Herein of Clarity and Confusion(s)

        1.  In his most recent post, Robby misunderstands what I meant when I said that then-Cardinal Ratzinger’s critique was “less than clear”.  To move the discussion along, let me take responsibility for the misunderstanding.  (Was I less than clear?)  Here’s what I meant--and mean:  Cardinal Ratzinger’s lament about “a dictatorship of relativism” was less than clear because even if, as I'm happy to assume, he meant exactly what Robby says he meant, the position Ratzinger was criticizing is not “relativist” on any account of relativism with which I am familiar:  epistemological, anthropological, or cultural.  I discuss the various relativist positions in Perry, The Idea of Human Rights (1998), at 57-86, in a chapter subtitled “The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters”.

        2.  Robby disagrees with me about how best to characterize the late Oxford philosopher John Mackie’s views.  I don’t think anything of consequence turns on this disagreement.  Nonetheless, I think that Robby’s characterization is, if not wrong, then suboptimal.  Does anyone want to take the time to adjudicate this rarefied terminological disagreement between Robby and me?  If so, then I suggest you begin by reading not only the account of “fictionalism” in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, here, but also Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West, “Moral Fictionalism” (where Mackie’s views are discussed as an example of “moral fictionalism”), here; and Richard Joyce’s outstanding book, The Myth of Morality, which I cited in my previous post.  But, again, unless I’m missing something, your time may be better spent:  Nothing of consequence turns on this terminological disagreement.

        3.  The issue of "proportionalism" is entirely beside the point in this context.  The views I was referencing—the views of some Catholic moral theologians that disagree with the magisterial views about the morality of same-sex sexual conduct—are not “proportionalist”.  See especially Salzman & Lawler, Theological Studies (2006), here; Salzman & Lawler, Theological Studies (2008), here.  (The latter piece by Salzman & Lawler is subtitled "A Response to Patrick Lee and Robert George".)  That debate—unlike, for example, the debate about the morality of abortion—simply does not implicate the issue of proportionalism.  That debate consists mainly of competing views about the requirements of human well-being.

        4.  The heart of the earlier disagreement between Robby and me—the disagreement, which Robby references in his post, that began with Robby’s contribution to the Tulane Law Review symposium on my 1988 book Morality, Politics, and Law—concerned the issue of (in)commensurability.  For readers who are interested, I critiqued the Finnis-George position in Perry, The Idea of Human Rights (1998), at 87-106, in a chapter subtitled “The Incommensurability Thesis and Related Matters”.