Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Please "Attack" Sparingly

Thanks to Bob Hockett for responding to my post linking to Mark Stricherz's commentary on Bob Casey's apparent lack of courage with respect to resisting the federal funding of abortions in the proposed health care reform bill.

Mark is more than capable of responding to Bob's comments (i.e. as to whether Casey is or is not principled or courageous) in detail -- something that I hope he will do in in the near future.  So I will limit my remarks here to a single point.

Bob urges Mark to "reconsider his attack" on Senator Casey.  Whatever else one may think of Mark's post, it can hardly be characterized as an "attack."  Mark notes that Casey has made "unpopular votes on the prolife side" and that Casey "wants to overturn Roe v. Wade."  Mark says that he "has a soft spot" for the Senator and recounts a lengthy interview he once had with him.  Clearly Mark criticizes Senator Casey for saying that he "will vote for health-care reform even if the legislation allows private insurers who cover abortion to get federal dollars" but then acknowledges that "[c]oming up with Casey's possible objections to making a bold stand on behalf of the unborn is not difficult."

This is hardly the stuff of an "attack."  It is reasoned, considered and measured.  Indeed, I suspect that Mark's post would strike most readers as the work of a journalist who is attempting to present a balanced view of Senator Casey's situation while also criticizing the Senator for not acting with the same courage that his father demonstrated.  Most people would, I think, agree that it is possible to criticize a person for a failure or shortcoming that one explains, without "attacking" them.

Bob's mischaracterization of Mark's post as an "attack" highlights, I think, a larger problem with respect to political discourse in this country.

The liberality with which the word "attack" is thrown around is simply astounding.  Like plastic beer cups at a Friday night fraternity kegger or colored beads thrown to women lifting their tops on Bourbon Street at Mardi Gras, the frequency with which the word "attack" is invoked to describe a point of view with which one simply disagrees is in no short supply.

This hyperbole, this misuse of the term "attack" to describe anything the reader disagrees with is simply irresponsible.  Mark's comments are not severe and aggressive, let alone spiteful.  They are instead respectful yet pointed expression of criticism.  If Bob Hockett wishes to stand by his characterization of Mark Stricherz's post as an "attack" on Bob Casey, then he should point out where such an attack occurs in the post-- something he simply failed to do in his MOJ response.  If not, I wish that he would amend his remarks.  Which is not to say that he can't -- in a reasoned an measured way -- take issue with what Stricherz says.  But let's keep the attacks to a minimum.

Something to keep an eye on

Irish abortion ban up before European human-rights court
Lawyers and activists argue an abortion ban in Ireland challenged by three women in the European court of human rights violates several articles of the Council of Europe's convention on human rights. In a case being closely watched by traditionally Catholic European nations, the three women told the Strasbourg, France, court that they traveled to Britain to seek abortions because of the Irish ban, which they say has caused them humiliation, hardship and trauma. The Guardian (London) (12/9)

In Defense of Senator Casey

Good Morning, All,

I'd like to thank John Breen for linking to Mark Stricherz's recent post on Senator Casey.  I must disagree, however, with the characterization of this post as 'thoughtful.'  With all respect to Mr. Stricherz, I think his post unfair to Senator Casey, and so I urge him either to reconsider his attack upon the Senator or to elaborate more fully his reasons for characterizing Senator Casey in the way that he does.

How does Mr. Stricherz characterize Senator Casey?  He suggests repeatedly that the Senator's decision to refrain thus far from threatening to filibuster the health insurance reform legislation now before the Senate, unless certain demands that he might make are met, is 'unprincipled.'  He relatedly attributes merely 'political' motives to the Senator in thus refraining till now.  And he repeatedly accuses the Senator of 'lacking courage' in light of thise decision. 

