Mirror of Justice

Friday, September 10, 2010

Reflecting on the Sabbath

The Christian Century has a review of a new book by Judith Shulevitz entitled The Sabbath World: Glimpses of a Different Order of Time. The author is ambivalent about the Sabbath. The review describes the book as a "wide-ranging investigation of the Sabbath with stories of her own persistent struggle." The book covers not only standard religious sources, but also Hannah Arendt, romantic poets, and Stalin. The review by Dorothy Bass concludes that the book is an important contribution to the literature on the Sabbath and an important reflection on religious life itself. Bass hopes that the honesty of the author about her ambivalence toward the Sabbath will inspire similar honesty in her readers "as we help one another to discern the contours of faithful living in the information age."

Among other things, I try to follow the practice of engaging in spiritual reading on the Sabbath. But I have never read material about the Sabbath on the Sabbath. I am not sure whether it is better to read this book as a preparation for the Sabbath or whether reflecting on the Sabbath on the Sabbath in this way makes sense (but I share Shulevitz's sense that getting caught up in rules about the Sabbath is not spiritually productive). I am sure that I want to read this book.

cross-posted at religiousleftlaw.com

Thursday, September 9, 2010

Law and Neuroscience

By Kevin P. Lee

Andrea Lavazzo has posted an interesting comment on the Neuroethics and Law blog. Using the Terri Shiavo case as an example, Lavazzo argues that there is no evolutionary basis for the conflicting moral intuitions at issue in the case. Here is a summary:

In our example, the two individuals have opposite moral reactions, and consequently different physiological expressions, because their respective systems of moral values are very different. So the first individual will have a reaction of moral disgust (and consequently will raise his lip) because she believes in the sanctity of life and in our scenario life has been profaned. On the contrary, the other individual will have the reaction of moral approval (with the related physiological expressions) because she believes that the life of the woman was not worth living. The difference in the physiological responses of the two individuals can therefore be explained by referring to their respective cultural backgrounds, in which their moral views are respectively incorporated.

Neuroscience and law is an important project for those who follow this blog. It offers many interesting insights into how moral reasoning arises in the functioning brain. Dipping into this matertial is fascinating. It holds implications for philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, moral theory, and law.

It is enthralling to read about the successes of recent neuroscience--an astonishing number of insights into how the brain perceives, learns, reasons, and grows. But despite its advances, it must be viewed with appropriate skepticism. As Lavazzo points out in the post (with links to supporting research) there is a great deal of over-reaching and over ambigious conclusions in the research. Catholic thinkers have much to offer in this area as critical evaluators of the emerging field who might challenge the over-reaching of the neuroethics enthusiasts. And also as persons with lived experiences of moral and religious life that are the phenomena that neuroethics studies.

For anyone interested and able to attend, I will be speaking on the use of neurological evidence in religious free exercise cases at a conference on "Neuroscience in European and North-American Case-Law" that will take place on September 17, 2010, at the Court of Milan, Aula Magna, Via Freguglia n. 1, 20122 Milan (Italy) hosted by the Tribunale di Milano and the European Center for Law, Science and New Technologies at the University of Pavia. Contact the center for more information. [email protected]

please don't believe everything you read (even when it plays into your pet prejudices or vices)

By Patrick McKinley Brennan

I am hesitant to make this post, and I do so reluctantly and with personal sorrow. The reason for the reluctance and hesitation and sorrow is that some of what this involves is better forgiven and forgotten. But because someone else is using the matter to do further damage to a person I care about and respect and to an institution I respect (with some qualification that involves the matter that should be forgiven and forgotten), I feel obligated to set the record straight.

This editorial by law professor Carlos Ball doesn't mention Villanova Law by name in its ignorant and vicious broadside on the Catholic Church and Villanova in particular, but because Villanova Law is the only Catholic law school whose dean has resigned for the reason Ball mentions, everyone knows the place he's talking about. Ball claims that the dean there, the unnamed Mark Sargent, "vetoed" the offer the faculty had voted him. Ball further claims: "Knowledgeable sources later told me that the Dean did so because I was openly gay and because of my writings in support of LGBT rights."

