Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Monday, June 13, 2011

University Faculty for Life conference

Thanks to Rick for his recent post highlighting John Breen's fine talk at this last weekend's University Faculty for Life (UFL) conference. The conference was supported by a generous grant from Our Sunday Visitor Institute, and hosted by the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Notre Dame's chapter of University Faculty for Life, and the Notre Dame Fund to Protect Human Life. After all lhe recent controversies concerning Notre Dame and the life issues, it was good to be at Notre Dame with the many members of that community who support the pro-life cause in so many ways.   

In addition to John's talk, the conference featured an interesting discussion of the Phoenix abortion case with Father Kevin Flannery SJ and Father Tom Berg, and talks by individuals such as Sam Calhoun, Tom Cavanuagh, Michael New, Teresa Collett, Clarke Forsythe, Mark Rienzi, Bill Saunders, Chris Kaczor, Richard Stith, Gerry Bradley, and John Keown. David Solomon of Notre Dame's Center for Ethics and Culture also gave a wondeful talk when he received UFL's Smith Award for distinguished contributions to pro-life scholarship.

Next year's UFL conference will be on June 1-2, 2012 at BYU.

Richard M. 

 

The Family's End?

Scott Yenor has posted "The Family's End" at Public Discourse, tracing the various intellectual threads in the family's demise.  An excerpt:

These profound intellectual trends have affected how men and women view themselves and view children and childbearing. The logic of contract has culminated in a triumph of autonomy. The movement to conquer nature promotes greater gender equality as an exercise in autonomy. Institutions buckle things together, suggesting that they have a necessary or salutary relation to one another, and both these trends reflect the modern penchant for separating what institutions once united. Marriage and family life had, among other things, buckled love and marriage, marriage and parenthood, parenthood and sex, marriage and sex, and sex and procreation together. Every modern defender of some family form ends up defending, in one way or another, various connections among these goods; the more radical the critics of the family are, the more buckles they seek to loosen.

Today we face the possibility of the family’s end, in part because of the attractive promise to free us from the buckles that nature seems to place on our freedom. The erosion of these buckles explains, in no small part, the amazing decline in birth rates seen across the Western world. Encapsulating all of these separations in one fell swoop is the move for public recognition for same-sex marriage, as it is the victory of the adult-centered marriage contract to secure whatever goods the adults choose, and is the final detachment of marriage and family life from nature.

I agree that we should be troubled by many aspects of the move from status to contract in family law, and I have argued as much in print (see chapter 9).  For a similar argument, you should also check out Mitt Regan's wonderful Alone Together.  Though I agree with much of what Yenor writes, the difficulty is trying to explain why and how the marriage and procreation buckle matters.  Same-sex marriage keeps the love and marriage, marriage and parenthood, marriage and sex, and parenthood and sex buckles together.  Unless it can be shown that same-sex marriages detrimentally impact the quality of the caregiving function, it's hard to make a convincing argument that the loss of the marriage-procreation buckle, standing alone, should determine the public definition of marriage.  I'm not addressing all arguments against same-sex marriage; I'm just adopting Yenor's framework and speculating that, of all the buckles that the public seems to care about, the marriage-procreation buckle would appear fairly far down on the list.

Stinneford on Proportionality as Part of the Original Meaning of the Eighth Amendment

Via Larry Solum, I see that John Stinneford has posted a new version of his terrific piece on the issue of excessiveness of punishment as part of the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  John also discusses the theoretical nature of proportionality as exclusively retributivist (see note 32 and the section beginning at page 961 for John's position w/r/t utilitarian aims -- he basically stakes out a negative retributivist place for proportionality).

For those that do not know John's excellent and interesting work on originalism and the Eighth Amendment, may I also recommend his The Original Meaning of Unusual and his piece on chemical castration, which a couple of my students this last year found helpful as we talked about various kinds of punishment practices -- the possibility of physical castration as punishment is (incredibly, to me) a live one in some states in this country. 

O'Brien and Koons on Natural Law

Matthew O'Brien and Robert Koons have an interesting and provocative series of posts at Public Discourse on, among other things, natural law, metaphysics, social practices, moral absolutes, and the history of twentieth century Anglo-American moral philosophy that MOJ readers will want to check out (here, here, and here).