Mr. Stricherz also cites, apparently with intended approval, sundry hold-up threats raised by other Senators.  In particular, he instances Senators Landrieu, Lieberman, and Nelson, who have threatened to prevent independently compelling health insurance reform legislation's going through unless the full Senate capitulates to certain individual demands that these Senators make.  One such demand noted by Mr. Stricherz is Senator Landrieu's demand that the final Senate bill funnel $300 million in federal subsidies to her state.  To be principled, it seems, and to be courageous, is to hold urgently needed health insurance reform, willed by a majority, hostage to one's individual will to see certain pet demands -- including demands for subsidies -- met by the US Senate. 

Now it of course bears noting that the issue that most exercises Mr. Stricherz -- as well, of course, as Senators Casey and Nelson, though not Landrieu or Lieberman -- is much more than a mere 'pet demand.'  It is a matter of foundational moral concern, about which scores of millions of morally sincere -- might one say 'principled'? -- even if often confused, people have long disagreed and continue to disagree.  But the critical point here is that there is nothing in Senator Casey's refusal thus far to threaten a filibuster on behalf of the Nelson amendment, in the manner that people like Landrieu and Lieberman have done on behalf of their own demands, that warrants the attribution of unprincipled opportunism or cowardice to him, much less the accusation that he is 'lukewarm' or 'tepid' in his opposition to abortion.  Quite the contrary; I think it is at least as likely -- and indeed much more likely -- that Senator Casey is activated by high principle and admirable courage.

I'll quickly substantiate that suggestion with two examples, both of which figure at least obliquely in Mr. Stricherz's post. 

First, as Mr. Stricherz notes, Senator Casey voted in favor of Senator Nelson's proffered amendment to the Senate bill, which would have introduced a counterpart, to this bill, of the hotly contested Stupak amendment made to the House bill.  That itself constitutes a principled stance, as even opponents of the Nelson amendment would likely admit.  It might be a stance on behalf of the wrong principle, in opponents' eyes, but it is not for that unprincipled.  Moreover takes something an awful lot like courage to take such a stand as that, when s/he who takes it is a member of a political party in the eyes of most of whose members Stupak itself was, justifiably or not, an outrage.  An opportunistic Senate Democrat would have declined to offer any support at all for the Nelson amendment.

Second, as Mr. Stricherz and I suspect all MoJ readers now surely appreciate, the Stupak amendment -- and a fortiori, presumably, the Nelson amendment -- quite possibly (if not likely) fail the test of abortion-neutrality.  And the latter is the acknowledged desideratum of all people of good will -- abortion opponents and 'choice' proponents alike -- who wish realistically to see a more just and less costly system of health insurance put into place now, while leaving the much more fraught and presently unresolvable matter of abortion to continue contested in the same fora as it has been to the present.  Hence one can have very good, principled reasons, even as an ardent opponent of abortion, of Roe v. Wade, and of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, not only for refraining from filibustering a health insurance reform bill on behalf of the Nelson amendment, but even for opposing the Nelson amendment.  

In short, then, if health insurance reform is independently compelling from a Catholic social justice point of view, and if it can only be had by severing it from the equally or more compelling question of abortion, then there are perfectly good grounds, sounding in principles cognate to those that often go under the name of 'subsidiarity,' upon which either to reject, or to support only with misgivings, something like a Nelson amendment, while adamently refraining from threatening to obstruct the good will of the majority in favor of health insurance reform unless that majority signs onto that non-neutral amendment. 

Senator Casey, then, might very well have very good principled reasons, which he harbors and acts upon with great moral courage, for not joining such hostage-takers as Landrieu and Lieberman.  And I think that familiar canons of charitable interpretation militate in favor of our attributing motives underwritten by precisely such reasons to Senator Casey.  I for my part have no doubt about his earnestness.

Thanks for listening,

Bob

  

Obama's Nobel Address: Herein of "Just War"

The text of the address is here.

"The Theological Book of the Decade" . . .

 . . . is David Bentley Hart's "The Beauty of the Infinite."Mathew Milliner makes the case, at First Things, here.

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Mighty Casey's Son Strikes Out?

