Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Sunday, October 10, 2010

Response to Fr. Araujo

Just a quick response to Fr. Araujo: First, my post did not make this clear enough, but I do not believe that the difference between Fred Phelps' rhetoric and opposition to SSM is simply a matter of degree; I was not vouching for that position, I was just describing that position as a formidable obstacle to the Church's arguments against SSM.  I reject that position, though I should have made it clearer.  Second, in the Twin Cities, the news was filled with stories of gay teenagers' suicides at the same time the DVDs were making news.  Whether or not certain bishops have made statements in the past on this issue againt bullying, I believe that it is important to make such statements when the public is focused on the issue, especially when the only mention of the Church's advocacy during that news cycle focused on the DVDs.  On an issue that is this explosive, and on which the media is more inclined to report counter-cultural Catholic teachings, it is important to make the anti-bullying statements (and perhaps even support anti-bullying legislation?) over and over and over. 

Saturday, October 9, 2010

The Church’s public role and responsibility

 

I thank Rob for his post on the Twin Cities church’s efforts in the ongoing marriage debate and the perception of some who choose to respond to the Church and her teachings in a particular way such as that depicted in the cartoon posted by Rob and upon which he commented. I take this opportunity to respond to two friends, Rob and to Russ for whom I have great respect and affection. Russ’s posting addressed the issues of gay teen suicides and complicity.  While I disagree with some of what they said, I take this opportunity to state and briefly explain my disagreement. However, if my disagreements stem from a misperception of their positions and arguments, I welcome any necessary correction.

 Let me begin with Rob’s discussion of the public perception of discrimination. I conclude that this issue emerges from the further perception that the Church’s teachings on homosexuality discriminates against homosexual persons when the question of marriage is under discussion. If the Church’s teachings discriminate in that some individuals may be excluded from marriage due to their particular status, the real question then becomes this: is this discrimination unjust? The Church in her teachings has long made the distinction between just and unjust discrimination.  If we think about it, discrimination surrounds us every day, but these discriminations are not necessarily unjust and are probably based on objective reasoning if they are accepted as the foundation of how we live our lives in common. For example, when a faculty is hiring someone for a teaching post, it has to select one candidate and discriminate against others who are not hired. Their decision is presumably based on the school’s teaching needs, respective credentials of the candidates, and other justifiable concerns. When a teacher gives an “A” to one student and an “F” to another student, there is discrimination, but again is this discrimination unjust? If the two students’ respective performances were evaluated on the basis of the same criteria, this discrimination is not unjust. When a licensing authority denies a motor vehicle operator’s license to a candidate who cannot read road signs and whose impaired vision does not permit safe operation of a motor vehicle, there is discrimination but it is not unjust. If a doctor prohibits a chemotherapy patient from consuming alcohol because of the potential conflict between the two types of cocktails, there is discrimination but it is not unjust. Hence, there is a need to be clear about what kind of discrimination—just or unjust—is being addressed. The Church’s discrimination is not unjust when it advances the position that homosexual couples are not the same as heterosexual couples in spite of the counterargument that they are “equal”.

I am in agreement with both Rob that it is wrong to express “the vilest sentiments” about any person including members of so-called sexual minorities. However, I must recall here what the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stated in its “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons” (1992) quoting from its 1986 “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons” about this very issue:

It is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and are the object of violent malice in speech or in action. Such treatment deserves condemnation from the Church’s pastors wherever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard for others which endangers the most fundamental principles of a healthy society. The intrinsic dignity of each person must always be respected in word, in action and in law. But the proper reaction to crimes committed against homosexual persons should not be to claim that the homosexual condition is not disordered.

But I must respectfully register my disagreement with what appears to be Rob’s conclusion that an expression of “the vilest sentiments about gays and lesbians is simply a difference in degree from excluding gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage.” One does not express “the vilest sentiments about gays and lesbians” or anyone else excluded from marriage such as children, persons within certain degrees of consanguinity, or polygamists when the speaker demonstrates objective reasons supporting the argument that not all persons may marry the person or persons whom they wish to marry. To point out why marriage should be restricted to certain individuals and not open to others is not to express anything vile about those persons in the second category.

As I read his posting, Rob relies on certain claims to individual liberty which are presumably an “organizing principle.” I’ll have to raise one more time my concern that the individual liberty principle must have some sensible limit if it is to mean anything in the law and if it is to avoid the inherent problems with self-definition. In regard to the last statement, I have argued on several previous occasions at the MoJ that the Supreme Court’s expression about liberty in Planned Parenthood v. Casey leads inevitably to a head-on collision of competing liberty claims. Authentic liberty cannot be without limit, it cannot be solely defined by the person claiming its exercise, and it must be ordered if it is to have any meaning.

While Rob acknowledges that the Church has not been silent about the humanity of homosexual persons (as noted above), I think it wrong to question Archbishop Nienstedt for not addressing the recent teen suicides in his public statements about the marriage question that is before the citizens of Minnesota. Whether silence is relative or not, it should not be mistaken for approval. It is significant to note here that in other fora, the Archdiocese (in August of this year) addressed the very question of bullying and cyber-bullying that has been responsible for or implicated in the recent deaths of young people. The critique of Archbishop Nienstedt and the Twin Cities Archdiocese in this regard for presumably missing the opportunity to address these tragedies is misplaced.

