Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Washington archdiocese ends foster care program

The lack of a broad religious exemption in the Washington D.C. SSM bill claims its first, but presumably not its last, casualty.

What should Catholic legal theory say to the "Tea Party" movement?

What does Catholic legal theory have to say, if anything, to the "Tea Party" phenomenon?  I realize that the New York Times is pretty quick to attribute ominous motives to any political movements that find considerable traction outside the 212 area code, but the destructive anger that seems to be building -- and the enthusiastic embrace of that anger by leaders of the movement -- is troubling.  I can think of a couple of lessons that Catholic legal theory could bring to the table: 1) blanket attributions of bad faith to our political leaders is a recipe for disaster; we are called to work together toward the common good, and a reflexive demonization of office-holders is not in keeping with our obligations as citizens; 2) references to the need for violence or revolution should not be made casually or except as a last resort; in this regard, does the rhetoric of Tea Party leaders reflect an awareness of the ideal toward which we, including our elected leaders, should be oriented -- i.e., a "civilization of love?"  This is not to ignore the potential value that the movement can bring, particularly with its focus on fiscal responsibility and its potential to cast a critical light on the corrupting potential of power.  But the substantive ends are not all that matters -- the tone of the conversation also matters if we are to promote, as the Church teaches, a "social life based on civil friendship."  Thoughts?

The Personhood Movement

I may be the last to know about this, but I was intrigued by the movement in Colorado (and other states?) to add a 'personhood" amendment to the state constitution.  Details here.  (HT: Howard Friedman) The amendment would be struck down by federal courts, but it raises some interesting issues, such as whether any law allowing abortion -- even in cases of rape, incest, or to protect the life of the mother -- would unconstitutionally discriminate against preborn persons.  These are just academic questions, it seems to me, at this stage in American legal history.

DeGirolami on Nussbaum on Equal Respect

Marc DeGirolami has posted his excellent new paper reviewing Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience.  Here's the abstract:

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum’s book, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). Nussbaum’s thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of “Equal Respect” – that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that Equal Respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense.

This piece criticizes Nussbaum’s elevation of the principle of Equal Respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum’s single-minded focus on Equal Respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the establishment context. The essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum’s approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses.

As Larry Solum says (and did say!), "Highly recommended."

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Dang, I used to enjoy "Family Guy"

I'm not sure I can anymore. 

Save the Date!

Open Hearts, Open Minds and Fair Minded Words
A Conference on Life and Choice in the Abortion Debate
Princeton University – October 15 & 16, 2010

Sponsors:
University Center for Human Values & James Madison Program, Princeton University; Department of Theology, Fordham University; Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania

Organizing Committee:

Charles Camosy, Fordham University, Frances Kissling, University of Pennsylvania
Jennifer Miller, Bioethics International, Peter Singer, Princeton University

Inspired by President Obama’s address at Notre Dame in which he called on those on different sides of the abortion issue not only to work together where we agree, but lso to engage in ‘vigorous debate’ with open hearts, open minds, and fair minded words.

Conference Panels

Plenary: The Moral Status of the Fetus.

Different perspectives on the moral status of the fetus deeply divide those who favor and those who oppose legal abortion. Proponents of different views will present and discuss their perspectives.
• Moderator: Arthur Caplan, Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania
• John Finnis, University of Oxford
• Margaret Little, Georgetown University
• Peter Singer, Princeton University

Plenary: A Woman’s Moral Duty to the Fetus?

This panel will bypass the moral status of the fetus and instead ask the following question: if we were to grant that the fetus has moral status, does it follow that there is a moral obligation on the part of a woman to bring her pregnancy to term?
• Moderator: Jennifer Miller, Bioethics International
• Charles Camosy, Fordham University and Ruth Macklin, Einstein College of Medicine

Plenary: From Morality to Public Policy.

This panel will debate the complex and important public policy questions remaining even after drawing conclusions about the topics of the previous two panels. For instance, if we were to agree that abortion is morally wrong, does this mean that we should prohibit it? Is it legally or practically possible to significantly restrict abortion?
• Helen Alvare, George Mason University
• David Garrow, University of Cambridge
• Cathleen Kaveny, University of Notre Dame
• Dorothy Roberts, Northwestern University

Plenary: Opening Hearts and Minds on Abortion. Is Common Ground Possible?

