Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Islam on Capitol Hill

There has been a lot of concern expressed in the blogosphere (and on Facebook) about a large Muslim prayer gathering on Capitol Hill scheduled for tomorrow.  One of the organizers apparently said some inflammatory things in an interview, including some notion about turning the White House into "the Muslim House."  That said, it seems to me that this is a moment when Christians need to show their commitment to religious pluralism and religious liberty by welcoming -- even celebrating -- an event like this.  Given the reaction to President Obama's remark that we are not a Christian nation (or a Muslim nation), I think it's difficult for many Christians (and secularists) to see visible manifestations of Islam in this country as anything but a threat to national identity.  The fact that this event may not reflect the wisest PR strategy does not justify a hostile "this is a slippery slope to Sharia" response.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

An article of interest to MOJ readers

Catholic Moral Demands in American Politics: A New Paradigm

By Jo Renee Formicola

J. of Church and State

Here.

A good day: New Eamon Duffy

I received today a copy of Eamon Duffy's new book, "The Fires of Faith:  Catholic England Under Mary Tudor."  A must-read (Ed.:  Have you read it?  RG:  No, but I just knowEd.:  Fair enough.).

Where goeth political debate?

 

 

Many thanks to Rob Vischer for bringing to our attention the recent developments regarding Professor Scott FitzGibbon of Boston College Law School and the “ruckus” over his appearance in a political advertisement concerning the state of Maine marriage referendum. At the outset of this posting I make a disclosure that Scott and I are good friends. Our friendship began thirty-nine years ago. At that time he was a nominal Christian, but in due course he entered the Church several years later. He has a keen intellect, and he searches for truth honestly and objectively.

I believe that Rob and I share the position that Professor FitzGibbon was clearly within his rights as a citizen and as a member of an academic community to express his view and propose to fellow citizens a particular course of action on an important political issue, in this case, same-sex marriage. In last year’s election season, I addressed the rights of individuals to participate in the political process, but I was and remain critical of those who deny to others the right that they insist on for themselves. [HERE] I am troubled by the fact that Professor FitzGibbon is being criticized for stating in the political advertising that he is a professor at Boston College. He did not imply or state that he represented Boston College. Rather, his identification was a statement of fact about what he does for a living and where he is a professor. Both he and I know that there are those members of his university who do not share all of his views on political issues just as he does not necessarily share theirs. In this context, faculty members from universities and colleges have often expressed political views and identify the institution with which they are associated not intending to imply that they speak for their institution. For example, last fall, members of then-Senator Obama’s Catholic Advisory Committee publicly associated themselves with their own home institutions that included Xavier, Harvard, Boston College, Toledo, Notre Dame, Georgetown, and Holy Cross. [HERE]

We all most likely agree that the issue of same-sex marriage is hotly contested subject generating robust engagement. But I think—I hope—that we can agree that it can be discussed and debated in a civil and rational manner. And that is precisely what Professor FitzGibbon has done. When certain views, his views in this case, are hounded from the public square, democracy is in trouble. When good people as citizens cannot enter a political discussion or enter a political campaign because others contend that their position is unwelcomed in the public debate, democracy is in peril.

I have raised on previous postings the thoughts of Christopher Dawson that provided insight into the point I was making. I shall do so again today. In a 1959 essay entitled Civilization in Crisis, Dawson said,

 

...if Christians cannot assert their right to exist in the sphere of higher education, they will eventually be pushed not only out of modern culture but out of physical existence. That is already the issue in Communist countries, and it will also become the issue in England and America if we do not use our opportunities while we still have them. We are still living internally on the capital of the past and externally on the existence of a vague atmosphere of religious tolerance which has already lost its justification in contemporary secular ideology. It is a precarious situation which cannot be expected to endure indefinitely...

 

The “ruckus” involving Professor FitzGibbon demonstrates that Dawson saw something happening in 1959. With the passage of fifty years, we have evidence that his prediction seems to be a most accurate one.

