars to hiring more police officers, creating alternative juvenile sentencing schemes, etc.

Finally, given that at least one innocent person likely has been executed in Texas under Governor Perry’s watch (here and here), his denial that he has lost any sleep or struggled over these cases is disconcerting.  If he becomes the Republican presidential nominee, we may expect powerful film documentaries and a plethora of reports about "Texas Justice" in death penalty cases to hound the candidate throughout the fall.

To be sure, given that the number of lives taken by the death penalty in the United States (even including Texas) remains a tiny, tiny percentage of those taken each year by abortion, protection of life for the unborn remains a much more pressing question in the national forum.  Still, the prospect of even a small slippage of the Republican voter base in the Midwest for a candidate seen as overly aggressive and unduly callous about dealing death should prompt careful consideration, thoughtful evaluation, and soul-searching by both the candidates and voters in the upcoming Republican primaries.

Greg Sisk

Kaczor responds to O'Brien

Prof. Christopher Kaczor (Philosophy, Loyola-LA) joins the conversation, here (at Public Discourse), with Dennis O'Brien about abortion.  (I linked, here, to the Commonweal discussion among Peter Steinfels, Cathy Kaveny, and O'Brien.)  Kaczor writes, in the reponse to the (I think entirely unconvincing) claim that principled opposition to abortion requires that one be committed to punishing abortions in the same way, and to the same extent, as one punishes the intentional killing of a human being who has been born:

[A] penalty’s severity is not determined solely by the wrongness of the criminal act, but also by the likely consequences of that wrong for the community. . . .

So, one can hold that abortion and the murder of an adult both intentionally kill an innocent human being without being forced to also hold that abortion and the murder of an adult should be punished in exactly the same way by law.

Read the whole thing!