While I am on this issue, I wonder if Rob thinks that Church officials should also address at this time other issues that harmfully affect gay and lesbian persons. I stopped by the digital information commons earlier today and read some articles in the Journal of Homosexuality published by Routledge which are illuminating about the harms that gay and lesbian persons confront in their lives. I believe it is fair to say that most of the articles I looked at are written by authors who are very sympathetic to the claims made by or on behalf of homosexual persons. But I discovered something of which I was previously unaware, namely, the body of literature that addresses abuse and bullying by members of the homosexual community itself; moreover, I saw a number of essays dealing with other issues, e.g., chemical dependency, that are linked with depression and suicidal thoughts and acts by homosexual persons. I just wonder if there is an expectation that Archbishop Nienstedt should have also addressed these important subjects since he was discussing the marriage issue and homosexuality? If there is an expectation that the Church address these matters too “early and often,” I am sure that the major media outlets should also do the same knowing that the Journal of Homosexuality has.

Unrelated to Rob’s or Russ’s specific posts but related to the issue of the recent teen suicides and Church teachings are many contemporary web and other media discussions on these which have appeared over the past several days. One that caught my attention was the October 7th editorial in The Heights, an independent student publication at Boston College. This editorial, “A Call for Reconciliation,” [HERE] is a strong critique against the Church and her teachings. While the editorial presumes to be a call for reconciliation, I don’t think it is. What is to be reconciled? If reconciliation means that the Church must surrender certain fundamental teachings involving sexual morality, then I guess that’s what it means to reconcile. This editorial takes the opportunity to identify the Church’s teachings as “homophobic” and intolerant. I am doubtful that such an approach promotes reconciliation. The authors of the editorial desperately want the Church to alter dramatically her position in order for “the great theological question of our time” to be addressed quickly. The editorial posits that if Boston College “aspires to be a leader in the Catholic world,” then it has to “explore ways to submit the question [meaning Church teachings] to rigorous examination.” The coup de grace of the editorial is found in its unsubstantiated allegation that “The Church can no longer choose to speak abstractly about the reality in the lives of Catholics.” If the editors cared to investigate, they would see concrete treatments of issues dealing with sexual morality issued by Rome, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and individual bishops. By ignoring these concrete endeavors of the Church, the editors’ heroic efforts hope that Boston College will be the “place where the tangled knot of Catholic moral theology on GLBTQ issues can be unraveled and debated by intelligent, thinking believers” where the Church will be compelled to change her positions on these matters.

If there is a robust critique of the Church’s teachings going on at Boston College, are the Church’s teachings and the explanations of why she teaches what she teaches receiving their due there? I’ll leave the answer to that question for another time. However, it does appear that Archbishop Nienstedt is, in fact, working hard to fulfill his responsibilities as a teacher of what the Church teaches. It is a pity that some folks, especially the editors of this editorial, fail to recognize this. Worse yet, some think it their duty to stop him from doing his.

 

RJA sj  

 

Friday, October 8, 2010

Announcing the fifth-annual Scarpa Conference at Villanova Law

I am pleased to announce the fifth-annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture.  The focus of this year's Conference is a monumental new book, published in June by Yale University Press, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, who will co-keynote the Conference.  William Eskridge is the John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School (http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/WEskridge.htm) and John Ferejohn is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford University (http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/ferejohn.html), Charles Seligson Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, and Professor of Political Science at New York University.
 
Other confirmed speakers include:
 
-Associate Justice David Stras, Minnesota Supreme Court; formerly a member of the University of Minnesota Law faculty (http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=JudgeBio_v2&menu=appellate&ID=30536);
-Martin Shapiro, James W. & Isabel Coffroth Professor, Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall) (http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=105)
-Kristin Hickman, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/hickmanke.html)
-Henry Paul Monaghan, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School (http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Henry_Monaghan)
-Thomas Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Thomas_Merrill)
-Theodore Ruger, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/truger/)
-Jane Schacter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor and Associate Dean, Stanford Law School (http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/133/Jane%20Schacter/
-Patrick Brennan, John F. Scarpa Chair, Villanova University School of Law
 
Please mark your calendars for Friday, February 11, 2010, and plan to join us at Villanova for what promises to be an extraordinary discussion of law, jurisprudence, and the political process.  I'll post more details as they become available.

Free Speech Assaulting Private Persons at Funerals: I Don't Think So

Oral argument was held day before yesterday in Snyder v. Phelps, the case in which demonstrators carried signs near a funeral of a Marine saying “God Hates Fags” (Snyder was not gay, but Phelps thinks America is sinful for tolerating gays and God is punishing America for its sins) and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” among others. If one thing emerged from oral argument, it is that Phelps is going to lose. The only question is what standard the Court will fix upon. From my perspective, this will be one of the few days in the history of the Roberts Court in which we can agree with former Justice Thomas Clark, “There is no war between the Constitution and common sense.”

