Whatever one thinks about the media coverageof you-know-what--in another man-bites-dog moment,
I’m with Peggy Noonan in her WSJ piece--there is the you-know-what
itself.Although many MOJ readers will
disagree with me—so what else is new?—I want to say it nonetheless:This is not the first time some powers-that-be in the Church have done the wrong thing for the wrong reason.
In the matter du jour, the wrong thing: the scandalous failure, in the United States, Ireland, and elsewhere, to deal appropriately with the
abusing clergy; the wrong reason:to
preserve the reputation/credibility/whatever of “the Church”.
In the matter du temps perdu, the wrong thing and the wrong
reason:well, let esteemed Catholic (and
British) theologian Nicholas Lash—for twenty years the Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University (1978-99)—explain.(Want to know more about Lash?google “Nicholas Lash”.)
In a letter to The Tablet on “The origins of Humanae Vitae,” September 13, 2008, Lash wrote:
I do not take issue with Dr. Kal’s argument (Letters, 6
September) but with his use of the expression “the minority report”. There never was any such report.The Pontifical Commission on Problems of
Marriage and the Family, as established by Pope John XXIII in 1963, consisted
of six people. By the beginning of 1965, the membership had expanded to 55 and,
part from a wider range of academic and technical expertise, it now included
three married couples.In February 1966,
two months before it began its fifth and final session, 16 cardinals and bishops
were added.Cardinal Ottaviani was now
president, with Cardinals Doepfner and Heenan as vice presidents.(These heavy pastoral guns were added, it
seems, because everyone now assumed that the commission was going to propose,
with near unanimity, a significant change in Catholic teaching on birth
regulation.)
On 28 June 1966, the commission’s report was presented to
Pope Paul VI by Cardinal Doepfner and Fr Henri de Riedmatten, the
secretary-general of the commission.A
few weeks earlier, four members of the commission, having decided that they
were going to be unable to sign the report, released a “working paper” explaining
their position.It is the paper from
which Dr. Kal quotes, and which has often, and incorrectly, been described as
the “minority report” of the commission.Two years later, after much agonized thought, Paul VI set the
commission’s report aside and issued the encyclical Humanae Vitae.
The four theologians who did not sign the report took the
action that they did, in large part, because they feared the damage that such a
change to official teaching on birth regulation would do to people’s trust in
the authority of the Church. Paul VI grounded his decision to reject the report
not on better arguments in the ethics of reproduction, but on considerations of
church authority: he felt unable to differ from his predecessors.The irony, and the tragedy as I see it, is
that, in the event, it seems to have been his refusal to countenance change which
gravely undermined the confidence of so many Catholics in the very authority
which he sought to uphold.
Looking for thorough analysis from the news media today may be expecting too much -- the resources for newsroom budgets being what they are.However, what might be an unrealistic expectation is almost an ontological impossibility where the news involves the Catholic Church in general and the Holy See in particular.
A recent story in the New York Times by Laurie Goodstein and Michael Luo entitled “Pope Put Off Punishing Abusive Priest” (here) which Michael P. linked to on MOJ under the provocative “Sad, disturbing news” (here) is a case in point.
The article attempts to paint of picture of a recalcitrant Vatican official, Joseph Ratzinger, who as head of the CDF approached the problem of pedophile priests with "little urgency" notwithstanding the "pleas from American bishops."
It is somewhat surprising to see an American bishop portrayed so favorably where clergy sexual abuse is involved, but where the current Pope is also involved, the media’s prospective seems to change.
The story concerns a 1985 letter by Ratzinger to Oakland Bishop John Cummins recently leaked by plaintiffs’ attorney Jeff Anderson.
The story does at least acknowledge the comments of Vatican spokesman Rev. Federico Lombardi, S.J., who "said it was wrong to draw conclusions based on one letter without carefully understanding the context in which it was written" and quotes Lombardi as saying that "It's evident that it's [i.e. the use of the leaked document by plaintiffs' attorneys in the news media] not an in-depth and serious use of documents."
But then Goodstein and Luo proceed not to seek to discover the context for a proper understanding of the documents.Although Lombardi’s comments would seem to challenge the journalists to provide “an in-depth and serious use of documents” they seem content with something less.They seem content to report that Ratzinger’s decision to laicize former Oakland priest Stephen Kiesle “did not come for two more years, the sort of delay that is fueling a renewed sexual abuse scandal in the church that has focused on whether the future pope moved quickly enough to remove known pedophile priests from the priesthood, despite pleas from American bishops.”
