Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Friday, June 19, 2009

St. Gregory's University and Catholic Higher Education

Recently, I was appointed to St. Gregory's University's Board of Directors.  Yesterday, I attended my first board function - an all day retreat,  And, I came away inspired and very hopeful about the future of Catholic higher education, at least in Oklahoma.  The day started with the University's Chancellor, Abbot Lawrence Stasyszen, O.S.B. providing an overview of St. Gregory's mission and vision.  What was clear from the start was that St. Gregory's aspires to provide an integrated Catholic education in the fullest sense.  Abbot Lawrence said that although the Board has a separate Committee on Mission Effectiveness, mission effectiveness ought to be a top or central priority for every committee.  He said that the Catholic and Benedictine identity of the university must be intentionally fostered and not left to chance and must be present in every facet of the university. He pointed to Paragraph 49 of Ex Corde Ecclesiae (the Catholic university as "a living institutional witness to Christ and his message...") as a foundation for the work of the university.  I look forward to contributing my small part to the development of this wonderful institution.

St. Gregory's is a small Catholic liberal arts university located in Shawnee, Oklahoma (with a College for Working Adults located in Tulsa, Oklahoma City, and Shawnee).  Its fascinating history dates to the 1870's when the Citizen Potawatomi Nation asked the Benedictines to send priests to Indian Territory.  The relationship between the Benedictines and the Citizen Potawatomi continues to this day with the current Chairman of the tribe serving on St. Gregory's board.  (As an aside, both Jim Thorpe and Tony Hillerman were baptized by this group of Benedictine's in their Sacred Heart Mission in nearby Konawa, Ok).

Theory and Practice

Two quick responses to the practicing lawyer's concernsthat our conversations may be too theoretical and too disconnected from the issues that matter to Catholic lawyers.

  • As Marc DeGirolami's comments suggest (to me anyway) the issue isn't theory vs. practice so much as examination of the foundational structures of our society vs. the practical day to day issues facing practicing lawyers.  Both sides of the equation have theoretical and practical aspects.  What I hear from the practicing lawyer is that s/he would like those of us who are gifted with more time for reflection to devote some energy to helping envision a way to make the practice more human.  And, this seems to be a worthy goal.
  • The Catholic Legal Theory project is developing along multiple fronts.  Some professors devote the bulk of their scholarly energy to what I consider a rear guard action of protecting the religious liberty of the faithful.  Others are involved primarily in exploring the foundations of our political communities, attempting to mine what is good in the liberal tradition, disregarding what is inhumane (radical autonomy, for instance), and recover what the Catholic tradition has to offer our ailing culture.  Still others focus on humanizing the law practice.  As to the latter, in the Spring of 2007, MOJer, Lisa Schiltz organized and hosted an excellent conference at St. Thomas, Workplace Restructuring to Accommodate Family Life, which is published in the St. Thomas Law Journal.    

A clarification on CLT and "theory"

The Catholic attorney who has raised questions about the direction of the Catholic legal thought project offers this clarification in response to Marc DeGirolami's post:

At one level I agree with Marc that the issue isn't whether CST is too focused on "theory"; it's whether the "theory" has any application to practice.  Mathematics, like CST, is, at one level, all theoretical, but academics still make a distinction between theoretical and applied mathematics.  I think the more important question is whether Catholic academics are using CST to speak to the questions and needs of real people (applied) or are using CST to engage the "law" as a purely, or at least primarily, theoretical matter.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

DeGirolami on Catholic legal thought and "theory"

Marc DeGirolami responds to my earlier post relating a Catholic attorney's concern that the Catholic legal thought project is too focused on theory:

The fact (at least for me it is a fact) is that "theory" is not a special kind of effete thinking reserved for pointy headed people.  Theory is thinking.  And many of the issues raised by your practicing correspondent are only adequately addressed by people prepared to engage deeply in theory (he mentions Professor Kaveny in particular, but while her excellent piece on the billable hour may be accessible, it is, surely, highly theoretical too).  When I was at Catholic University, Patrick Brennan gave a wonderful talk in which he emphasized that the primary light toward which the CST project must be oriented is "philosophy," by which I took him to mean not necessarily philosophy proper (though there is nothing wrong with that!), but precisely theory -- deep and sustained reflection on the many issues about which CST might have something interesting and illuminating to say.
 
It is also true that "theorizing" is not something that intelligent people can simply choose not to do; one is always theorizing, if one is an intelligent person, whether one calls it that or not, and whether one is conscious of it or not.  True, there are different kinds of inquiries suited to different kinds of minds, but one of the reasons for the famous "disjunction" between legal academics and legal practice is the failure to recognize the pervasiveness of theory -- its importance to ordinary, intelligent men and women.  And surely, that group includes many law students and practicing attorneys.