I wish these "knowledgeable sources" would present themselves to me in person so that we can set the record straight in person. But I need to set the public record straight as well, at least to the extent I am not bound by obligations of confidentiality. I will stipulate for present purposes that Prof. Ball believed that his sources were in fact "knowledgeable" (though his total lack of compassion for the failing that led to Dean Sargent's resignation from the deanship raises questions of integrity in my mind). Those sources were, however, in error, and I don't know whether their intent was to calumniate Sargent and Villanova Law, but their false statements did in fact contribute to the calumniations Ball offered to all the world. I am aware of no one on the Villanova Law faculty, including the former member Dean Sargent, who would oppose a faculty candidate on the basis of sexual orientation. Absolutely no one. Dean Sargent in fact later led a full-court-press effort to recruit a gay entry-level candidate who was in an open relationship. One of the catered recruiting dinners was at my house; the candidate and his partner were here, as were a University Vice President and several of my colleagues It was marvelous and memorable evening, and I am still disappointed that we lost the candidate to a better school. Sargent was fully behind all that recruiting. The faculty and dean were eager to have an openly gay colleague.

In a season in which Villanova is engaged in a dean search, I think it's vital to be unequivocal that Villanova Law faculty enjoy complete academic freedom. They can write about whatever the heck they want. I have colleagues who write about all kinds of stuff I regard as truly crazy, and many colleagues advance in print positions that are opposed to the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. That last fact, like the former, is not to my liking, but I accept that it is part of the American university model. If the then-President of Villanova refused to authorize Dean Sargent to extend an offer of employment to someone because of his writing in favor "of LGBT rights," that is (a) not Sargent's doing and (b) not a violation of anyone's academic freedom. I put this matter conditionally, because unlike my allegedly "knowledgable" colleagues who have savagely attacked a person and an institution, I recall that the meeting at which the decision regarding the Ball candidacy was announced was subject to the regular rules of faculty confidentiality regarding hiring.

I'm not saying who made the decision not to extend an offer to Ball, but I feel morally obligated to state unequivocally that Sargent did not act against Ball in any way on account of his being "openly gay." That Sargent did so is a lie, and I am very sorry those who told it contributed to Ball's personal hurt and misunderstanding and to damaging the reputations of both Mark Sargent and Villanova Law. Shame on you.

Macedo on Public Reason

By Rob Vischer

Stephen Macedo has posted his new paper, Why Public Reason? The abstract:

Some have recently argued that the ideal of public reason not only accords insufficient respect or freedom to some citizens, including some religious citizens, but in addition, it is superfluous. It is enough, according to Jeffrey Stout, Gerald Gaus, and others, if citizens converge on shared principles of justice. No practical purpose is served by the project of seeking to secure consensus on a common, public justification for such principles (what Rawls would call a shared “political conception”). This paper seeks to make the case that seeking to secure a common justification for our most basic principles does serve a variety of practical imperatives. These include greater guidance for public officials charged with interpreting and applying the principles, and greater stability based on deeper mutual assurance of our shared moral commitment to principles of justice. In addition, a shared moral justification can be expected to play an educative role over the course of time. I argue that all of these consequences are most important for the least well off (and most vulnerable) in society, who benefit most from the greater assurance that their fellow citizens are committed to justice.

On the Mosque, the Exorcist, the Pope, and other (First) things

By Rick Garnett

I just received my copy of the October 2010 issue of First Things. Lots of good stuff within: I think that Jody Bottum does a nice job of reminding readers that the "principle [of religious freedom] remains sound, even when it is violated or honored only in the breach." Yes, as I've grumbled recently, it would be nice if all of those who are at present outraged by others' outrage over the proposed mosque near Ground Zero were similarly outraged (or even bothered) by other assaults on religious freedom and yes, the speed with which many of the proposal's supporters settled on condescension and charges of bigotry as their strategy and explanation is off-putting, but, nevertheless, the religious-freedom principle does not depend for its soundness on the consistency or good faith of those who invoke it.