Friend of MOJ Mark Stricherz recently provided a very thoughtful post on Senator Bob Casey's lack of courage with respect to federal funding of abortion in the Senate version of the health care bill.  You can find Mark's post here at True/Slant where he blogs.

Religiously grounded morality in our politics and law

In his most recent response to Chip Lupu, Robby George wrote:

"The final paragraph of Chip's most recent comment presents liberalism's "old time religion" on the role of religion and religiously informed moral judgment in public life and the formation of public policy.  It rehearses various implausible liberal dogmas, including the one that claims that deviations from liberal beliefs about sexual morality and marriage represent sectarian views that cannot be rationally defended apart from appeals to revelation and religious authority.  The truth is that there is a serious rational debate among intelligent and intellectually sophisticated people of goodwill about the morality of various forms of sexual conduct and the nature of marriage.  Religions have something to say on the subject; and religious people have every right to enter the public square and make their arguments in the languages of their traditions--just as they have done on everything from gladiatorial contests, to feuding, to slavery and civil rights.  Not just conservatives, but also liberals who recognize the flaws of their tradition's "old time religion"--I have in mind scholars such as Michael Sandel and Bill Galston--recognize that liberal views about sex and marriage have no right to prevail in the domain of policy or anywhere else by the dubious expedient of ruling competing views out of bounds.  Liberals, no less than conservatives, have an obligation to make their arguments about sex and marriage and answer the counterarguments advanced against them."

There are several issues that need disaggregating:

 1.  What is the distinction between a religiously grounded moral argument and one that is not religiously grounded?  What is the distinction, that is, in the relevant context, namely, the context  of disputes about the implications of our constitutional commitments to the right to freedom of religious practice (in the U.S., a.k.a the right to “free exercise” of religion) and to the nonestablishment of religion?

 In that context, a moral argument is not religiously grounded if the argument neither asserts not presupposes either an affirmative or a negative position on these questions (or on variations of these questions):  Does God exist?  Assuming that God exists, what is the nature of God?  the will of God?  the activity of God?

 2.   Does the best understanding of our constitutional commitment to the nonestablishment of religion rule out coercive and/or discriminatory laws and policies that are based on a religiously grounded moral argument?  By a law (or policy) “based on” an argument, I mean a law that would not have been enacted (or that would not be maintained on the books) but for the lawmakers’ acceptance of the argument.

3.  Does the best understanding of our constitutional commitment to the right to religious freedom rule out coercive and/or discriminatory laws and policies that are based on a religiously grounded moral argument?  The right to religious freedom subsumes not just the right to practice one’s own religion, but also the right not to be coerced into practicing, and not to be penalized for not practicing, someone else’s religion.

4.  Are laws banning abortion typically based on a religiously grounded moral argument?  They are not, in my judgment:  There is a plausible secular moral argument fully adequate to support such laws—that is, a plausible secular argument that we can realistically imagine the lawmakers accepting in enacting laws banning abortion.

5.  Is government’s refusal to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions based on a religiously grounded moral argument?  In the United States, many who oppose extending the benefit of law to same-sex unions undeniably invoke religiously grounded—indeed, biblically grounded—moral arguments.  Still, the question remains:  Is government’s refusal to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions based on a religiously grounded moral argument?  In order to answer that question, we need to answer this question:  Is there a plausible secular argument for not extending the benefit of law to same-sex unions—that is, a plausible secular argument that we can realistically imagine the lawmakers accepting in opposing efforts to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions?  The magisterial argument about the immorality of “inherently nonprocreative” sexual conduct (intentional, deliberate conduct) is a secular moral argument.  Let’s assume for the sake of discussion what some would deny:  that it is also a plausible secular argument.  But is it a plausible secular argument that we can realistically imagine the lawmakers accepting in opposing efforts to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions?  Certainly not in my home state of Georgia, where most citizens do not entertain any doubts about the morality, say, of using condoms, etc., as a contraceptive.  In my home state of Georgia, and in many other places I assume, the determinative argument for refusing to extend the benefit of law to same-sex unions is religiously—in Georgia, biblically—grounded.

