Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Is this really what government ought to be meddling in?

From ESPN's website:

Federal legislation that could lead to a college football playoff tournament will move a step closer to reality on Wednesday in a hearing before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives.

The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection will consider a bill that would allow the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prohibit any bowl game from calling itself a "national championship" unless the game is "the final game of a single elimination post-season playoff system." The subcommittee is expected to vote on the proposal on Wednesday after a line-by-line consideration of the bill.

Written and sponsored by Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex.), the bill is a direct attack on the BCS and, if enacted, would bring the long simmering controversy over the BCS to an end. In a legislative process that is long and can be tortuous, the hearing is a significant step. This is the furthest any bill on the BCS controversy has ever progressed on Capitol Hill.

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Paul Horwitz and reporters' errors

No, no, no, no, no.  No I did NOT say that no one would disagree with me about whether the NYT reporter manufactured a quote or did so in order to present Professor Lupu as impugning other people's motives.  What I said is that for a reporter to manufacture a quote in order to present someone as impugning other people's motives is outrageous, and no one would disagree about that.  As to whether the reporter manufactured the quote, as I inferred from Professor Lupu's first comment she had done ("I was not happy with the attribution of the word "fear-mongering" to me in that story.  I never used it in talking to the reporter"), all I can say is that the matter has been rendered murky by Professor Lupu's second comment (in which he revealed, to my surprise in light of his first comment, that the reporter had actually read to him the text of what she was going to attribute to him, albeit without mentioning the quotation marks, and he did not object).  So there we are.  It's hard to blame the reporter.  As for the more general point Paul Horwitz is making, namely that we're all human and make mistakes, I say, "amen, brother."  (You can quote me on that.)  I've certainly made my share, alas.  Noting that lawyers and law professors make errors and need forgiveness, and that the law itself recognizes excusable mistakes, Paul says:  "Surely we can extend the same forgiving spirit outside our own profession without rushing to assume that this reporter acted out of bad motives."  Dare I say it?  That seems to me to be a proposition --another propostion -- that no one would disagree with.

Cardinal Pell on Religion, Human Rights, and Policy

Here's Australia's Cardinal George Pell, speaking at a recent conference in Sydney.  Cardinal Pell is concerned (with good reason, it appears) about an ongoing investigation by that country's Human Rights Commission into the freedom of religion and, more specifically, "the compatibility of religious freedom with human rights[.]"  Cardinal Pell writes:

. . .  The tone was set when the inquiry was announced in September 2008. The ABC reported the Commission’s Race Discrimination Commissioner, Tom Calma, expressing concern (in the ABC’s words) “at evidence of a growing fundamentalist religious lobby, in areas such as same-sex relationships, stem-cell research and abortion”.[1] I am not a fundamentalist religiously, politically or morally.  But I was not aware that being a fundamentalist was against any Australian law; nor am I aware why this should be of any concern to a Race Discrimination Commissioner. This alleged fundamentalism is apparently one of the main reasons for the inquiry, and this attitude — that religious opinion and religious people in the public square are somehow a problem, perhaps even a danger — runs through the discussion paper the Commission issued to commence the inquiry.

In case there was any doubt about the matter, in August Mr Calma and Conrad Gershevitch delivered a conference paper on the inquiry which opened with these words:

"The compatibility of religious freedom with human rights is the subject of the most comprehensive study ever undertaken in Australia in this area. ..." [2] (emphasis added).

Let us spell this out: the clear meaning of these words is that religious freedom is not a human right and may not be compatible with human rights. This is an astonishing claim from a senior officer of the body responsible for the protection and advancement of human rights in Australia. Mr Calma announced the inquiry in a similar vein, comparing religion and human rights to oil and water – substances that do not mix.[3] . . .

Healthcare reform and undocumented immigrants: Cardinal Mahony speaks

NYT, 12/8/09

Op-Ed Contributor

Coverage Without Borders

By ROGER MAHONY

LOS ANGELES

AS the leaders of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops noted last month, the current health care reform bills in Congress are fundamentally flawed because they fall short in three critical areas: the prohibition of federal financing for abortions and the protection of current conscience laws; the inclusion of meaningful provisions to ensure affordability; and the defense of immigrants’ rights to health care.

Although all three areas are critical for this proposed legislation to be acceptable to the Catholic Church in our country, I would like to focus on the lack of adequate health care for immigrants who live in our midst but who do not yet have legal standing.

