Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Gay Marriage Comes to the United Kingdom

See this post by Steve Shiffrin, at ReligiousLeftLaw.

Commonweal's Paul Baumann on Archbishop's Chaput's Houston Speech

[Several comments on the speech here, including this by Paul Baumann, editor of Commonweal:]

I attended the Fordham conference on Kennedy’s speech, and remember well Shaun Casey’s rebuttal to those, such as Chaput, who insist that the speech was an effort to “privatize” religion. “After the [Kennedy] speech there was a question-and-answer period,” Casey said, “The transcript of the Q&A session is actually three times as long as the speech itself. The exchanges there, in particular, I think helped knock down the argument that somehow Kennedy was declaring his Catholicism to be purely private, and hence irrelevant. He embraces his Catholicism. He says he’s not renouncing his church. At the very end, he said, ‘I don’t think I made any converts to my church in the process of this meeting, but I don’t repudiate my faith.’”

So it seems clear to me that Chaput’s reading of the speech is anachronistic at best. Chaput’s talk is also studded with provocative but vague declarations about the false faith of others: “It’s a form of lying,” “They’re not optional,” “I wonder if we’ve ever had fewer of them who can coherently explain how their faith informs their work, or who event feel obligated to try,” “Too many live their faith as if it were a private idiosyncrasy—the kind that they’ll never allow to become a public nuisance. And too many just don’t really believe.” This doesn’t strike me as the kind of language one uses when trying to persuade those who might disagree with you, let alone fellow Christians. In any event, Chaput fails to make a plausible case that Kennedy’s speech “profoundly undermined the place not just of Catholics, but of all religious believers, in America’s public life and political conversation.” Even if you accept the notion that religious believers have been marginalize in this way—which I don’t—it’s quite a stretch to lay the blame at Kennedy’s door.

As many contributors to this blog know, long-time Commonweal columnist John Cogley was an important adviser to Kennedy and a speechwriter Ted Sorenson for the Houston address. Cogley concluded his 1973 book “Catholic America” as follows: “While Catholicism can coexist very well with separation of church and state, its best representatives will always refuse to separate religion and life. And that makes all the difference.”

Happy Anniversary, Front Porch Republic

If you are not reading the "Front Porch Republic" blog (here), you should be.

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Thanks, Michael

Thanks, Michael, for pointing this out. I would suggest that my route is more direct.


RJA sj

What the Archbishop actually said ...

... is provided in the link I provided!  Take another look, Robert.

Archbishop Chaput in Houston

Thanks to Michael P. for the postings linking the opinions of Sandro Magister regarding the address given by Archbishop Chaput yesterday in Houston.

I, for one, think it is important to read what the archbishop actually said


RJA sj


Chaput in Houston (2010) on Kennedy in Houston (1960)

[Cross-posted at ReligiousLeftLaw.]

[HT:  MOJ friend Gerry Whyte of Trinity College Dublin.]

Pick your favorite language, click, and read.

Newsletter chiesa

2 marzo 2010

La dottrina del cattolico Kennedy? Da dimenticare

Nel 1960 teorizzò la più rigida separazione tra Chiesa e Stato, per farsi accettare come presidente. Mezzo secolo dopo, l'arcivescovo Chaput lo accusa d'aver fatto un grave danno. Un saggio del professor Diotallevi sui limiti e i fallimenti della laicità


The Doctrine of the Catholic Kennedy? Worthless

In 1960, he theorized the most rigid separation between Church and state, in order to be acceptable as president. Half a century later, Archbishop Chaput is accusing him of causing serious damage. An essay by Professor Diotallevi on the limits and shortcomings of secularism


La doctrine du catholique Kennedy? À oublier

En 1960 il s'était fait le théoricien de la plus stricte séparation entre l'Église et l'État, afin de se faire accepter comme président. Un demi-siècle plus tard, l'archevêque Chaput l'accuse d'avoir provoqué de gros dégâts. Un essai du professeur Diotallevi sur les limites et les échecs de la laïcité


¿La doctrina del católico Kennedy? Mejor olvidarla

En 1960 teorizó la más rígida separación entre Iglesia y Estado, para hacerse aceptar como presidente. Medio siglo después el arzobispo Chaput lo acusa de haber hecho un daño grave. Un ensayo del profesor Diotallevi sobre los límites y fracasos de la laicidad

European Court of Human Rights

Press release issued by the Registrar  

Chamber judgment1

 
Kozak v. Poland (application no. 13102/02)

SUCCESSION TO TENANCY OF A FLAT DENIED TO HOMOSEXUAL AFTER HIS PARTNER’S DEATH IN BREACH OF THE CONVENTION

Unanimously

Violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)

in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)

of the European Convention on Human Rights

    

Principal facts

The applicant, Piotr Kozak, is a Polish national who was born in 1951 and lives in Szczecin (Poland). For several years, he lived together with his partner in a homosexual relationship. They shared a municipality flat rented by the applicant’s partner. After his partner had died in April 1998, the applicant applied to the municipality to succeed to the tenancy of the flat. The municipal buildings department denied the request in June 1998, claiming that the applicant had not lived in the flat before his partner’s death, and ordered the applicant to move out.