This panel will explore efforts to increase understanding, reduce conflict and find common ground among those who hold different views on abortion. In addition to analyzing past efforts, it will explore the current efforts of the Obama administration and make suggestions for improving that work.
• Panelists include: David Gushee, Mercer and Rachel Laser, Third Way

Plenary: Abortion in America, Should it be a Constitutional Question?

The United States and South Africa are the only two countries where abortion’s legality has been determined on the basis of a constitutional right. In the US this approach has been applauded and criticized on both legal and ethical grounds. This panel will ask whether it is sound public policy to rely on the courts, rather than the legislatures, to settle abortion policy.

Concurrent Sessions:
Do Some Reasons for Abortion Exacerbate Discrimination against Persons?
Preventing Unintended Pregnancies
When Might a Fetus Feel Pain and What Should We Do about It?
How Far Does the Right of Conscientious Refusal Extend?
Providing Support for Continuing Pregnancy

To receive early notification when registration opens, please contact:
Kim Girman, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
[email protected]

A conference: Jean Bethke Elshtain: The Engaged Mind

The University of Chicago's Divinity School is hosting "a series of cross-disciplinary conferences reflecting on themes inspired by the work of Jean Bethke Elshtain. Given the protean nature of her thought, one conference each year will take up a set of related issues drawn from her body of work. The series will bring together senior scholars and major thinkers, many of whom have been Professor Elshtain's interlocutors over the course of her thirty-five year career. From a variety of viewpoints, they will examine Elshtain’s contributions to the ongoing scholarly conversation and consider how the intellectual landscape has changed over time."  (More here.)  Participants and speakers include John Witte, Bill Galston, Mary Ann Glendon, and others.  Should be fun!

SSM and moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct

Michael Perry asks a good question, "Who but one who believes that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral will think it is  legitimate, that it is just, to deny access to civil marriage to the same-sex couples who intend for their unions to be lifelong, monogamous unions of faithful love, because there are other same-sex couples who do not so intend?"  I'm interested in the related but broader question: what percentage of people who oppose SSM believe that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral?  I'm guessing that it's a pretty high percentage, but there are noteworthy exceptions.  David Blankenhorn, for example, writes:

I reject homophobia and believe in the equal dignity of gay and lesbian love. Because I also believe with all my heart in the right of the child to the mother and father who made her, I believe that we as a society should seek to maintain and to strengthen the only human institution -- marriage -- that is specifically intended to safeguard that right and make it real for our children.

Legalized same-sex marriage almost certainly benefits those same-sex couples who choose to marry, as well as the children being raised in those homes. But changing the meaning of marriage to accommodate homosexual orientation further and perhaps definitively undermines for all of us the very thing -- the gift, the birthright -- that is marriage's most distinctive contribution to human society. That's a change that, in the final analysis, I cannot support.

I still struggle with the move from "adoption as concession to fallen world = very good" to "adoption as the child-rearing norm for a new type of marital relationship = so bad that the relationship threatens the well-being of children."  But it is this type of argument on which the SSM debate will rise or fall, I think.  In public policy debates, for better or for worse (and I know Robby would say for worse), it seems that everyone is a consequentialist now.  Are some of the consequentialist arguments shaped by moral opposition to same-sex sexual conduct?  No doubt.  But they still need to be engaged on the merits.  In the end, the outcome of the debate may turn on the question, "Who bears the burden of proof?"  Those who wish to change the longstanding definition of a social institution to include citizens who currently cannot participate given their sexual orientation, or those who believe that the institution's value to society derives in significant part from the nature of the procreative relationship between a man and a woman?

Monday, February 15, 2010

On religious objections to granting access to civil marriage to same-sex couples, con't

And this is what I have to say:

"If the only rationale for concluding that a coercive and/or discriminatory law serves a legitimate and sufficiently weighty governmental interest—the only rationale, that is, other than an implausible secular rationale—is a religious rationale, then the law violates the right to freedom of religion, which includes, after all, not only freedom to practice one's own religion (if one has a religion) but also freedom not to practice someone else's religion—or, indeed, any religion at all.  Freedom not to practice someone else's religion includes, of course, freedom not to be punished or discriminated against based on one's refusal to practice someone else's religion.  A coercive and/or discriminatory law for which the only rationale, other than an implausible secular rationale, is religious imposes religion on those the law coerces or against whom it discriminates; such a law . . . 'enforce[s] a purely religious morality [and thereby] unacceptably impose[s] religion on others.'"