The two bills are quite different. The Senate bill bars undocumented immigrants from using even their own money to buy health insurance in the government-sponsored marketplace, or exchange, being proposed. The House bill allows undocumented immigrants to purchase health insurance from the exchange, if they use their own money and receive no federal subsidy.

Most studies estimate that more than 10 million undocumented immigrants live in our country. Many have been here for decades. The majority of these immigrants live in “mixed families” — some members of the family were born here, while other relatives are here without documents. It is unrealistic to think that these millions of people with roots deep in their communities are somehow going to pack up and move back to their country of origin — whether that is Korea, the Philippines, Russia, England, France or Mexico. Most have their children in local schools, the vast majority of them have jobs here, and all are contributing to the betterment of our nation.

It makes no sense to deny this large population necessary health care services. It certainly does not help Americans as a whole to remain healthy when millions of people, including schoolchildren, cannot get basic preventive care like immunizations and medications.

When undocumented immigrants are intentionally excluded from health care coverage, they are forced to go to the only place where they will be accepted for care: trauma centers and emergency rooms — the most expensive health care delivery systems in the country. What a foolish waste of money, particularly in a time of economic stress for everyone.

Using their own money, undocumented immigrants could receive basic health services through less expensive community clinics and doctors’ offices. Studies have shown that immigrants are generally younger and healthier than citizens, and use health care facilities and resources less frequently. Giving them access to less costly preventive care would help keep them that way. And by paying into the system, immigrants would make health care less pricey for all by spreading the risks and costs among a larger pool of participants.

At least the House bill allows undocumented immigrants to purchase health insurance from the proposed exchange. It’s difficult to understand anti-immigrant groups’ objections to this provision. No one would be rewarded for lacking proper documentation, since undocumented immigrants wouldn’t be eligible for subsidies.

The Senate bill takes us in the opposite direction and needs to be changed. How is the health of the entire country helped when the Senate will not even allow immigrants to use their own money to purchase their health insurance?

In many conversations with people around the country, I have found that the dreadful anti-immigrant rhetoric that dominates talk shows does not represent the views of a majority of Americans, who do not reject immigrants out of hand as a burden. Instead, they want to find a way for these people to emerge from the shadows and to begin down a path to legal status.

To deny our immigrant brothers and sisters basic health care coverage is immoral. To allow people’s basic health needs to be trumped by divisive politics violates American standards of decency and compassion. We should pass health care reform that provides access to all, in the interests of the common good. We must also enact comprehensive immigration reform that better balances our country’s need for a stable work force with the orderly flow of immigrants to help bring greater prosperity to all Americans.

Otherwise, in our country there will remain a permanent underclass left standing in the waiting room, asking for a doctor’s visit that will never come.

Roger Mahony is the cardinal archbishop of Los Angeles.

Personal Autonomy and Religious Law

Another paper of possible interest, this one by Farrah Ahmed:

The ‘millet’ and 'personal law' systems, found in countries such as India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia and Israel, are long-standing models of state accommodation of religious norms in family law. This paper, a work of applied normative legal theory, uses the Indian system of personal laws as a test-case to consider the extent to which these modes of accommodation undermine personal autonomy.

In particular, it studies the claim, made both in the context of the Indian personal law system and in debates in other jurisdictions on the use of religious norms in family law, that if people had a choice between religious law and generally-applicable secular law, this would remove any objection to such systems on the grounds of personal autonomy. It also studies the further claim that such a power to choose would actually make the personal law system better for personal autonomy than a system of general secular laws.

Liberal states, including the United Kingdom and Canada, increasingly face calls from religious groups to reform family law in order to accommodate religious norms. The conclusions of this paper contribute to the broader question of whether these states should do so, as well as the question of what form any accommodation should take.

Culture warriors?

Are those who work prudently and persistently "to impress the divine law on the affairs of the earthly city" culture warriors?  The task in the quotation marks is one the Second Vatican Council assigns to the laity.  (See Gaudium et spes no. 43.  See also Lumen gentium no. 31).  The Council fathers were of course aware of the fact of moral disagreement in the modern world to which they were speaking.