Sunday, June 12, 2011

Not So Nice Item in Today's New York Times

Katherine Stewart writes in today's New York Times that she's terribly upset that the public school (with a red door, no less) she can see from her Upper East Side apartment is hosting Christian worship services on Sundays. Ms. Stewart writes that Good News Club v. Milford Central School "appeared to suggest that keeping religious groups out of schools after hours amounted to discrimination against their religious views." Indeed, Good News Club (and Rosenberger, and Lamb's Chapel) stands for the proposition that where the government maintains a "limited public forum" (such as after-hours use of public school facilities), it cannot single out religion for special disfavor and discrimination. I gather Ms. Stewart disagrees with that line of cases, or at least she agrees with the recent Second Circuit decision that "worship" (because that's an "activity") is readily distinguishable from other forms of speech, which just goes to show that the distinctions among belief-speech-conduct-activity (and "worship") are often arbitrarily drawn in such a way as to favor whomever is making them at the time.

I'm also puzzled by her grievance that the PTA spent $100,000 last year renovating the school building's restrooms, since "my P.T.A. donations should not be used to supply furniture for a religious group that thinks I am bound for hell." This is merely anecdotal, but, as the parent of children in a local public school, it never crossed my mind to wonder whether my donations to the PTA were an endorsement of the views, religious or otherwise, of whatever groups use the public school facilities after my kids come home (and, even if I were as bothered as Ms. Stewart seems to be, I'd worry that such a complaint would pose a state action or standing problem).

Saturday, June 11, 2011

Nice Items in Today's NY Times

Three of them: (1) a story about Bologna, the Lucullan princess of Italy and my childhood home away from home (Santa Maria Maggiore and Santo Stefano are ancient and magnificent); (2) a review of a wonderful looking new translation by John Ashbery of Rimbaud's Illuminations; and (3) a review of a book about a really neat volume by Tacitus, Germania, re-discovered sometime in the 15th century.  Tacitus is the author of the insufficiently well-known Annales, as great a declinist history as has ever been written (post-Augustan Rome was grim). 

From Book I of the Annales: "The histories of Tiberius, Caius [that's Caligula!], Claudius, and Nero, while they were in power, were falsified through terror, and after their death were written under the irritation of a recent hatred.  Hence my purpose is to relate a few facts about Augustus -- more particularly his last acts, then the reign of Tiberius, and all which follows, without either bitterness or partiality, from any motives to which I am far removed."  

Friday, June 10, 2011

"Religious Freedom and the Regulatory State"

At First Things, Joseph Knippenberg (reasonably) reacts uneasily to a recent NLRB decision requiring a Catholic university to permit a labor union to attempt to organize its adjunct faculty.  His post includes links to the relevant decisions.

Breen on Justice Stevens, the Establishment Clause, and abortion

Our own John Breen just delivered, here at Notre Dame, at the annual conference of University Faculty for Life, an (I thought) devastating critique of the argument -- often associated with Justice Stevens -- that regulations of abortion violate the Establishment Clause because they depend on (what can only be) a "religious" premise.  In due course, I hope John will post the paper here at MOJ!

Individual Religious Expression v. Organized Religious Worship

This is an interesting case from a few days ago, Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., in which a three judge panel of the Second Circuit upheld a local rule which prohibited outside groups from using public school facilities after hours for "religious worship services."  Judge Leval wrote the main opinion, joined in concurrence by Judge Calabresi, and with Judge Walker dissenting.  Two points in particular seemed interesting to me:

1. You might be wondering how the court managed to get around Good News Club v. Milford Central School.  The New York City Department of Education makes its public school classrooms available as limited public forums to a variety of groups.  Bronx Household of Faith, a Christian Church, applied to take advantage of one such space for its Sunday morning church service, stating that its services were to include "singing of Christian hymns and songs, prayer, fellowship with other church members and Biblical preaching and teaching, communion, [and] sharing of testimonies," followed by a "fellowship meal," during which attendees "talk to one another, [and] share one another's joys and sorrows so as to be a mutual help and comfort to each other."  Part of the procedural history of the case precedes Good News Club (also out of the Second Circuit), but as folks here at MOJ know well, Good News Club held that a public school district which operated as a limited public forum could not exclude a Christian group which sought space in order to teach young children (aged 6-12) about Christian morality (through the use of songs, prayer, story telling, and in other ways), because doing so was prohibited viewpoint discrimination (see also Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger).  This case has had a long and involved procedural history during which the Board of Ed.'s rule was gradually modified.  But the upshot in this opinion is that Judge Leval held that "[t]he prohibition against using school facilities for the conduct of religious worship services bars a type of activity. It does not discriminate against any point of view . . . . While the conduct of religious services undoubtedly includes expressions of a religious point of view, it is not the expression of that point of view that is prohibited by the rule. Prayer, religious instruction, expression of devotion to God, and the singing of hymns, whether done by a person or a group, do not constitute the conduct of worship services. Those activities are not excluded."

I'm having some difficulty with this interesting argument but probably I just am not understanding it.  It seems to be that the disorganized activity of "worship" would not itself be something which the district could prohibit consistent with Good News Club, but the "event" or "collective activity" of worship may be excluded.  Judge Leval: "What is prohibited by this clause is solely the conduct of a particular type of event: a collective activity characteristically done according to an order prescribed by and under the auspices of an organized religion, typically but not necessarily conducted by an ordained official of the religion."  Granting use of the forum to an "organized religion," in the majority opinion's view, "has the effect of placing centrally, and perhaps even of establishing, the religion in the school."  A bit of Protestant theology from the Second Circuit?

2.  The other interesting feature is the use to which Judge Leval put the Establishment Clause.  The district's exclusion of religious worship services was recognized as reasonable in light of its wish to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.  Again, from Judge Leval's opinion: "In order to determine whether the content restriction for this purpose is reasonable and thus permissible, we need not decide whether use of the school for worship services would in fact violate the Establishment Clause, a question as to which reasonable arguments could be made either way, and on which no determinative ruling exists.  It is sufficient if the Board has a strong basis for concern that permitting use of a public school for the conduct of religious worship services would violate the Establishment Clause."  And again, Judge Leval emphasized that worship services are a "core event in organized religion" and because the classroom "at least for a time, becomes the church," not only was it distinguishable from the Good News Club situation, but it also might well violate the EC for the district to permit such a use.  Two other points made by the Judge: establishment concerns (filtered through the lens of a "perception of endorsement") are reasonable because (1) the availability to Christians on Sunday of the public school space is an unintentional bias in favor of Christian religions; and (2) the religious services of Bronx Household are not open on equal terms to everyone, since the Church holds that one must be baptized and not excommunicated in order to participate. 

Judge Walker's dissent is also well worth reading for those who are interested.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Mr. Cain, please do the right thing, and the American thing

There is a lot to like about Republican presidential aspirant Herman Cain, the former CEO of Godfather's Pizza. He is genuinely pro-life and pro-marriage; he has personally triumphed over poverty and racism; he has extensive experience as an entrepreneur and businessman, and is credited with restoring a failing company to profitability.  It is being reported, however, that in comments made to Glenn Beck, Mr. Cain said that though he would permit Muslims to serve in his administration, he would demand of them a degree of "loyalty proof" that he would not demand of Catholics, Mormons, and members of other faiths. If his words are being reported accurately, what he said is wrong, foolish, and unacceptable. It is disrespectful of Muslims, the vast majority of whom in our country are, as Cain himself seems to acknowledge, loyal, honorable citizens; and it is incompatible with a sound understanding of religious freedom (and with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution's no-religious-tests clause). It puts Cain in a camp with Martha Coakley, the hapless Massachusetts Democrat who, when running against Scott Brown for the United States Senate, infamously said that devout Catholics should not work in emergency rooms inasmuch as they are unwilling to be involved in providing contraceptives and abortions. That is a place Mr. Cain surely does not want to be. Now is his chance to show that he is the kind of man who is willing to admit a mistake and make things right. I hope that he will reflect on what he said and, at the first possible opportunity, repudiate the idea that Muslim citizens are to be held to standards of "loyalty proof" higher than those to which other citizens are held.  He should make clear that, if elected President, he will hold possible appointees to his administration to exactly the same standards, irrespective of their religious faith.  That would be the right thing to do.  It would, moreover, be the American thing to do.