 

RJA sj

 

Teaching Terror as a Moral Obligation and the First Amendment

I think the question whether teaching that the practice of terror is a moral obligation is constitutionally protected primarily raises free speech issues (not freedom of religion issues), and under current law, the rules dictate that the facts are important. E.g., Yates, Brandenburg, Scales, Noto.   If the method of teaching is not constitutionally protected under the speech clause, it is not constitutionally protected under the free exercise clause, and government can subsidize protected speech while refusing to subsidize unprotected speech without establishment clause difficulties. Many argue that the free speech regime is too speech protective in this context, and whether they are right or wrong, it seems to me that they are focusing on the key issue. It does not matter whether the speakers are religious or not in this context.

Should the government take sides in intra-religious debates?

From the "better late than never" file:  Keith Pavlischek has this post, over at First Things, asking whether it "violates the First Amendment" to "oppos[e] radical Islam".  He writes:

Since the Islamists believe they are permitted, indeed obliged, by their canonical religious texts to use terrorism to advance their agenda, you would think that it would be in the national interest of the United States that “moderate Islam” prevails in this internal struggle. In fact, as just about any expert will tell you, the primary goal of public diplomacy efforts should be to separate the jihadists from the broader non-jihadist Muslim population. To put it crudely, we want one side of this controversy within Islam to win and another to lose.

But that creates a problem because if, as a matter of public policy, we want the moderate (non-Islamist) side to win we would be promoting with public money one religion (moderate Islam) over another (radical Islamism). But if we promote one religion over another we have, according to some of our more brilliant Constitutional scholars, violated the First Amendment’s prohibition on laws respecting the Establishment of religion.

Similar issues and questions have come up in the domestic context.  For example, some "Safe Space" training materials, used at Georgia Tech, tried to help gays and lesbians feel more safe and comfortable on campus by -- in Eugene Volokh's words -- "taking stands on quintessentially theological questions -- e.g., the true meaning of the Bible, and the 'legitimacy' of various interpretations of 'Biblical texts.'"

Does the government have any interest in what Justice Brennan called "the development of doctrine"?  Or is it, again quoting the Justice, a "matter[] of purely ecclesiastical concern"?  As I see it -- for (a lot) more, see this paper -- the answer is tricky.  One the one hand, we should not be surprised if and when the government tries to push religious doctrine in ways that are more congenial to the government's understanding of the public good or public interest.  We would be kidding ourselves if we thought that a government could ever really be "neutral" with respect to what citizens believe and in what moral traditions they are formed.  That this is true, though, does not mean we (who value religious freedom) should not worry about the implications of this fact:

[F]ar from being a "purely ecclesiastical concern," the content of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its development are matters to which even a secular, liberal, and democratic government will almost certainly attend. It is not the case that governments like ours are or can be "neutral" with respect to religion's claims and content. [T]he content, meaning, and implications of religious doctrine are and have long been the subjects of government power and policy. Secular, liberal, democratic governments like ours not only take cognizance of, but also and in many ways seek to assimilate - that is, to transform - religion and religious teaching. And, it is precisely because such governments do have an interest in the content, and, therefore, in the "development," of religious doctrine - an interest that they will, if permitted, quite understandably pursue - that authentic religious freedom is so fragile.

Tuesday, September 22, 2009

The denouement of the travesty at Ave Maria Law School?

A partial denouement, at least.

Read the good news here.

Reminder: "The Summons of Freedom"

If it's Fall, that means (i) Bell's Brewery has a tasty Octoberfest beer out, and (ii) the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture's big annual conference is drawing near.  This conference is among the highlights of the academic year for me.  This year, the theme is "The Summons of Freedom:  Virtue, Sacrifice, and the Common Good."  See you (t)here!

Final confirmation of the relevance of this conference theme came when we reflected once again upon the remarks made on the South Lawn of the White House by Pope Benedict XVI during his apostolic visit to the United States last April. In those remarks the Holy Father said:

Freedom is not only a gift, but also a summons to personal responsibility. Americans know this from experience—almost every town in this country has its monuments honoring those who sacrificed their lives in defense of freedom, both at home and abroad. The preservation of freedom calls for the cultivation of virtue, self-discipline, sacrifice for the common good, and a sense of responsibility towards the less fortunate. It also demands the courage to engage in civic life and to bring one’s deepest beliefs and values to reasoned public debate.