"Exposing the Underground Establishment Clause" in the abortion decisions

Justin Murray has posted a paper on SSRN that might be of interest to readers.  Here is the abstract:

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that women have a constitutional right to abortion based on the Due Process Clause. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court implicitly relied on concepts that properly belong to the Establishment Clause - in particular, the Establishment Clause requirement that all laws must be supported by secular purposes, not religious ones. This Article is the first attempt to describe and critically evaluate the Court’s use of Establishment Clause ideas in Roe and later abortion cases.

Some brief background is essential in order to grasp the structure and significance of the underlying Establishment Clause dynamic of Roe. The Due Process Clause allows the government to restrict fundamental constitutional liberties (such as abortion) if it has a compelling reason for doing so. States have defended their abortion laws by arguing that protecting unborn human life against homicide is a compelling reason to restrict abortion. This argument, advanced in Roe, directly presented the Supreme Court with the question of whether fetuses are human beings entitled to protection against homicide.

The Court, however, refused to answer the question and provided a convoluted, ambiguous explanation for its refusal. Careful interpretation of these ambiguous passages reveals the Court’s underlying concern that neither the judiciary nor the legislature may decide the question of fetal humanity because it is a controversial religious question. When the Court’s rationale is clarified and plainly stated in this way, it becomes clear that Roe’s method of analysis - rejecting the state’s interest not because it is false or unimportant, but because it is religious and therefore an inappropriate basis for political judgment - is identical to the Establishment Clause requirement that legislation must be based on a secular purpose.

However, the Court’s analysis is problematic, because Establishment Clause principles are consistent with governmental protection of fetal life. The humanity of the fetus can be plausibly supported, not only on religious grounds, but also on the secular grounds of philosophical, historical, and experiential reasoning. To be clear, I do not argue that these secular grounds prove beyond dispute that fetuses are human beings. Instead, I defend the more modest proposition that a debatable secular case can be made for viewing fetuses as human beings. This conclusion is not strong enough to justify criminalization or restriction of abortion (which is beyond the scope of this Article), but it does prove that such criminalization or restriction would not violate the Establishment Clause. Thus, the Court should revisit the fundamental question that it evaded in Roe and later cases: is the fetus a human being, such that legislatures have a compelling interest in protecting fetal life against abortion?

Paul Horwitz on the NYT's error

MOJ-friend Paul Horwitz writes:

Professor George, writing about a reporter's (serious) error in a story quoting Chip Lupu, says that the reporter "manufacure[d]" the quote from Lupu "in order to present him as impugning other people's motives."  He adds that this conduct is "outrageous," and that surely "not a single participant or reader of this blog would disagree with me about that."  I am a loyal MoJ reader.  I respectfully disagree.

Perhaps my own past experience as a journalist colors my views here, but I believe most reporters are conscientious and that even the best reporters are all too human.  The reporter in question surely made a serious mistake; journalists, I can attest from my own experience, take very seriously what falls inside the quotation marks and what falls outside them, and even if the sense of the quote were right, one should feel awful about getting the letter of the quote wrong.  This reporter does not appear to have acted recklessly; Professor Lupu says she read the relevant portions of her notes back to him, even if the mistake nevertheless occurred.  Still, mistakes can enter in when one takes written or typed notes on an interview.  Sometimes, the mistake is introduced not by the reporter but by the editor, and I do not know whether that is the case here, although I would still hope a reporter would take it upon herself to secure a correction in that event.  But we are all human.

Is there an MoJ-related point here?  You bet.  Reporters, like everyone else, make mistakes, even when they are trying their best not to.  If enough of them are made, we can start questioning the reliability of that reporter.  But I don't think we should rush in civil dialogue to assume that someone -- even someone at the dreaded New York Times! -- has deliberately "manufactured" a quote, let alone done so with a deliberate and malicious end in mind.  Most faiths distinguish between intentional and inadvertent wrongs.  Some law students (and professors!) sometimes place the quotation marks wrongly in a piece of writing, even when they are on a deadline that stretches to weeks and months rather than mere hours, and we do not assume they always do so deliberately.  Even the law believes in excusable error, and on the level of day-to-day practice lawyers regularly make mistakes and forgive each other's errors without assuming some evil intent on anyone's part; have not most of us gotten filing extensions and continuances, made allowances for other's need to reschedule, agreed to the filing of amended briefs or complaints, and so on?  Surely we can extend the same forgiving spirit outside our own profession without rushing to assume that this reporter acted out of bad motives.  To err is human. . . .   

Response to Kaveny on framing, "culture wars", etc.