These are contested questions—questions that cannot be done justice in a brisk blog post.  I discuss them at length in my new book, The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  Alas, the book is too expensive ($80.00), but MOJ readers who are interested can see the table of contents and the introduction to the book (and a few other things) here.

A final comment.  In his post Robby mentioned the names and invoked the positions of Michael Sandel and William Galston.  So it bears mention that both Sandel and Galston were criticizing, in the passages I suspect Robby had in mind, mainly the misguided conception of “liberalism-as-neutrality” (moral neutrality), a conception defended over the years by Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and others—a conception attacked by me in the 1980s, in my book, Morality, Politics, and Law (Oxford University Press, 1988).  In a blurb he kindly wrote for that book, John Noonan said that my critique of (what I then called) “the liberal political-philosophical project” was compelling.

Hockett to Capretta

Hello All,

Many warm thanks to Robby for the kind thoughts on my earlier post, and for posting Mr. Capretta's reactions thereto.  I don't think that Mr. Capretta has managed to respond to the questions I directed to Dr. K, however -- doubtless owing to lack of clarity on my own part.  So I shall here attempt briefly to sharpen the points I attempted to make earlier, by addressing the observations offered by Mr. Capretta.

1.

Mr. Capretta first nicely characterizes my response to Dr. K's first criticism.  That response was to the effect that a complaint such as Dr. K's, directed as it was at the sprawling nature of the health care reform legislation now under debate, is effectively a complaint every piece of complex legislation drafted by our Congress since early in the 20th century.  For this Congress has long been riven by faction and, relatedly, beholden to an immense assortment of sectional interests.  That fact in turn is the product in part of our large, sprawling democracy and economy (have another look at Federalist 10), and in part of our perverse, plutocratic system of political campaign finance.  

Mr. Capretta does not appear to disagree with these observations -- at least he does not in his reply purport to do that -- but instead suggests that I have 'miss[ed] Krauthammer’s larger point.'  That larger point, Mr. Capretta goes on, is that 'the bills are much more unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic because the authors start from the premise that the federal government has the capacity to centrally plan one-sixth of the American economy from Washington D.C.' 

If this was indeed Dr. K's point, then I must confess to having missed it.  It was better for Dr. K, however, that I did.  For this putative point, resting as it does upon a falsehood, is not really a point at all.  The reason is two-fold. 

The first reason is that, while the health care industry as a whole constitutes a large sector of the full economy, the health insurance industry does not constitute anywhere near so large a portion of the economy; and what we are talking about here is not 'health care reform' so much as it is health insurance reform.  To make that point plain, and to draw consequences of the fact, is part of the object of the forthcoming article to which I linked in the earlier post.  Congress is dealing with a classic social insurance problem right now, a problem that all of our peer nations did systematically and effectively literally decades ago.  One cannot begin to understand the nature of the problem until one first grasps that fact, and then, ideally, second, takes a hard look at how our peers have managed it -- that we might learn from both their failures and their successes.

The second reason that the point attributed by Mr. Capretta to Dr. K is no point at all is that there is no question of 'central planning' here, at least in the pejorative, 'Soviet'-reminiscent sense in which those who now employ this familiar 1920-1990 term of art appear to be traficking, at all.  The only sense in which something like 'planning' that is 'central' is at work here is the sense that Dr. K and Mr. Capretta would presumably applaud:  Congress is attempting to understand the likely systemic consequences of the sundry components of the legislation it is contemplating, debating, and amending even now.  Not to do that would be to proceed in reckless disregard of precisely such 'unintended consequences' as those about which Mr. Capretta in a later paragraph expresses concern.  The way to avoid unintended consequences is to work systematically and responsibly to foresee them, assign reasonable probabilities to them, amend to avoid them, and allow flexibility going forward to respond to them if and when they emerge.  Call that 'central' planning' if you like.  I call it 'responsible legislating.'