Sometimes, it seems, to get the kind of analysis about the Church that one would hope to receive from the news media, one has to instead turn to . . . well, the Church, or part of the body that is the Church.For just such an analysis I would recommend that MOJ readers see Rev. Joseph Fessio, S.J.’s comments here.
As Father Fessio notes the premise that “defrocking” Kiesle had “anything to do with protecting victims and preventing further abuse” is “completely mistaken.”Indeed, where serious sins like Kiesle’s are involved nothing “at all prevents a bishop from: removing a priest from all ministry; removing his faculties; reporting him to civil authorities.”Oakland’s Bishop Cummins had already taken or should have taken these steps.Sadly “the priest in question continued to abuse children after he was ‘defrocked’ and had married.”
As Fessio also makes clear, the letter, which Michael P. says is “sad, disturbing news” “did not mean that Ratzinger was not taking the priest’s sins seriously” and that “[i]f Ratzinger took part in ‘stall[ing]’ a ‘pedophile case’, the worse that one can say is that the wanted care taken in a canonical trial.”The right to due process, even for one who as it were, pleads guilty, would seem to be a high concern of the NYT, except where the Church’s ecclesial law is concerned.
Phil Lawler’s analysis of the story can be found here, and commentary by Rev. Zuhlsdorf on the initial AP story can be found here.
Perhaps to ensure providing the necessary context in her future reports Ms. Goodstein would consider putting Fathers Fessio and Zuhlsdorf’s numbers together with Phil Lawler’s on her Rolodex?
Today at St. Thomas we're hosting a symposium on Islamic Law and Constitutional Liberty. Participants include Noah Feldman, MoJer Russ Powell, Haider ala Hamoudi, Ali Khan, Clark Lombardi, John Bowen, Joel Nichols, and Rep. Keith Ellison (the first practicing Muslim elected to Congress), among others. I've only been able to make it to a couple of sessions, but they were interesting: Noah Feldman had an interesting analysis of the three levels of relationship between Sharia law and constitutional liberty (political, philosophical, and institutional), and Russ Powell used the example of Turkey to caution against "essentializing" Islamic law.
One talk that I found especially fascinating was by Clark Lombardi, who told the story of Alvin Robert Cornelius, a devout Catholic who served as the chief justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court during the 1960s. Surprisingly (to me anyway), Justice Cornelius was also a major proponent of the Islamization of the Pakistani legal system, arguing that there is a plausible version of Islamic law that is fundamentally liberal, and that the public would accept judges as authoritative intepreters of Islamic law. Prof. Lombardi suggests that Cornelius may have been more correct that we assume, and that some degree of Islamization may be necessary for the rule of law in majority-Muslim countries.
Yesterday, in the Basilica of the Sacred Heart, on the campus of the University of Notre Dame, I witnessed the ordination of two friends, Gerry Olinger (my former student) and Kevin Grove. It was an amazing, beautiful day. More than 100 priests -- many of whom are very close to my family -- concelebrated, and Peoria's (wonderful) bishop, Dan Jenky, presided. My 8-year-old son, who has probably played football with a dozen of these priests, and who has said that, "after he retires from the NFL," he wants to be one, too, was mesmerized. (He had the best seat in the house.) As they were processing out, probably twenty gave him "high fives."
These men have so blessed my life. I am grateful to God for calling now-Frs. Grove and Olinger to the priesthood, and to them for answering. What courage it shows, saying "yes" in these days, knowing that the joys of one's vocation will almost certainly be accompanied by unwarranted suspicion, snide jokes, and malicious attacks! It was tempting for me, during the mass, to dwell resentfully on the fact that, despite the best efforts of some, I would certainly trust any one of them with the lives and well being of my children far more than I would a drawn-at-random plaintiff's lawyer, religion-beat journalist, or public-school administrator. But, the occasion was just too happy, too joyful to stew for long about that. Instead, I just thanked God for raising up these "men with hope to bring."
