I have just posted a new paper with the above title on SSRN. It was presented at a conference at USC a few weeks ago. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1524436
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Forgiveness in Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Role in Intercommunal Relations
More news from Ireland in the wake of the scandal
This from MOJ friend Gerry Whyte:
Pope accepts Bishop of Limerick's resignation
The Vatican confirmed this
morning that Pope Benedict XVI has accepted the resignation
of the Bishop of Limerick Donal Murray. The story is here.
An Advent thought
"Why does faith still have any chance at all? . . . Because it corresponds to the nature of man. . . .Man possesses an inexhaustible aspiration, full of nostalgia, for an infinite. None of the attempted answers will do; only the God who himself became finite in order to tear open our finitude and lead us into the wide spaces of his infinity, only he corresponds to the question of our being. That is why, even today, Christian faith will come to seek out man again." Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger.
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
More on Weigel and the presumption against war
As part of our ongoing conversation about George Weigel's recent column on the "presumption against war" in the Catholic just war tradition (for other posts in this thread, read this, this, and this), Christopher Dodson comments:
I am certainly no expert on the church’s just war teaching or its historical manifestations through the centuries. However, upon reflecting on Weigel’s column two thoughts come to mind that might contribute to the discussion.
First, Weigel appears to conclude that a presumption against war does not exist because it does not expressly appear in the traditional manifestations of the just war teaching. Just because it does not appear in those cases, however, does not mean that it does not exist or could not exist In this respect, Weigel makes the same error he made in his response to Caritas in Veritate. He fails to look at Catholic social teaching as a whole. Specifically, he fails to interpret individual portions of the teaching, such as the just war tradition, in light of the whole Ironically, Weigel missed this very point in Caritas in Veritate.:
In this sense, clarity is not served by certain abstract subdivisions of the Church's social doctrine, which apply categories to Papal social teaching that are extraneous to it. It is not a case of two typologies of social doctrine, one pre-conciliar and one post-conciliar, differing from one another: on the contrary, there is a single teaching, consistent and at the same time ever new. It is one thing to draw attention to the particular characteristics of one Encyclical or another, of the teaching of one Pope or another, but quite another to lose sight of the coherence of the overall doctrinal corpus. (No. 12)
The civil law principle of in pari materia is helpful here. Just as statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and to give force and effect to the provisions of each, expressions of Catholic social teaching - indeed, all Catholic teaching - should be read and interpreted with a view toward the whole and with a view toward harmonizing and giving all parts the same force and effect.
Therefore, rather than viewing the just war tradition in isolation, it should be interpreted so as to harmonize with the entire teaching of the church. As already noted in some of the posts, there is support for the presumption against war in the Compendium, scripture, and elsewhere.
Second, Weigel argues that the just war teaching begins with “legitimate public authority’s moral obligation to defend the common good by defending the peace composed of justice, security, and freedom.” That is essentially the same basis for the state’s use of the death penalty. However, as Evangelium Vitae and the Catechism make clear, those obligations of the state do not exist in isolation. We are instructed that if “non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people's safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.” (emphasis added.)
Thankfully, the Catechism points us in the direction of understanding why the “hurdle” - to use Weigel’s words - exists with regards to use of the death penalty. It’s purpose is to conform to the dignity of the human person and the common good. In practice, this is a presumption against the use of the death penalty.
Following Weigel’s logic, if the explanatory clause was not there, we would have no reason to conclude that a presumption against the use of the death penalty exists. He would, however, be wrong. Like the hurdles in the just war tradition, the hurdle for using the death penalty does not exist in isolation and without reason. We would have to discover it’s reason by interpreting the hurdle with a view toward harmonizing it with the entire teaching of the church.
The Church's teachings on "just war" theory--the use of force
I have been following the recent thread on the Magisterium as it pertains to "just war theory"/the use of force. I have been contributing to an international project concerning these matters over the last couple of years. One of my draft chapters (minus footnotes) deals with a good number of the issues presented in the recent thread. Perhaps contributors and readers of the Mirror of Justice might find some of the points I develop useful for reflection and discussion. The paper is here: Download Araujo on use of force-just war theory
RJA sj
Good tidings to you?