While eviction proceedings against him were still pending, the applicant brought proceedings against the municipality in 2000, seeking to have his succession to the tenancy acknowledged. Relying on the housing act in force at the time, he brought forward that he had a right to succession, as he had run a common household with his partner for many years and had thus lived with him in de facto marital cohabitation. The claim was dismissed by the district court, holding in particular that Polish law recognised de facto marital relationships only between partners of different sex. On appeal, the judgment was upheld by the regional court in June 2001.

The regional court did not grant the applicant’s request to have referred to the Supreme Court the question of whether the clause “de facto marital cohabitation” also concerned persons living in a homosexual relationship. Nor did it obtain a ruling of the Constitutional Court on whether that clause, understood as including only heterosexual partners, was compatible with the Polish Constitution and the Convention.

Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court

Relying in particular on Articles 8 and 14, the applicant complained that the Polish courts, by denying him the right to succeed to a tenancy after the death of his partner, had discriminated against him on the ground of his homosexual orientation.

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 23 August 2001.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

Nicolas Bratza (United Kingdom), President,

Lech Garlicki (Poland),

Giovanni Bonello (Malta),

Ljiljana Mijović (Bosnia and Herzegovina),

David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland),

Ján Šikuta (Slovak Republic),

Ledi Bianku (Albania), judges, 

and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar.

Decision of the Court

The Court agreed with the Polish Government that some of the applicant’s statements concerning the nature and duration of his relationship with his partner and his residence in the latter’s flat that he had made before the domestic courts and authorities had been inconsistent. However, it was not for the Court to decide which of the trial courts made correct findings of fact. It had to confine its examination to the proceedings at issue, concerning the applicant’s succession to tenancy.

The Court observed that in establishing whether the applicant fulfilled the conditions of the housing act the domestic courts had focused on the homosexual nature of the relationship with his partner. While the district court had also expressed some doubts as to whether the applicant had lived in the flat at the relevant time, both courts had rejected his claim on the grounds that under Polish law only a relationship between a woman and a man could qualify for de facto marital cohabitation.

The Court accepted that the protection of the family founded on a union of a man and a woman, as stipulated by the Polish Constitution, was in principle a legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment. However, when striking the balance between the protection of the family and the Convention rights of sexual minorities, States had to take into consideration developments in society including the fact that there was not just one way of leading one’s private life. The Court could not accept that a blanket exclusion of persons living in a homosexual relationship from succession to a tenancy was necessary for the protection of the family. It therefore unanimously concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.

Can a state restrict immigration in order to protect its culture?

Liav Orgad has posted an interesting new paper, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe. Here's the abstract:

This article addresses a simple but important and understudied question: Is culture a legitimate criterion for regulating migration and access to citizenship? While focusing on France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark, I describe how these states embrace illiberal migration policies which violate the same values they seek to protect. I then construct a two-stage set of immigration-regulation principles: In the first stage, immigrants would have to accept some structural liberal-democratic principles as a prerequisite for admission; these principles are not culturally-oriented but constitute a system of rules governing human behavior in liberal democracies. In the second stage, as part of the naturalization process, immigrants would have to recognize and respect some constitutional principles essential for obtaining citizenship of a specific state. I call this concept 'National Constitutionalism'. As the American debate on immigrant integration policy comes at a decisive moment, the European experience has some important lessons for U.S. policymakers.

How does the Church handle this tension?  On one hand, the Church emphasizes the importance of culture and warns about the homogenizing dangers of globalization.  On the other hand, the Church speaks out in favor of liberal immigration policies.  Would the Church ever support restrictions on immigration in order to maintain a distinct culture?  Perhaps the Church teaches that keeping people out reflects an overly narrow or defensive view of culture?  Or maybe that culture is not coterminous with political boundaries, so immigration policy is a poor proxy for defense of culture?  Has the Church already addressed this tension somewhere?

Happy Texas Independence Day!