Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Nussbaum on Perfectionist and Political Liberalism
One of the summer delights at Villanova is taking a break from research and writing to participate in a biweekly reading group on moral, political, and legal philosophy organized by my friend and colleague Michelle Madden Dempsey. We recently read Martha Nussbaum's article "Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism," 39 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (2011), in which Nussbaum offers a strong defense of Rawlsian political liberalism against Razian perfectionist liberalism. I have some significant reservations about aspects of the article, particularly Nussbaum's characterization of the incompatability of religion and pluralism (14-15) and her discussion of the "irrationality" of Christianity on account of its doctrines of the Trinity and of grace (26-28), where I think her treatment of these issues is much too compressed. Nussbaum does say some nice things about Jacques Maritain, however, and she writes he might be called "the first political [ie, Rawlsian] liberal." (Patrick Brennan and other fans of Maritain can tell us if the compliment is welcome.)
Nussbaum gives an excellent summary and defense of the Rawlsian account of political liberalism and the central importance of respect for persons in that account--in some ways, her reconstruction here is more persuasive and clearer than one finds in Rawls himself. And I especially liked Nussbaum's slap at utilitarianism and its frequent failure to consider the political implications of a utilitarian view. Nussbaum writes, "The concept of political liberalism is simply ignored in a large proportion of discussions of welfare and social policy, as are the challenges Rawls poses to thinkers who would base politics on a single comprehensive normative view," and then drops this footnote: "This is true to some extent even in philosophical utilitarianism: Peter Singer, for example, has never, to my knowledge, addressed the challenge that political liberalism raises for his comprehensive view. It is ubiquitously true in philosophically informed areas of welfarist economics" (6, n.9).
Next up: John Gardner's brilliant paper "What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice."
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/06/nussbaum-on-perfectionist-and-political-liberalism.html
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Here is the offending passage in Nussbaum, a former teacher of mine:
" The Christian doctrine of the Trinity...asks the believing Christian to believe a contradiction....The doctrine of the Trinity may be interpreted in ways that soften this problem, but central strands of Christianity, at any rate, emphasize the importance of departing from the most fundamental axiom of reason. Nor is this a case that one might easily isolate from the rest of Christian doctrine: it is a premise in most concrete arguments that the believer will make or learn. It would be implausible, then, to describe this doctrine as “more or less consistent and coherent.” Indeed, its **whole purpose** is to violate consistency and coherence in order to humble reason. In other words, it is not just from the point of view of a nonbeliever that a key doctrine of Christianity looks irrational: its irrationality is absolutely key to its theological meaning and purpose."
**Emphasis mine.