2.

Mr. Capretta next cites a paper from the conservative Heritage Foundation, and a presentation made at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, that purport to show that certain disparities and inequities in treatment are apt to result from the legislation then under discussion in the Senate.  He cites these as examples of the kind of unintended consequence that he credits Dr. K with fearing.  I've only four brief reactions to these citations. 

The first is that I have no idea whether this is the sort of thing Dr. K had in mind, as the Op Ed to which I directed my earlier questions afforded no guidance on this score. 

The second is that I am thus far incompetent to judge whether these consequences are really apt to follow on the legislation now under consideration, or whether, if so, they are justifiable.  Perhaps Mr. Capretta can say something about why the Senators themselves have not seen these alleged inequities and acted to rectify them.  I for my part will have to take time of my own to look into them. 

The third is that if in fact these two particular consequences are apt to follow, and if in fact they are unjustified, then it seems to me that the correct course of action is to bring this to the attention of legislators and call for amendment, rather than to throw hands in the air and say let's wait another 15 years before trying yet again to bring down health insurance costs and get health insurance to the now uninsured.  Please recall here my earlier point to the effect that Dr. K's proposed remedy -- burning the whole bill and scattering its ashes over a swimming pool -- simply is too much like lancing a blister with a chainsaw. 

Finally, my fourth reaction is to say thanks to Mr. C for helping to make a larger point that many besides me (including, I think, Dr. K in part) have tried to make elsewhere.  That is that we could simplify things considerably and avoid Baroque complexities (no disrespect intended to the Baroque, a wonderful period of cultural achievement) such as those deplored by Mr. C and Dr. K were we to revisit the curious decision not to allow single payer (per Canada) or single provider (per the UK) onto the agenda at all. 

The 'Medicare for All' proposal recently made by academic doctors in the Lancet and New England Journal of Medicine, or cognate proposals to extend to all who wish it the health plan enjoyed by Congress members themselves, would be a lovely place to start. 

3. 

Mr. Capretta next takes up Dr. K's 'out of a hat' charges, essentially repeating them under the heading of a new colorful simile:  Now Congress is said simply to have 'picked an arbitrary number and crossed their fingers.'  I'll accordingly repeat here what I said in reply to Dr. K:  If this is true -- and I ask again how the leveler of the charge purports to know it -- the remedy is that suggested above in my third reaction to point 2:  Don't burn the whole bill and scatter it over a swimming pool; tell Congress to do the modelling whose absence you are deploring.

4.

Mr. Capretta next defends Dr. K's trotting out of the familiar tort reform canard.  He does so by citing a CBO study to said to estimate that 'serious' tort reform could save up to $54 billion per annum.  There are several reaons why this is not responsive to my objection to Dr. K.

The first is that my point was not that the existence of a tort system does not result in costs faced by healthcare providers.  Any system of accountability brings costs.  (Imagine how much less expensive it would be to start and operate a gasoline station if you didn't have to pay all that money to avoid exposing those pesky neighbors to benzine contamination.)  The point I made, rather, was that all the empirical work out there -- notably that of Greg's, Eduardo's, Steve's and my colleage Ted Eisenberg, who is hardly a molotov cocktail throwing 'liberal' -- shows that the putative 'liability crisis' decried periodically since the early 1980s by lawyer-baiting conservatives simply does not exist, nor has it every existed.  Adjusted for inflation, tort damage awards have been constant in the aggregate for decades.

The second is that, even ignoring the injustice that would result to wrongfully harmed people, and the incentives to carelessness in respect of the lives and limbs of ourselves and our fellows that we would lock into place, were we arbitrarily to eviscerate our system of tort remedies -- a system we and our Roman and English legal forebears have had literally for centuries, since long before becoming Americans -- saving $54 billion over ten years would amount to saving quite literally a tiny fraction of the costs currently wrought by our system of health care insurance.  Since Mr. Capretta has seen fit to cite the CBO, I wonder what he has to say about the far greater savings that the selfsame CBO has attributed to the bills currently before Congress. 

