Thursday, January 13, 2011
Conscience (but mostly Rawls) in Pavia
This week I had the thoroughly enjoyable experience of participating in a symposium at the University of Pavia in Italy celebrating the publication of a new book on the law's treatment of religious and cultural diversity in Europe. The conversation centered on liberty of conscience and what that means (and should mean) in European society today. What struck me was the contrasting set of intellectual figures who serve as the touchstones for these sorts of conversations in Europe versus those in the United States. When we talk about the liberty of conscience in the U.S., we tend to look to history (or even theology) initially, and figures such as James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Roger Williams will figure to crop up sooner or later. In the conversation in Pavia, the figures referenced most frequently were: 1) John Rawls; 2) John Rawls; and 3) John Rawls. Obviously, when Rawls is the starting point, the liberty of conscience will end up in some curious places. One participant, for example, argued that a claim of conscience must be grounded in public reason; if not, the claim should be treated as a preference with no more force than other preferences.
Another participant was more supportive of individual conscience-based claims for legal exemptions, and while he could defend group claims as the aggregation of individual claims, he could not find space within his framework for institutional claims. The operating premise was that the state's authority is all-encompassing unless an individual (or a collection of indivduals) possess a sufficient countervailing interest to exempt herself from a particular exercise of authority. Institutions do not fit because they are simply "sets of rules." The notion of state power being limited in some non-instrumental way was not on the radar screen.
So while the hospitality of my hosts was fabulous, and the conversations challenging, I was reminded that the premises from which we begin the conversation have a significant impact on whether we have much to talk about.
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2011/01/conscience-but-mostly-rawls-in-pavia.html
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First, let me say that I'm surprised to hear that Rawls figured so strongly at the conference, given it's location. There are people interested in Rawls in Europe, of course, but philosophy is often quite local. So, this is interesting, if nothing else. (Unless it was just a bunch of Americans or people who did graduate work in the US on vacation for a conference in Italy- that would be less interesting.)
More substantively, though, I'm interested in hearing more from you about this bit:
"One participant, for example, argued that a claim of conscience must be grounded in public reason; if not, the claim should be treated as a preference with no more force than other preferences."
Depending on what one means by a "public reason", this might seem perfectly reasonable to me. For example, saying something like, "Doing X would violate a deeply held belief that I have, and there are others who could do X if I don't, thereby imposing no special cost on others if I do not do X. Therefore, I should not be required to do X, even if people reasonably believe they have a right to have someone do X, and I of course extend this same right to others about their deeply held beliefs in similar situations," would be providing a "public reason" on any plausible understanding. Note that saying something like this would also be treating everyone else with respect and not demanding special treatment for one's self. On the other hand, saying something like "I can't do X because the Holy Ghost said I shouldn't" would not be giving a public reason, and also would not, I think, give anyone who didn't believe the claim any special reason to respect it at all. Certainly, I'd feel no more inclined to respect such a request than I would one where the person said "I just don't want to do X- I don't like it".
Were people saying something different from this, and if so, what's wrong with it?