Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Punishment Theory and the Method of System: Stephen's Thought
Please excuse two self-promotional posts in a row, but in case it might be of interest, I wanted to flag a paper I just posted about the relationship of punishment theory and the intellectual history of punishment. The paper explores and reconstructs the ideas of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, a prominent judge and public intellectual in the late Victorian period, and uses that reconstruction to make some methodological criticisms about the way that punishment theory gets done today. For those that may not know Stephen, may I strongly recommend that you have a look at this powerful and rewarding writer -- in fact, I can think of little that is better beach reading than Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (a critique of Mill's On Liberty, with resonances for many contemporary issues -- this edition has a useful foreword by Richard Posner) or Essays by a Barrister.
Comments on the article are welcome. [Painting of Stephen by Watts]
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/07/punishment-theory-and-the-method-of-system-stephens-thought.html
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Marc- I've only read about a third of L, E, and F, but while it's certainly interesting and has some good stuff in it from a historical perspective, my impression of the parts I read was much like Sidgwick's in his review of it- that the arguments are generally no good. (Sidgwick is more sympathetic to Stephen than one might think. Even though Sidgwick was nearly as strong an advocate of women's equality as was Mill, and even though Stephen was generally opposed to equality for women, Sidgwick is pretty sympathetic to many of the claims in L, E, F, and thinks that _On Liberty_ is open to some serious criticisms. But in his review he claimed that the arguments Stephen actually gives are not good, and that was my feeling, too, for the parts I've read, though I'm also less sympathetic to Stephen's positions than was Sidgwick.) So, my feeling was that it's an important text for understanding the development of moral and legal philosophy but not so good on its own merits. What did you think really stood out in it as useful today, other than as of historical interest, if anything? (I need to finally read your article, too. I've been meaning to for some time.)