Perry, The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy 119 (2010) (quoting Kent  Greenawalt, “History as Ideology,” 93 California L. Rev. 367, 390-91 (2005)).  See also Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution:  Establishment and Fairness  533 (2008).


On religious objections to granting access to civil marriage to same-sex couples

Same-sex sexual conduct—and therefore same-sex unions—are “in direct opposition to God’s truth as He has revealed it in the Scriptures.”  So said the Rev. Ron Johnson, Jr. on Sept. 28, 2008.  See Peter Slevin, “33 Pastors Flout Tax Law with Political Sermons,” Washington Post, Sept. 29, 2008.

This is what the Supreme Court of Iowa had to say--not the Massachusetts Supreme Court, not the California Supreme Court, but the Iowa Supreme Court--in Varnum v. Brien (2009):

            Now that we have addressed and rejected each specific interest advanced by the County to justify the classification drawn under the statute, we consider the reason for the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by the County: religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The County’s silence reflects, we believe, its understanding this reason cannot, under our Iowa Constitution, be used to justify a ban on same-sex marriage.

 

            While unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage and perhaps even shapes the views of those people who may accept gay and lesbian unions but find the notion of same-sex marriage unsettling. Consequently, we address the religious undercurrent propelling the same-sex marriage debate as a means to fully explain our rationale for rejecting the dual-gender requirement of the marriage statute.

 

            It is quite understandable that religiously motivated opposition to same-sex civil marriage shapes the basis for legal opposition to same-sex marriage, even if only indirectly. Religious objections to same-sex marriage are supported by thousands of years of tradition and biblical interpretation. The belief that the “sanctity of marriage” would be undermined by the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples bears a striking conceptual resemblance to the expressed secular rationale for maintaining the tradition of marriage as a union between dual-gender couples, but better identifies the source of the opposition. Whether expressly or impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex marriage due to sincere, deeply ingrained—even fundamental—religious belief.

 

            Yet, such views are not the only religious views of marriage. As demonstrated by amicus groups, other equally sincere groups and people in Iowa and around the nation have strong religious views that yield the opposite conclusion.

 

            This contrast of opinions in our society largely explains the absence of any religion-based rationale to test the constitutionality of Iowa’s same-sex marriage ban. Our constitution does not permit any branch of government to resolve these types of religious debates and entrusts to courts the task of ensuring government avoids them. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 (“The general assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”). The statute at issue in this case does not prescribe a definition of marriage for religious institutions. Instead, the statute declares, “Marriage is a civil contract” and then regulates that civil contract. Iowa Code § 595A.1. Thus, in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil judges, far removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, and focus only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licensing system that identifies a limited class of persons entitled to secular rights and benefits associated with civil marriage.

 

            We, of course, have a constitutional mandate to protect the free exercise of religion in Iowa, which includes the freedom of a religious organization to define marriages it solemnizes as unions between a man and a woman. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 (“The general assembly shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . .”). This mission to protect religious freedom is consistent with our task to prevent government from endorsing any religious view. State government can have no religious views, either directly or indirectly, expressed through its legislation. This proposition is the essence of the separation of church and state.

 

            As a result, civil marriage must be judged under our constitutional standards of equal protection and not under religious doctrines or the religious views of individuals. This approach does not disrespect or denigrate the religious views of many Iowans who may strongly believe in marriage as a dual-gender union, but considers, as we must, only the constitutional rights of all people, as expressed by the promise of equal protection for all. We are not permitted to do less and would damage our constitution immeasurably by trying to do more.  “The only legitimate inquiry we can make is whether [the statute] is constitutional. If it is not, its virtues . . . cannot save it; if it is, its faults cannot be invoked to accomplish its destruction. If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned.”

 

            In the final analysis, we give respect to the views of all Iowans on the issue of same-sex marriage—religious or otherwise—by giving respect to our constitutional principles. These principles require that the state recognize both opposite-sex and same-sex civil marriage. Religious doctrine and views contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and people can continue to associate with the religion that best reflects their views. A religious denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and a marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, or other person ordained or designated as a leader of the person’s religious faith does not lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious institution. The sanctity of all religious marriages celebrated in the future will have the same meaning as those celebrated in the past. The only difference is civil marriage will now take on a new meaning that reflects a more complete understanding of equal protection of the law. This result is what our constitution requires.