The issue also includes a review, by Don Briel, of George Weigel's new biography of the late Holy Father: The End and the Beginning: John Paul II -- The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy. (Order it here.) There is also an intriguing review, by Thomas Hibbs, of William Peter Blatty's new (!!) novel, Dimiter. As one who thinks that -- the dozens of installments of Saw notwithstanding -- The Exorcist remains terrifying and gripping, I'm looking forward to reading this book that (in Hibbs' words) explores in novel form both the "mystery of goodness" and "the mystery of evil."

And, Matthew Franck has a helpful review of Hadley Arkes' Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths. Like Franck (but, perhaps, unlike my colleague Patrick Brennan), I tend to think that the Constitution does not authorize federal judges to engage in a freewheeling, general inquiry into the "rightness" of duly enacted positive laws.

So, again . . . lots of good stuff. And, I (still) really like the re-design.

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

A follow-up to incitement to religious hatred

By Robert John Araujo, SJ

Thank you, Patrick, for your post on Mr. Damian Thompson’s report of the Peter Tatchell production that will soon air on British television. Mr. Thompson correctly takes to task those responsible for not only the production but also the distribution of a terribly flawed propaganda exploit that is being passed off as a documentary.

In the past I have been critical of some elements of the media because of what I saw in particular reporting as a disservice to the truth—not my truth, but the objective truth that surrounds us and to which our merciful God leads us. The Tatchell production is one further illustration of a concern that I share with others. So, what interest does Catholic legal theory have in this? One item quickly surfaces: if public discourse is vital to our society and the legal norms that it develops, do contributions such as the Tatchell production foster or suppress authentic dialogue vital to the democratic experiment? As John Courtney Murray reminded us a half century ago, “Civility dies with the death of dialogue.” The Tatchell documentary is counterproductive to dialogue. The harm to civility that welcomes the Church’s contribution to civil society may just be around the corner.

RJA sj

incitement to religious hatred: the possible case of Peter Tatchell

By Patrick McKinley Brennan

Damian Thompson in the Telegraph offers some telling data and insights about how incitement to religious hatred sometimes comes to pass. Could any educated person in good faith reject the corrections Thompson makes to Tatchell's "account"? The further question, then, is the source and motive for the misprepresentations Thompson calls out. Any number of possible answers comes to mind, though some more than others.

Call for papers: Journal of Business Ethics

By Rob Vischer

The Encyclical-Letter Caritas in veritate: Ethical Challenges for Business

The Journal of Business Ethics announces the Call for Papers for a special issue on Business Ethics and the Encyclical-Letter Caritas in veritate.

Inequality, Asset Price Bubbles, and Depressions

By Steve Shiffrin

It's great to be reminded, both by Steve's and by Rob's recent posts here, of recent, alarming trends in the direction of heightened wealth- and income-inequality in America. It's also lovely to be reminded, in this connection, of a terrific post by Steve this past July. I want in particular to recommend the double-issue of The Nation that Steve cited in that post. It is available here: http://www.thenation.com/article/36894/inequality-america . In addition to Robert Reich's piece, there are thoughtul pieces by Dean Baker, Jeff Madrick, and others.

Reich's mention, in his contribution, of a possible link between growing wealth- and income-inequality on the one hand, and asset price bubbles and busts -- hence recessions and depressions -- on the other, is especially worth noting and exploring. It is striking, for example, that wealth- and income-inequality measures in America circa 2008 had returned for the first time to what they had been 80 years earlier, in 1928. But this is just one interesting comparison. For as it happens, two old acquaintances of mine, Dave Moss at the Harvard Business School, and Richard Freeman with Harvard's Economics Department and NBER, have in separate empirical studies found a pronounced correlation between wealth- and income-inequality on the one hand, and financial asset price bubbles and busts on the other hand, that is much more general. And the link is robust across continents and centuries.