I just came across this story from my native place in Massachusetts where I shall be visiting my family for Christmas. Yes, Christmas. I don’t mind saying Merry Christmas, or Happy Christmas as is the English custom. It is a sad day when a young individual is sent home and ordered to undergo psychological testing for drawing a picture of the crucifixion. For those unfamiliar with the La Salette shrine, it is a Catholic place of worship and devotion that has drawn many faithful over the decades. During Christmas, the shrine is decorated with lights that accentuate the images of the nativity. There is a large crucifix on a hill where the faithful can pray and/or recite the rosary. I think this particular part of the shrine left an impression on the young artist.
I wonder if he would have been disciplined if he copied for his art class Michelangelo’s Last Judgment or one of the famous depictions of the martyrdom of St. Sebastian?
It is a sad day when a school official believes that a student’s depiction of an important Christian image is analogous to a picture that depicts a student shooting a teacher and classmate and takes disciplinary action on such a misguided belief. What is permitted and what is not in the Massachusetts public schools these days is troubling. (In full disclosure, the mayor’s assistant is my cousin.)
RJA sj
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
The "presumption against war": Eberle critiques Weigel
[At my invitation, MOJ friend Chris Eberle (Philosophy, U.S. Naval Academy) weighs in. (You may remember that in an earlier post, I referred to Chris's brilliant book, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge, 2002).) Here is what Chris has to say:]
According to George Weigel, the just war tradition does not incorporate a so-called “presumption against war,” which he construes as the toxic assumption that the tradition “begins with a prima facie moral duty to do no harm to others.” Rather, just war thinking begins with “a passion for justice” – duly authorized political authorities have a duty to secure a peace “composed of justice, security and freedom” … by employing military violence in some circumstances. As I see it, Rob Vischer rightly expresses skepticism about this overall view. A couple of points seem worth making here.
First, it might be the case that most reputable just war
thinkers did not affirm anything like a presumption against war; perhaps they
repudiated any such presumption. So the
just war tradition might not include a presumption against war. But this claim has only the slightest
normative weight. After all, it might be
the case that there is a presumption against war and the tradition should come
to reflect that moral fact.
Second, why believe that the just war tradition should
incorporate a presumption against war? I
don't think we need much heavy lifting here.
Waging war inevitably involves the destruction, maiming, 'dehousing,' of
human beings – soldiers slit throats, bombs obliterate bodies, armies dislodge
and disorient populations. Given what
waging war on human beings inevitably involves, and given that each human being
possesses great worth, we always and everywhere have powerful moral reason not
to wage war. That is, we have a prima
facie duty to refrain from waging war.
This is no less true of modern industrialized war than it is over
ancient siege warfare or contemporary counter-insurgency. I can't imagine why anyone committed to human
dignity would want to deny this.
Third, the claim that there is a presumption against war is
consistent with the claim that there is also a presumption in favor of
justice. Weigel seems to think that
there is some tension here. I can't see
that there is. There can be many moral
'presumptions' (read: prima facie duties) that bear on the moral propriety of a
given act and, when there are, then one should take them all into
consideration. So, for example, the
political authorities have a moral duty to prosecute citizens who have violated
the law, but they should also presume that each and every citizen is
innocent. Presuming innocence isn't at
all in tension with a duty to protect the innocent from the rapacious. Again, the political authorities have a prima
facie duty to secure a just peace and they also have a prima facie duty to
refrain from employing military violence as a means to achieve that end. No tension here either.
Fourth, the claim that there is a presumption against war is
consistent with the claim that that presumption can be overridden by
sufficiently weighty considerations.
This is standard fare: we have a prima facie duty not to kill our fellow
human beings, but certain normative considerations might count decisively in
favor of our killing some particular human being in some particular case – when
he is bearing down on my children with the clear intent to kill. Again, we have a prima facie duty not to wage
war, but compelling normative considerations might override that prima facie
duty – when the Japanese launched their unjust attack on Pearl Harbor, for
example. Indeed, the countervailing
considerations that count in favor of war can be sufficiently weighty that
waging a given war can be, not only permissible, but obligatory. I take it that the United States was not only
permitted but required to wage war against Japan after Dec 7, 1941 – despite
the presumption against doing so.