My down-the-hall Notre Dame colleague Cathy Kaveny says that an earlier blog of mine shows that I have "too much energy."  If only!  (Readers familiar with Cathy's up-to-the-minute Colbert-blogging will know that hers is high praise.)  I'm glad that Cathy found my post "interesting" but worry that she might have read it as questioning the merits of "neutral framing", or as reflecting an inability to "see how someone who is reasonable could take the position that they take", or (worst of all) reasoning "instrumentally" in accord with a "culture war mentality."

A few thoughts:  First, I am happy to agree with Cathy that it can often be illuminating "to frame legal and jurisprudential questions in a general way", and to highlight the "structural similarit[ies]" between arguments.  I am not "uncomfortable" with "neutral framing" (How could I be?  After all, like Cathy, I'm a law professor.)  Sometimes, though, such similarities can be more apparent then real.  And yes, of course, the "merits matter . . . to everyone not just to you and me."  Still, "as . . . Catholic scholar[s]", Cathy and I will sometimes need to evaluate carefully the merits of structurally similar (or apparently structurally similar) arguments; in doing so, we are not (and should not) refusing to see how someone who is reasonable could take the position that they take, but are instead trying to determine which position we should take.

Next, Cathy asks whether the "actions of religious groups [are] deserving of special consideration when they break with the common morality?"  For starters, I guess I would say (in keeping with our constitutional traditions) that, as a general matter, religious claims for exemptions are stronger than other such requests.  But, I'd also say (in keeping with, say, Dignitatis humanae) -- and I'm sure Cathy would, too -- that the public authority need not and should not comply with every request for religiously motivated exemptions.  With respect to the particular debate Cathy is addressing -- the applicability of nondiscrimination laws to religious institutions -- it does seem to me (for plenty of reasons that I and many other religious-liberty scholars have elaborated elsewhere) that we can and should distinguish discrimination in employment and benefits by government and commercial entities (which conflicts with the liberal norms that do and should govern such entities' operations) from religious institutions' efforts to operate in accord with the different norms that might govern theirs.  (Obviously, there are limits; there always are.  The content and implications of these different norms will matter.  We can take seriously this distinction in our public policy without endorsing religiously motivated human sacrifice.)

On the matter of the "culture war mentality" and "instrumental analysis."  Culture-warring sounds bad.  Like Cathy, I worry about the tone and rigor of "public moral deliberation" and so about any "mentality" that undermines it.  I worry also, though, that it might be easier for all of us to see public-deliberation-undermining habits of mind, and purely instrumental deployment of lawyerly arguments, in others' interventions than in our own.  As Cathy says, no place on the political spectrum is safe from this temptation.  Cathy worries that "culture warriors make an argument because it advances their view of the way things should be –the merits — on an ad hoc basis–and make a different argument on a different issue."  Maybe "culture warriors", and lawyers generally, do this (we shouldn't, and I didn't); however, they also sometimes move too quickly from the merits of particular arguments to higher-than-warranted levels of generality.

Finally, with respect to the Stupak Amendment:  Cathy is quite right that the "money is fungible" argument could be (and has been) used to "stop students taking Pell Grants to Catholic colleges, or to stop the funding of faith based initiatives – or even to stop the funding of Catholic Charities."  It is not, however, necessarily "inconsisten[t]" to think that money's fungibility (i) warrants support for the Stupak Amendment but (ii) does not provide a good reason to oppose the President's funding of faith-based social-welfare agencies.  It would be inconsistent, I think, if the principle doing the work were "public funds ought never to be used to support of advance activities to which some taxpayers are opposed"; or "even indirect public funding makes taxpayers' complicit in those activities that are so funded, and taxapyers ought not to be forced to be complicit in activities they oppose."  Cathy is right -- a Catholic scholar (like any scholar) should point out such inconsistencies.  My own view on the matter, though, is that the Stupak Amendment is welcome not because it protects the consciences of taxpayers (I do not believe, generally speaking, that public funding of X should be regarded as wrongfully burdening the consciences of taxpayers who oppose X) but because (i) it puts law's pedagogical function to work in the right direction and (ii) it will probably result in fewer abortions.

So much for "too much energy."  I need an espresso. . .