The mechanisms that Moss and Freeman posit to account for the correlations, however, I think inadequate. They speculate that as the rich grow richer, they are able to procure laxer and laxer regulation of financial markets. While there is doubtless some truth in that, I think the story inadequate because I don't think asset price bubbles are the product of lax regulation so much as they are the product of central banks' and other government organs' failures to recognize the sense in which bubbles and bursts are collective action problems, and their consequent failures to use monetary and tax policy, respectively, to address those problems on behalf of the collectivity. (I've harped on this point before, and linked to some articles I've written on it, so I won't harp much now.)

If I am right about this, then the role that wealth- and income-inequality play is that of instigating and fueling the collective action problem that is the asset price bubble itself. More specifically, the story is a Keynesian one, in which greater wealth yields a diminishing marginal propensity to consume and a correspondingly higher marginal propensity either to invest or to speculate. The first of those developments of course yields lower consumer demand and hence lower working class incomes and growing consumer debt meant to maintain purchasing power. The second for its part yields hyperinflation in financial asset markets -- a vicious cycle of price rises that can only be slowed either by (a) higher interest rates or tightened money supplies that risk worsening the lower consumer demand and lower working class income problems, or (b) higher capital gains taxes that tamp down the incentives of rich speculators to speculate and at any rate channel the 'winnings' to the general public.

A colleague and I are now at work on an empirical project aimed aimed at testing this hypothesis. Details to come. But what can be said even now is that it is somewhat suprising that so few seem thus far to have considered this proposed mechanism. Reich in this respect represents a refreshing change of pace. Thanks again to Steve, and for that matter to Rob, for effectively drawing our attention both to him and to the issue that so concerns him.

Cross-Posted at ReligiousLeftLaw

Income Inequality

By Steve Shiffrin

In light of Rob's focus on income inequality, I am reminded of two posts I put up on religiousleftlaw.com in July. In the first I asked: " What is most correlated with human well being including the reduction of poor health (including obesity, hypertension, mental illness, and diabetes) and social disfunction (including violent crime, drug use, educational failure, teenage births and incarceration rates? It turns out that the answer among nations that have reached a certain level of wealth is that lower income inequality correlates with better outcomes. This holds among industrialized nations and among the fifty states. This holds not only for the poor, but surprisingly for the rich as well (perhaps because societies marked by inequality heighten stress).

"These propositions are supported and developed in a new book called The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. The book is reviewed by Daniel Finn in the current issue of Commonweal."

In the other post I referred to an article by Robert Reich: "A few days ago, I called attention to a book whose thesis is that at a particular level of wealth, the most important factor in a nation's well being is equality of income, see here. The lack of equality of income of in the United States is particularly problematic. Robert Reich argues in the July 19/26 double issue of The Nation argues that our income inequality caused the recession. He argues that when earnings accumulate at the top, wealth is invested where other big investors are likely to put their assets. This causes speculative bubbles. Meanwhile, when wealth is concentrated at the top, the rest do not have enough purchasing power to support the economy. This helped us get into the recession and makes it more difficult to get out.

"Reich predicts that the pendulum will swing against the current inequality, but he is not sure whether it will swing "with reforms that widen the circle of prosperity or with demagoguery that turns America away from the rest of the world, shrinks the economy and sets American against one another."Reich outlines a series of progressive reforms. But those reforms would require the support of an enlightened business community to get through Congress.

"Although Reich purports to believe that such enlightenment will show up at some point, it seems more likely that change will only come when things get ugly -- when an economic populism of "mad-as-hell" Americans turn against the establishment. "