As I opened the door yesterday morning, I could here other pilgrims as their walking sticks and trekking poles clicked against the cobblestones of the medieval city of St. Jean Pied de Port. On the way out of town in the predawn light and fog, I saw that the church was open, and I went and lit a candle for my daughter Michelle on her 21st birthday, my dad on his birthday, and one for all the pilgrims leaving St. Jean that day. As I headed into the mountains alone, I could see pilgrims ahead of me and behind me.
After an hour or so, I fell into a group with four others - Roberto from Italy, Romana from Austria, and a Spanish couple Mariano and Lily. At about 11 am when came across a small restruant in the mountains. Our dilemma, coffee or a beer. I won´t tell you what we chose, but I will tell you we were advised that beer has electrolytes. Roberto expressed well the reason for doing the Camino - the Camino is a microcosm of life - a way to step outside of the normal routine to consciously embrace life on its own terms.
We stopped for lunch near a statue of the Virgen at one of the highest points on the mountain with pastures with a sweeping panaroma. And, what an amazing lunch - The only shop that I had found open that morning sold meat so I only had ham. Three others only had bread and the fourth chocolate. I had feared that I would eat only meat for lunch, instead we shared a feast.
Tired in the afternoon, we descended on the Spanish side through a forest with its autumn leaves. At mass last night, the priest mentioned the countries represented that day in this small village - there were pilgrims from all over Europe, US, Australia, Argentina, Venz., Brasil, Korea, and Eriteria. I slept well in the alberque, which was a big room with 100 bunk beds stretching from one end to the other.
One last comment, giving rise to the small world title. The very first pilgrim I met - we literally ran into each other - in St. Jean is a very good friend of our friend Doug Kmeic. Martin, his son Emilio, and a film crew are doing the Camino, with plans to arrive in Santiago a few days after me. (John, when I return, I´ll send Martin a copy of our boat article).
Tuesday, September 29, 2009

Doug Mills/The New York Times.The Supreme Court photograph is taken only when there is a change on the bench.
And the MOJ party rolls on! Robby George joined us a few weeks ago and today I am delighted to announce that Bob Hockett (Cornell) has also signed on. For more about Bob's wide-ranging, excellent work, go here.
Strange (but interesting) times, I suppose, when "A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic Legal Theory" has more participants from Cornell than from Notre Dame, Boston College, or -- well, almost anywhere (Go, St. Tommy, go!).
I am participating this weekend in a conference at Yale Law School on "The Constitution in 2020" (more info
here). There is also a blog up-and-running, where the various participants have posted summaries of their contributions to the conference. My contributions on "The Infrastructure of Religious Freedom" and "Religion and Division" are available
here and
here. Here is a bit from the former:
What The Constitution in 2020 calls a “progressive vision of constitutional law in the years ahead” should, I believe, re-discover, incorporate, and emphasize what might seem a not-very-progressive – because very old – idea. Here it is: Constitutionalism generally, and religious freedom more specifically, are well served by the protection and flourishing of an array of self-governing non-state authorities. The Jacobins were wrong. In a nutshell, religious liberty is both nurtured in and protected by – it needs, I think – religious communities, associations, and institutions.
Take a look at Brian Leiter's new paper, posted on SSRN, "Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?" Here is the abstract:
Should we think of what I will refer to generically as “the law of religious liberty” as grounded in the moral attitude of respect for religion or in the moral attitude of tolerance of religion? I begin by explicating the relevant moral attitudes of “respect” and “toleration.” With regard to the former, I start with a well-known treatment of the idea of “respect” in the Anglophone literature by the moral philosopher Stephen Darwall. With respect to the latter concept, toleration, I shall draw on my own earlier discussion, though now emphasizing the features of toleration that set it apart from one kind of respect. In deciding whether “respect” or “toleration” can plausibly serve as the moral foundation for the law of religious liberty we will need to say something about the nature of religion. I shall propose a fairly precise analysis of what makes a belief and a concomitant set of practices “religious” (again drawing on earlier work). That will then bring us to the central question: should our laws reflect “respect” for religion” or only “toleration”? Martha Nussbaum has recently argued for “respect” as the moral foundation of religious liberty, though, as I will suggest, her account is ambiguous between the two senses of respect that emerge from Darwall’s work. In particular, I shall claim that in one “thin” sense of respect, it is compatible with nothing more than toleration of religion; and that in a “thicker” sense (which Nussbaum appears to want to invoke), it could not form the moral basis of a legal regime since religion is not the kind of belief system that could warrant that attitude. To make the latter case, I examine critically a recent attack on the idea of "respect" for religious belief by Simon Blackburn.
Although I think that Prof. Leiter's conclusion that "religion is not the kind of belief system that could warrant [thick respect]" is misguided (in part because his understanding of "religion" is not mine), I find this paper -- like his earlier piece, "Why Tolerate Religion?" -- kind of refreshing, bracing even. Like Prof. Leiter, I come away from works like Prof. Nussbaum's new book on religious liberty not sure that any case has (or, given the working premises, could) been made for religious liberty. Perhaps, as Prof. Steve Smith has been saying for a while, the only solid arguments for religious freedom (that is, for something more than a cost-benefit-based "toleration" of religion) are themselves "religious" or, at least, depend on anthropological and other foundations that we -- even if we are willing to invoke them from time to time -- no longer really accept?
Just a little something to think about over lunch . . .