Legal Theories of Honor

Nate Oman has posted a very interesting looking paper (h/t Larry S.) that attempts to revive and update a theory of honor to explain and justify private law.  A while back, Paul Horwitz tried to do something similar in the realm of public law for oaths (see here and also in this little review of Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty).  

Putting aside their substantive merits (both papers have a lot to offer), these assays to reconstruct honor for modern sensibilities are interesting as a sociological matter -- just as a matter of mapping the moods and movements of academic thought.  Oman quotes a piece by Peter Berger from the late '80s that I remember reading a while back called, "On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor," but it seems that obsolescence may be a cyclical rather than linear phenomenon.  Likewise, and as Oman notes, Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self describes a transition from 'honor' societies to societies of 'dignity.' 

All of this leads to a question: in what way (if at all) does the concept of honor figure into Catholic writing and thought?  If it is right that a dignitarian outlook has largely replaced the honor ethic (pace the good efforts of folks like Oman), was it always the case that Catholic writers spoke in terms of dignity?  And are there Catholic writers who rely explicitly on ideas of honor (and not dignity) to explain their views?