Wading into Michael's "deep waters"

Thanks to Michael for his recent post, in which he asks us to consider two hypotheticals in light of Jeffrey Goldsworthy's claim that "[j]udges may sometimes be morally justified in lying about what they are doing, but in a democratic and tolerably just society, only in rare and exceptional circumstances."  Sometimes morally justified.  Even in a democratic and tolerably just society.  But only in rare and exceptional circumstances."

So, my view -- which is certainly open to revision -- is that it is not "legitimate in either or both [of Michael's hypotheticals] for [a judge] to pretend that according to what [he or she] judge[s] to be the better interpretation of the Amendment, the policy at issue is unconstitutional[.]"  Part of the "deal", it seems to me, is that a judge is given a role -- a role to which power attaches -- on the condition that he or she agrees (promises, I think) not to "lie about what [he or she is] doing."

But, again, I could be wrong.  So, Michael, what do you think?