MOJ-friend and Prawfsblogger Paul Horwitz sends in these as-per-usual charitable and careful thoughts, responding to Chris Eberle (see here):
In a sense, Eberle's point - that the question is not one of the mosque's right to build but whether, given the public response, it ought to - hearkens back, interestingly enough, to other academic writing by Rick. What we have in a nutshell is a version of the argument in Establishment Clause law that some government actions respecting religion should be forbidden because they will be politically divisive. That concern is real and historically well-documented. But as Rick has written, it does not tell us enough. Few actions by government that involve religion, in one direction or another, will not be divisive; government's refusal to take certain actions (say, erecting a Ten Commandments monument) can be equally divisive to a different group of citizens. It is thus hard to decide in whose favor a divisiveness argument should run. And we would not want to make a constitutional rule turn on how loudly one side clamors against the other.
Of course, as Eberle has pointed out, the present controversy, if we leave the law out of it, involves private and not public choices, and that's potentially quite different. The mosque could always choose to build elsewhere. But that raises another question, again drawn from constitutional doctrine: that of the heckler's veto. The mosque believes that it will build bridges to the Muslim and non-Muslim community in the long run by building in lower Manhattan. A vocal group opposes its decision to do so. As Eberle says, the furor is supposed to convince the mosque to desist. But we could say the same about any speech situation, and we often hesitate to put the final say in the hands of the objectors. For one thing, the fact that there is vocal objection doesn't mean there isn't also a good deal of support out there for the mosque; those people's interests would be sacrificed if the mosque decided to capitulate to the loudest objectors. For another, perhaps the furor will subside, as furors tend to do, and the mosque will still be right that in the long run it will have built more bridges than it burned.
That doesn't mean we never believe, as a matter of respect rather than constitutional law, that a speaker should desist from speaking, or speaking in a particular time, place or manner, when there is substantial objection. We may believe that one is free to use racial epithets, but that one shouldn't, and that objections to those epithets are real and meaningful. We may support the right of those who condemn homosexuality to say so, but abhor a church group's decision to picket outside the funeral of a bias crime victim, like Matthew Sheppard.
But is this really such a case? Notwithstanding the vocal objections we have heard, is it really the case that building a mosque near Ground Zero is insensitive to either the nation (many of whom are Muslim citizens) or to the victims and survivors of the 9/11 attacks (same)? Even as a matter of dialogue rather than law, should the objectors here really have a de facto veto right? Or is it the case that, at least assuming the good faith of the mosque's organizers, the argument for building in lower Manhattan, if they choose to do so, should be stronger than the argument for their desisting?
And none of this yet considers the religious element involved. Many churches take actions that provoke objections from the local community - not because they want to give offense, but because they believe their mission requires those actions. A church that decides to substantially expand its seating capacity may infuriate local residents, and understandably so given the potential inconvenience, but it may believe it is religiously required to do so - and we in turn may believe that although the church could refrain from doing so, we ought in a properly functioning pluralist democracy to accommodate that church's needs if we can, even at the risk of inconveniencing neighbors. Likewise, a local community that objects to a church's decision to start or expand a program of feeding the homeless out of its basement could say, echoing Eberle's point about the mosque: "The fervor of our objections will make the homeless feel unwelcome and cause tension between the church and local residents. Therefore, your stated mission will fail. Even if you have the right to do so, you should stop." But for many readers of this blog, at least, the fact that the church feels compelled to continue with this program should be given strong weight, not just as a matter of law but as a matter of the respect that we accord to religious groups within our society, even when we are not members of that church.
The mosque may consider itself to be in a similar position. To ask it to build elsewhere, or not at all, is of course an option, just as we could ask churches to refrain from feeding the homeless near residential neighborhoods. But, knowing that the mosque considers building at this location to be important to its mission, both to the local Muslim community and others, should we ask? Or, despite the objections, should we say that it is better for our society as a whole in the long run to respect the mosque's religious mission, and respectfully tell the objectors that their complaints should not have the upper hand here, no matter how vocal they may be?
I won't answer those questions, although my views should be evident. I should add that I don't know what Eberle's own views are. I simply want to point out that our intuitions about what the law does here not totally unrelated to our moral or political intuitions about what we ought do as a matter of social etiquette or dialogue, and that there are powerful reasons at both levels to worry about giving an effective heckler's veto to those who object to building the mosque at this location.