Others on Noonan on Paslgraf

It's true that Judge Noonan did us all a great jurisprudential favor by telling the story of Helen Palsgraf.  I'm not sure it's quite true, though, that Judge Noonan regarded Judge Cardozo as "mechanically following [the] rule," as has been represented  here.  After all, as Noonan also reports, the statute was in desuetude, unenforced for many years.  Cardozo's following it, therefore, especially given all else we know and admire about Cardozo, can't likely have been merely "mechanical[]." 

Notre Dame's Cathy Kaveny on John Noonan, judges, and "empathy"

Here, in the new issue of Commonweal.  An excerpt:

Obama’s critics worry that “empathy” is not merely undesirable, but inconsistent with the fundamental obligations of a judge. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch fears it is a code word for judicial “activism,” a potent political issue, if a notoriously elusive concept. In an opinion piece in the Washington Times, Wendy Long argued that empathy was inconsistent with impartiality. She truculently accused Obama of being “the first president in American history to make lawlessness an explicit standard for Supreme Court justices.”

Despite appearances, this debate is not simply partisan. It involves important and enduring questions about what it means to be a good judge. Jurist and Catholic moralist John Noonan tackled the question head-on in Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, and Wythe as Makers of Masks.

Noonan argues that at the heart of the legal system are two equally essential components: rules and persons. We all know the importance of rules-they are impersonal, they are impartial, they are framed with a concern for the larger good of the whole community. Neglecting the claims made by rules produces judicial “monsters” who strangle justice with bribery, arbitrariness, or bias. As Noonan notes, the Book of Deuteronomy describes God as a judge who “regardeth not persons nor taketh rewards.” A good judge must have due regard for the rules.

But rules are not enough. “There is no reason to suppose that justice is the only virtue required of a lawyer, legislator, or judge,” Noonan writes. “If [judges] are not to cease to be human, they must cultivate the other virtues of humanity.” Without these other virtues, the application of rules can become “merciless and inhuman.” Playing on the dual meaning of the Latin word persona as both “person” and “mask,” Noonan argues that rules can become masks that conceal the human faces-and human needs-of the persons to whom they apply. A judge can hide behind rules to escape responsibility for the harm he or she is causing to other human beings.

"there must be a lot of Catholic law schools where"

So says (Georgetown Law's) David Luban here  in explaining his voting in Leiter's recent survey concerning "which philosophers have had the most impact on legal scholarship."  Must there?   "I found myself placing Aristotle and Aquinas high on the list because there must be a lot of Catholic law schools where the Thomistic influence lingers even if the recent decades have seen their faculties become far more secular."  Please.  Why "must [must] there be" what by no reasonable account obtains at Luban's own nominally Catholic home institution?  Where are these sub silentio Thomists who "must" exist?  I would like to see the relevant data -- and be able to draw the conclusions.


UPDATE: Prof. Luban is on leave  "spring 2007".   

Is the Catholic Legal Thought project too focused on theory?

My recap of the Conference on Catholic Legal Thought prompted a reader (and practicing lawyer) to express his concern that our conversations may be too theoretical and too disconnected from the issues that matter to Catholic lawyers.  Here's an excerpt of his email:

The disassociation between the world of academia and the world of practice is unfortunate, especially because the Catholic faith is a lived aesthetic experience, not something we just know intellectually.  I think a lot of us who are actually practicing law want our friends in academia to do some thinking for us about how we can re-shape the practice of law in the U.S. to make it, as JPII says, "more human and more fraternal."  At some level, this will have to go beyond theoretical discussions about the difference between JPII v. Benedict's view of natural law, and will need to involve a critique of the culture in which lawyers live and work, what impact that culture has on the law and the public's perception of the law, and the connection between the culture of law and justice. . . . Too much emphasis on engaging the "law" can make the needs of the human person secondary or even irrelevant, and can render CST just another academic form of analysis rather than a prophetic movement that seeks the liberation of the human person in his daily struggles and burdens.

He offered several examples of lines of inquiry that he would find helpful:

1. The structure of law firms - billable hours (Kaveny has addressed this a little bit), the commercialization of the practice of law, and the problem of over-specialization; lack of mentoring; the loneliness and competitiveness experienced by associates;

2. The connection between the problems in #1 and the huge tuition bills we have from law school that force, or appear to force, many students into big firms.  Are Catholic law schools helping students to choose their professional paths wisely, or are Catholic law schools just complicit in promoting the dehumanizing aspects of lthe practice of law, with their own focus on rankings, prestige and endowed chairs?