One final point. Although I think that it's pretty obvious that there is a presumption against war, and so the just war tradition should incorporate such a presumption, I find it very difficult to get all wee wee'd up about it. Weigel thinks it important to deny such a toxic claim, but I really don't see the harm in it. Do others have a better sense than I for what's at stake?
Is there (or should there be) a presumption against war in just war theory?
Yesterday I wondered whether George Weigel is correct in insisting that the Catholic just war tradition does not (and should not) include a "presumption against war." Jonathan Watson points out James Turner Johnson's article on just war theory, including this excerpt:
The idea that Catholic just war teaching begins with a “presumption against war,” more recently phrased as “a strong presumption against the use of force,” first appears in the United States bishops’ widely read 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace. In the context of its original adoption, this conception had three important roots. First, it reflected a judgment about modern warfare as inherently grossly destructive, so much so that it could never be conducted morally or be an instrument of moral purpose. In the immediate context of The Challenge of Peace this conviction was focused specifically on the question of nuclear weapons and whether they might ever be morally used; the United States bishops’ answer was No, and in this they concurred with a wide range of opponents of nuclear weapons around the world. Though in certain ways this pastoral letter drew on the thought of Paul Ramsey, the statement (without mentioning him by name) explicitly rejected Ramsey’s conception that even in the case of nuclear weapons the key issue is human moral control: Ramsey argued for the possibility of a rational, politically purposive use of nuclear weapons—namely, counter-force warfare—while the U.S. bishops rejected any and all possible “war-fighting” uses and plans for use of such weapons. Their conclusions about the likely result of any war involving nuclear weapons mirrored Jonathan Schell’s contemporaneous image of global nuclear destruction and the end of human life: a “republic of insects and grasses,” as he famously put it in The Fate of the Earth."
And Alabama 3L Abe Delnore comments:
I think that George Weigel's problem, fundamentally, is that he thinks just war is the only intellectual tradition on war within Catholic teaching. In fact there is an older, better-attested rival tradition: pacifism. The presumption against war makes sense if you see just war as a response to pacifism, which of course is how it developed. Furthermore, every presentation of just war I can think of begins with the premise that killing is wrong; however, just war provides an exception to the general rule. So there is a good case for the presumption against war underlying even just war theory. And, of course, Catholics also have access to the pacifist tradition. (Indeed, I think I am right in saying that some Catholics--members of particular religious orders--are obliged to be pacifists; none are obliged to accept just war theory.)
Some interesting news from Ireland ...
... sent our way by MOJ friend and law prof Gerry Whyte of Trinity College Dublin. Gerry writes:
"MOJ readers may be interested in this Supreme Court decision handed down today
in which the Court ruled that in vitro embryos do not enjoy protection under the
Irish Constitution."
Court rules against woman in frozen embryos case
The Supreme Court has
unanimously dismissed an appeal by a separated mother of two
against the High Court's refusal to order a Dublin clinic to
release three frozen embryos to her with a view to becoming
pregnant against the wishes of her estranged husband. Story here.
O brave new world......
Check out this new article posted on SSRN:
MAOA Gene Predicts Credit Card Debt
Abstract:
Economists have long realized the importance of credit markets and borrowing behavior for household finance and economics more generally. However, none of this previous work has explored the role of biological constraints. Here we present the first evidence of a specific gene that may influence borrowing behavior. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show that individuals with a polymorphism of the MAOA gene that has lower transcriptional efficiency are significantly more likely to report having credit card debt. Having one or both MAOA alleles of the low efficiency type raises the average likelihood of having credit card debt by 7.8% and 15.9% respectively. About half of our population has one or both MAOA alleles of the low type. The results suggest that economists should integrate innate propensities into economic models and consider the welfare consequences of possible discrimination by lenders on the basis of genotype.
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