James Capretta responds to Bob Hockett on health care legisaltion

A little whle back, Bob Hockett helpfully offered a spirited defense of the proposed health care legislation favored by most congressional Democrats against Charles Krauthammer's scathing criticisms.  James Capretta, a health care policy specialist at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and a former Associate Director of the United States Office of Management and Budget, defends Dr. K. against Bob's criticisms.   Bob and Mr. Capretta know a great deal more about this very important subject than I do, so I'm grateful to both of them for their efforts to inform the rest of us.  Disagreement on a subject this complex and difficult, even among people who share the same goal of insuring the uninsured while maintaining the quality of healthcare, honoring the principle of subsidiarity, and eliminating inefficiencies and other factors that unnecessarily boost costs, is anything but surprising.   The fact that it is a debate about means, rather than ends, makes it, in principle, less intractable than some of the other issues we discuss on MoJ, though its unavoidable complexity and the necessarily speculative nature of some of the economic and sociological judgments that end up determining one's position make it unlikely that a consensus will emerge. 

 

A Response to Robert Hockett

December 7, 2009

 

At the Mirror of Justice website, Robert Hockett takes exception to columnist Charles Krauthammer’s arguments against the current health-care bills being considered in Congress.

 

First, Hockett objects to Krauthammer’s accusation that the bills are sprawling, inelegant, 2,000-plus page behemoths. Hockett argues that this is the norm whenever Congress attempts a large-scale reform of a complex sector of American society. To condemn the current health-care bills on this score would be to suggest that no health reform legislation should be considered — because any credible one would look equally unwieldy once the congressional sausage-making process got a hold of it.

 

But Hockett misses Krauthammer’s larger point. Yes, the bills under development in Congress are unwieldy messes partly because the subject is health-care. But the bills are much more unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic because the authors start from the premise that the federal government has the capacity to centrally plan one-sixth of the American economy from Washington, D.C. That’s the main reason the bill contains scores of new agencies, mountains of regulations, and pages and pages of taxes, mandates, and fees.

 

Krauthammer is also right that, if enacted, all of this complexity would create perverse incentives and unintended consequences. For instance, as this paper from the Heritage Foundation demonstrates, the Senate bill would create powerful financial incentives for employers to discriminate against low-wage workers from low-income households. Employers that hired teenagers from poor neighborhoods could face penalties for not complying with the government’s new health insurance requirements, but they would face no such penalties if they hired teenagers from more well-to-do families.

 

Moreover, the bills would create massive inequities by treating households with identical incomes very differently depending on where they got their health insurance. At a recent session at the American Enterprise Institute, Eugene Steuerle of the Urban Institute presented data which shows that a family of four with $42,000 in compensation from an employer in 2016 would get $7000 more in governmental subsidization if they got their insurance through an “exchange” instead of at the workplace. This massive disparity is created by the complex rules in the bill which were written into it to artificially hold down costs. But, if enacted, it would only be a matter of time before Congress greatly increased the cost to the government by giving the same subsidy to everyone with the same income.

 

Krauthammer is also correct that many of the fines and fees are arbitrary. For instance, the fine for not obtaining health insurance is set at $750 in the Senate bill. Was this picked because it was found to optimize coverage at the lowest possible amount? No. As Jon Gabel explains in this Health Affairs blog post, no effort has been made to calibrate where the fine should be set to induce robust participation without being overly punitive. What’s happened instead is that Congress picked an arbitrary number for the fine and crossed their fingers that it would result in favorable budget and coverage numbers. There wasn’t any sophisticated modeling of the effectiveness of the $750 fee. It’s a guess, and nothing more.

 

Finally, there is the issue of what Krauthammer proposes as an alternative. For starters, Hockett says that savings from tort reform are overblown, but the Congressional Budget Office disagrees. CBO’s latest estimate shows the federal government alone would save $54 billion over ten years from a serious reform plan. Private costs would fall even more. In addition, Krauthammer’s proposal to convert today’s tax preference for job-based insurance into something that is fair, uniform, and limited — a proposal also suggested by Senator John McCain in his presidential campaign last year — would have dramatic implications in the health sector. All American households would have access to an equal level of insurance subsidization, thus solving the uninsured problem. In addition, there would much more pressure for decentralized efforts to control costs, without any need for clumsy governmental efforts which always lead to queues and lower-quality care. Yes, such a reform would be difficult to pass. But mainly because President Obama and his allies oppose it. They want a reform that is centered on full governmental control of health care. That’s why the bill is 2,000 pages and filled to the brim with governmental micro-management of every corner of the health sector. It doesn’t have to be so.