Thursday, June 23, 2011
General Discrimination vs. Religiously Based Moral Objection to an Act: A Question for Steve Shiffrin
In his discussion of religious exemptions to same-sex marriage legislation (here) Steve Shiffrin draws a distinction between “general discrimination” on the one hand, and on the other hand “declining to participate in an act that you think is immoral.” Employing this distinction, Steve says that one could adhere to some foundational principle of equality such that a caterer would be prohibited from refusing to serve gays and lesbians generally but would be allowed to abstain from providing catering services at a same-sex wedding based on a conscientious, religious objection.
Steve foresees that adhereing to this distinction might lead to the case in which a caterer might refuse to participate in an inter-racial wedding. Steve would allow a religious exemption in such a case, though he would demand the satisfaction of some kind of religious sincerity test – while acknowledging the likely difficulties in implementing such a test.
My question, however, is whether the distinction between impermissible “general discrimination” vs. permissible discrimination based on sincere religious objection to an act can be maintained. Does the school which does not wish to admit black students object to African-Americans “in general” or do they object to the “act” of inter-racial education? Do the owners of a lunch counter which is happy to serve African-Americans in a designated space but unwilling to seat them next to white customers discriminate against blacks “in general” or do they object to the “act” of inter-racial dining?
Moreover, if the distinction can be maintained – if discrimination against the person as such can be distinguished from moral objection to the act that the person engages in – isn’t this precisely the distinction employed by opponents not only of same-sex marriage but of intimate same-sex relations? If so, then doesn’t the question become whether such moral objections can be founded on non-religious premises in a way that is convincing to a broad public?
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/06/general-discrimination-vs-religiously-based-moral-objection-to-an-act-a-question-for-steve-shiffrin.html
Comments
You can follow this conversation by subscribing to the
comment feed
for this post.
Professor Breen, I don't believe that you can base a non-religious argument against same-sex marriage and still sell it to a broad publie. In my humble opinion, this is where the argument against a civil version of same sex marriage has failed. In many ways, this argument cannot be easily seperated from a religious basis and it has even led a Mass going Catholic such as myself to support same sex marriage rights on a civil basis (and I do believe there should be exemptions for religious institutions). I simply do not beleive, that so long as the state will continue to require couples to register before marriage and so long as so many economic benfits accrus from marriage, that the public will or should continue to beleive that civil marriage should be prohibited to same sex couples.