Finally, the third point is that there is a structural similarity between the familiar 'tort reform' canard and the 'unnecessary tests' canard I addressed in my earlier post responding to Dr. K:  It is easy to opine in the abstract that 'tests' in the aggregate are overprescribed, or that 'damages' in the aggregate are overawarded.  A funny thing happens, however, when it is you who the doctor says ought to undergo tests, or when it is you whose colon now contains a scalphel inadvertently left by a surgeon.  And just as the same people who complain of too much testing or too many unnecessarty procedures are those who complain about 'rationing' (either by govt or by HMOs) when somebody suggests actually limiting these things, my bet is that any lawyer-hater who actually knows or has been the victim of a reckless or neglegent medical practice (I do) will complain about govt's 'getting between you and your lawyer'  the moment that Congress attempts to eliminate accountability from medical practice. 

5.

Mr. Capretta closes by reiterating Dr. K's endorsement of Senator McCain's campaign proposal that we establish something more uniform in the way of health insurance provision for all.  To that I say, as I did in my earlier post, hear hear.  Please note also that this would be quite in keeping with what I suggest above under heading 2.  One warning, however:  In proposing something as radical (in the best, 'roots'-y sense) as this, Mr. Capretta risks being accused of attributing to Congress competence to engage in ... yep, 'central planning.'  See last paragraph under heading 1, above.

6.

Let me close by observing, once more, something I observed in my response to Dr. K's Op Ed, something with which I have yet to see those who object to the current efforts underway in Congress engage: 

We regularly hear innuendos to the effect that Congress is attempting to meddle in a 'free market' and is in so doing apt to lower the quality of our health care, as well as introduce inequities and, perversely, raise costs.  But these people have yet, to my knowledge, to grapple with the fact that we do not presently enjoy a free market in health insurance, and indeed never will enjoy such a thing in light not only of the antitrust and additional federal regulatory exemption currently extended the health insurance companies under McCarran-Ferguson, but more intractably still of the 'natural monopoly' characteristics of health insurance.  Nor have these people ever yet, to my knowledge, addressed the embarrassing fact that, of the full list of 30 OECD countries -- our peers -- to which the US belongs, the US ranks 26th in the quality of its health outcomes, while ranking first in the costs that it shoulders.  It is no accident that these facts are both found together.  Nor is it an accident that these peer countries I reference also are precisely those that treat health insurance as what I have been asserting it to be -- a classic social insurance problem.  (For goodness sake, even Bismark, hardly a leftist, saw this!)  It is high time we did so as well, in order that we be no more than a century late in so doing.  And until we begin saying explicitly that it is not 'health care,' but health insurance that Congress is aiming to reform, we are not apt so much as to begin barking up the right tree.

Thanks again for listening,

Bob

conference on rights of conscience in health care

With all the discussion about conscience, I thought I'd mention an upcoming conference entitled "The Future of Rights of Conscience in Health Care: Legal and Ethical Perspectives." The conference, which is co-sponsored by University Faculty for Life, Ave Maria School of Law, and BYU Law School, will be held on February 26, 2010 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.

The speakers will be Armand Antommaria, Tom Cavanaugh, Rebecca Dresser, Cole Durham, Clarke Forsythe, Jill Morrison, Richard Myers, Edmund Pellegrino, Rob Vischer, Lynn Wardle, and Robin Fretwell Wilson. The papers will be published in the Ave Maria Law Review. More information about the conference is available at this link. Here.

Richard M.

Bart Stupak, pro-life Democrat, defends his amendment ...

... in an op-ed in today's New York Times, here.

In the Senate:  "Besides Mr. [Ben] Nelson, the Democrats who voted for the ban on abortion coverage [which was defeated] were Senators Evan Bayh of Indiana, Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, Kent Conrad and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota, Ted Kaufman of Delaware and Mark Pryor of Arkansas."