Here is a paper that Eduardo wrote, a few years ago, on the religious-freedom-related work and thinking of Justice Stevens:
JusticeStevens has sometimes been caricatured as the Supreme Court Justice who hates religion, but an exploration of the cases in which JusticeStevens has voted in favor of religious claimants reveals that, rather than being moved by a reflexive hostility toward religion, JusticeStevens appears to respect religion as a powerful motivator of human action, though one that is largely able to look out for its own interests in the political process. Notwithstanding my rejection of the common view of JusticeStevens as hostile to religion, I argue in this paper that there are substantial problems with his actual approach. First, JusticeStevens has a tendency to treat religion as no more valuable than other valuable categories of expressive activity, a tendency that brings him into agreement with a great deal of recent scholarly commentary on the Religion Clauses. The protection he would afford religious practice is therefore largely coextensive with the protection afforded to expressive conduct more generally under the First Amendment, thereby rendering the Free Exercise Clause superfluous. Second, I argue that JusticeStevens places too much faith in the ability of legislatures to look out for the interests of minority religious groups, ignoring the important role that courts play in highlighting for legislatures the situations in which minority religions appear to be suffering disproportionately under generally applicable regulations. Accordingly, I propose a different approach, one that builds on Justice Stevens's views but that adequately acknowledges the unique value of religion in the lives of believers.
I tend to think that Justice Stevens -- who always struck me as unfailingly amiable and decent -- has been wrong in most of his religious-liberty and Establishment Clause votes and opinions. As Eduardo notes, he sees "religion as a powerful motivator of human action[.]" It seems to me, though, that it is a motivator about which he tends to be concerned, or suspicious. (I'm thinking here of his Dale dissent, or his suggestions that regulations of abortion present Establishment Clause problems because they are motivated by or reflect religious commitment.) Eduardo, do you think this impression of mine is unwarranted? Other thoughts? Comments are open.
Here's a story about a recent address by the Pope, recalling the "Christian humanism" exemplified in the lives of the saints. The story caught my eye, because we have so often -- here at MOJ -- emphasized the centrality of "anthropological" questions to the legal enterprise.
Recalling some saints whose memory is celebrated in the weeks to come, Benedict XVI affirmed that they are witness to a "Christian humanism" that differs deeply from an "atheistic humanism".
The Saints - the pope cited in particular the martyrs Maximilian Kolbe and Edith Stein - are indeed witnesses of “an antithesis which spans history, but at the end of the second millennium, with the contemporary nihilism, we have come to a crucial point, as major writers and thinkers have perceived, and as events have amply demonstrated." . . .
Here's a link to a book chapter I've done, for a forthcoming volume (edited by John Witte and Frank Alexander) on "Christianity and Human Rights."
What is the “right to freedom of religion,” a right which our leading human-rights instruments commit us to protecting, and what are the legal and other mechanisms that will sustain and vindicate our commitment? Some mechanisms might be better (or less well) designed for the purpose and so might work better (or less well) than others; some actors and authorities might be more (or less) reliable and effective protectors than others. In other words, the project of protecting human rights – including the right to religious freedom – involves not only reflecting on human goods and goals, but also wrestling with questions about institutional design and competence.
This chapter considers both the content of religious freedom and the ways it is protected and promoted. It proposes, first, that the “right to freedom of religion” belongs not only to individuals, but also to institutions, associations, communities, and congregations. Just as every person has the right to seek religious truth and to cling to it when it is found, religious communities have the right to hold and teach their own doctrines; just as every person ought to be free from official coercion when it comes to religious practices or professions, religious institutions are entitled to govern themselves, and to exercise appropriate authority, free from official interference; just as every person has the right to select the religious teachings he will embrace, churches have the right to select the ministers they will ordain.
Next, it is suggested that the right to church autonomy is a structural mechanism for protecting both the freedom of religion and human rights more generally. The relationship between the enterprise of protecting human rights and religious communities’ right to self-determination is a dynamic, mutually reinforcing one. Human rights law, in other words, protects church autonomy – it protects the freedom of religious communities to govern and organize themselves, to decide religious matters without government interference, to establish their own criteria for membership, leadership, and orthodoxy, etc. – and, in turn, church autonomy promotes the enjoyment and exercise of human rights. This mechanism is, John Courtney Murray thought, “Christianity’s basic contribution to freedom in the political order.” If we understand and appreciate this contribution, we will better understand and appreciate that often misunderstood idea, “the separation of church and state.”
The future Pope Benedict XVI, then a top Vatican official, signed a 1985
letter saying that a case needed more time and that “the good of the
church” had to be considered.