Here the Holy Father makes clear certain connections that are of utmost importance not only to us Americans, but also to anyone trying to sort through the enormous moral and political complexities of our dizzyingly globalized world. Pope Benedict underscores that freedom is both gift and summons, a call toward a particular “cultivation” or cultural formation in the virtues, virtues that always demand sacrifice—and sometimes even the total sacrifice of one’s life—for the sake of common goods higher than the merely private goods of the self. Earlier in his remarks the Holy Father had emphasized that “the great intellectual and moral resolve” that, in America, ended slavery and brought into being the civil rights movement, took religious belief as a “constant inspiration and driving force,” thus reminding us of Christianity’s role as the true preserver and defender of human freedom. In saying this, the pope invoked his revered predecessor, John Paul II, who tirelessly preached that “in a world without truth, freedom loses its foundation.”

Should an anti-SSM professor be welcome in an inclusive law school?

Boston College law prof Scott Fitzgibbon has caused quite a ruckus by appearing in an ad opposing same-sex marriage.  I don't have anything new to say about the ad itself, but I was struck by a post at the popular Above the Law blog:

According to his bio, Professor Fitzgibbon teaches jurisprudence, corporations, securities regulation, and contracts. Are gay and lesbian BC Law students comfortable learning about these subjects from an anti-gay marriage professor?

This is an ominous road to go down.  Unless we're ready to chalk up all opposition to SSM to nothing more reasonable than "disgust," Professor Fitzgibbon's views on the subject should not detract from the learning environment for GLBT students -- in fact, it could enrich the environment, even if he taught a course such as family law.  Reasoned discourse is not possible when disagreement is reflexively equated with personal animus.  Martha Fineman, as best I can tell, is anti-marriage.  I happen to be pro-marriage.  I'd love to take a family law course with her because I think it would deepen my understanding of her views and, as a result, my own.  It's perfectly fine (and healthy) to engage with Professor Fitzgibbon on the substance of his views and the content of his ad.  But to suggest that his views render him somehow ill-suited to teaching about controversial topics in a diverse environment, we're missing the point of diversity, and of teaching. 

Does CST's support of the market extend to health care?

Over at PrawfsBlawg, Rick Esenberg responds to my question about Bishop Nickless's statement regarding the importance of defending the private sector in health care.  Rick comments:

Rob asks whether Catholic Social Thought actually claims that "a flourishing private sector" is the predominant concern when it comes to a society's provision of health care? "

If the question is put in that way, the answer is "no.' It is not the "predominant concern" although, in fairness to Bishop Nickless, I am not sure that he claimed it to be. He did say that it was the only way to prevent a "top down" rationing of care and CST does suggest that we be skeptical of that type of decision making. This, I think, is what may cause him to say that any bill that undermines the viability of the private sector is suspect.

As I suggested last week, subsidiarity is premised, at least in part, on the subjectivity of individuals and the associations that they form. The state is to empower and facilitate - rather than stifle - human agency and creativity. While this is cannot be read as an uncritical endorsement of markets or a rejection of the need for state regulation and even intervention in their operation (there is much criticism of unbridled markets in CST and robust support for assistance to the poor and to the weak), flourishing private markets are a way in which human creativity is expressed. There are, it seems to me, an almost infinite numbers of ways to control costs and to socialize (or insure) the cost of care. Choosing among them will almost certainly affect incentives to innovate. The notions that the state can choose the "best" form of insurance (mandating coverages and setting limits) or specify the conditions for optimal innovation seem rather dubious and, beyond that, restrict the subjectivity that is at the heart of subsidiarity (and, I would argue, solidarity).

This doesn't mean that the Obama health care plan (whatever it turns out to be) is inconsistent with CST or that current arrangements are not, by its lights, in need of reform. Large numbers of uninsured rests very uneasily with the premises of the Church's social encyclicals. But I think it does suggest why a "flourishing private market" is, if not the predominant concern, an important one.

Rick's insights are sensible, but I still wonder whether we are too quick to assume that CST embraces a market approach to health care.  (Has the Church criticized any other countries for their state-run health care systems?) Obviously, CST opposes a market in the sale of human organs, as the commodification of such goods defies human dignity.  I don't think the sale of health care is equivalent to the sale of human organs, but it's also not exactly like the sale of tires.  The American tendency is to take a very narrow view of the category of "needs and common goods that cannot be satisfied by the market system." (Centesimus annus)  To be clear, I'm not rejecting the practical importance of the market when it comes to health care; I'm just hesitant to claim CST's imprimatur.