The result will not be popular with those who never have seen a first amendment claim they did not like. And the usual suspects (the journalistic establishment, the ACLU, a group of First Amendment scholars, the Jefferson Center) filed briefs with the Court distancing themselves from the message of Phelps, but saying that our country stands for the proposition that we protect the speech we hate. Journalists are perhaps the most devoted First Amendment cheerleaders. Lyle Denniston, otherwise an outstanding Supreme Court reporter, allowed his deep affection for the First Amendment to get in the way of his commentary on the case. Denniston says that if passion guides the Supreme Court, that Phelps will lose. On the other hand, he suggests, if judicial detachment could be preserved, perhaps a different outcome might prevail.

Lost in this discussion is the novel character of the legal claim made by Phelps. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized for more than one hundred years. The claim urged upon the Court in some of the amicus briefs is that there is a constitutional right to deliberately inflict emotional distress on a victim through speech. More plausible, is the argument that the tort is unconstitutional when the speech addresses public issues. The Court held that the First Amendment protected a Hustler Magazine cartoon lampooning Jerry Falwell despite a jury verdict that the cartoon was intended to inflict emotional distress. The Court ruled that public criticism of public figures could not constitutionally be subjected to damages under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Phelps argues that the Falwell decision authorizes him to inflict emotional distress on the grieving mourners at a funeral. No doubt Phelps and his followers can carry their signs in public places from sidewalks to parks. The First Amendment is especially concerned to protect dissenters – even lunatic dissenters. But First Amendment law routinely strikes a balance between conflicting values. Speech is balanced against order, reputation, privacy, and intellectual property among others. Sometimes the speech value prevails; sometimes it does not. Here speech needs to be weighed against privacy and the emotional sensibilities of a parent mourning the death of a son. To decide in favor of speech in this case is not to strike a blow for judicial detachment over passion.  It is to preserve the sensibility of eleven decades of tort law over overly broad generalizations about, and an emotional attachment to, a formal, abstract, and confused conception of freedom of speech. To be sure, the First Amendment protects the speech we hate. But it need not and never has protected it anywhere at any time wholly apart from the damage it is intended to cause.

cross-posted at religiousleftlaw.com

Who gets to be a feminist?

Slate has asked their favorite "lady luminaries" the provocative question, "Who gets to be a feminist?"  You probably can guess where this is going, and Nora Ephron cuts right to it:

"I know that I'm supposed to write 500 words on this subject, but it seems much simpler: You can't call yourself a feminist if you don't believe in the right to abortion."

Thankfully, most of the views offered are more nuanced than Ephron's, but the nuance is more along the lines of "Who am I to judge?" rather than any deliberate recognition of feminism's potential harmony with a belief in the sanctity of life.

The Church's political advocacy, public perception, and SSM

This cartoon (from today's Minneapolis Star-Tribune) reflects the enormous problem facing the Church's effort to stop the inclusion of same-sex couples within civil law marriage.  Increasingly, it seems, the public perception is that discrimination = discrimination = discrimination.  Expressing the vilest sentiments about gays and lesbians is simply a difference in degree from excluding gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage.  Part of this dynamic stems from our society's increasing embrace of individual liberty as an organizing principle, part of it, I'm sure, stems from a deliberate strategy by some SSM advocates to obfuscate potential distinctions between public policy stances affecting gays and lesbians, and part of it, in my view, stems from SSM opponents' failure to take the lead in advocating against social practices that we can all agree bring unjustifiable harm to gays and lesbians.  Along with the DVD campaign, for example, Abp. Nienstedt could have publicly and prominently expressed his concern about the tragedy of recent suicides by gay teenagers, encouraged more vigilant efforts by school officials to police bullying, etc.  Of course the Church has not been silent on the humanity of gays and lesbians, and relative silence should not ever be mistaken for approval, but in this climate, I think the Church needs to be speaking out early and often about affirming and defending the dignity of gays and lesbians if the distinction between anti-SSM and anti-gay is going to have any long-term traction.

The First Amendment, Religion, and the Public Schools

On Wednesday, I discussed the First Amendment, Religion, and the Public Schools on WILL an Illinois public radio station (covering southern Illinois including Chicago and parts of Indiana). To find a link to the interview, go to the Cornell Law School site here or the WILL radio site here.

Thursday, October 7, 2010

Good news from Europe

The Council of Europe amended the proposed conscience resolution to include this key provision:

[N]o person and no hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion . . . .

(Thanks to Gerry Whyte for the pointer.)

Banning the burqa

Speaking of conscience protection in Europe, a disappointing (but not surprising) development in France.

Do natural rights attach to humanoids?

Science is poised to pose some challenging questions for our understanding of the human person; Catholic legal theorists also need to begin thinking about what science means for our understanding of the legal rights that attach (or do not attach) to the human person (or to a creation that looks awfully similar to the human person).  Adam Serwer reports on the ACLU's exploration in this area.

UPDATE: Thanks to R. George Wright for forwarding his article, "Pale Cast of Thought: On the Legal Status of Sophisticated Androids."