3. The practice of American-style litigation and whether Catholics can/should participate in it (i.e. fomenting conflict in order to keep the billable clock running; overwhelming opponents who don't have deep pockets with filings and delay tactics that have nothing to do with achieving a just result; using the courts to resolve marriage issues - what does "winning" look like in a marriage dispute; etc).

4. What is a profession? Is the current legal profession actually a profession?  Should it matter?  Could a reinvigoration of the concept of "profession" help to change the practice of law and in what ways? 5. In what ways are lawyers participating in the healing work of God?  Doctors and priests are seen, in many circles, as healers; why are lawyers seen as scoundrels?  How does the concept of privilege work into our role as healers, etc. 

These, to me, seem like very practical and very important issues that really affect practicing lawyers (and law students) and that also have a social impact (i.e. how we structure law firms affects how those in need of legal services experience lawyers, either as money-grubbers or servants; how we structure law schools affects how available and disposed students are to pursue careers focused on justice, rather than money; etc.).  I would love to see academics tackle these issues in order to provide law students and practitioners with a new vision of what it means to be a lawyer. 

In fairness, I think some of these areas have been explored by MoJ-ers and other Catholic law profs, but undoubtedly there is more work to be done.  (An area that merits much more exploration, in my view, is the role of Catholic law schools in exacerbating or remedying the plight of the debt-laden law student.)  The broader question -- whether Catholic legal thought is spending too much time on theory -- merits some discussion.  One way I would explain it is this: our project, at least in the context of American law and lawyering, is relatively new.  A significant amount of theoretical spade work is needed in order to make the practical implications authentically insightful, rather than just a dressed-up version of our own predispositions. 

What do others think: has the Catholic legal thought project been too focused on theory?

Women Religious Tackle Human Trafficking

I've just arrived in Rome, where I'll be spending the summer teaching at the joint University of St. Thomas/Villanova law school summer law program, after a wonderful but exhausting five days treking through Germany, showing my kids where I grew up.  We spent the first couple of days with friends in Mainz, attending Mass at the beautiful baroque Church of St. Peter's, and admiring the astonishingly moving stained glass windows of Chagall at St. Stephen's.  (After years of pleading, the pastor of St. Stephen's, Fr. Klaus Mayer -- himself of Catholic and Jewish heritage, convinced Chagall -- all of whose relatives were killed in the Holocaust -- to make these windows, as an expression of German-Jewish reconciliation.  Chagall did them for free, but would NOT come and see them -- he would not visit Germany).

I am really not intending to write a travelogue, but you have to admit I kept the posting Catholic-related so far, didn't I?  But I really did have a Catholic legal theory-related reason to post, namely the news of this extraordinary conference going on somewhere very close to where I am now sitting.  It's a international conference of women religious working on stopping human trafficking and ministering to the victims of human trafficking.  From the Pope's message for the opening of the conference, he said it was important to bring about "a renewed awareness of the inestimable value of life and an ever more courageous commitment to the defense of human rights and the overcoming of every type of abuse."

Some descriptions from the ZENIT report on this conference struck me as a poignant reminder of the significance of this problem, and the importance of addressing not simply the legal structures that allow this exploitative industry to continue, but also the human dimension -- ministering to the victims.  The time and attention these women religious are devoting to this issue does seem to be to me, as Archbishop Veglio states, "prophetic."

In the Friday press conference presenting the conference, it was reported that 2.5 million people are affected by trafficking, which is a $150 billion business -- money that goes in the pockets of those who control the markets of prostitution, trafficking in organs, and forms of slavery that predominantly affect women and children.

In this context, Archbishop Vegliò affirmed, the Church has a role that is "not only important, but also prophetic."

He said that before all else, it is important to "know the factors that encourage and especially attract prostitution, and the strategies used by recruiters, traffickers, intermediaries and those who abuse the victims."

Then, in the commitment made by the religious to combat human trafficking, the Vatican official affirmed that personal and spiritual formation is needed, so that they know how to deal with difficult and broken lives that need to be reconstructed.


Wednesday, June 17, 2009

The illusion of consensual marriage

Over at First Things, Andrew Peach has written a beautiful reflection on fatherhood in the context of lamenting its demise.  You should read the whole thing, but here's a snippet:

Faith in fatherhood, when such faith has existed, has always been faith in a tradition, which is to say faith in a communally and historically based institution that is wiser and more robust than any individual’s desires, whims, or considered judgments. Even before the children arrive and he is standing on the altar, the young father-in-the-making can hardly be said to be giving full consent to his marriage vows. The groom has little idea what he is getting himself into when he agrees to love his bride “for richer and for poorer, in sickness and in health.” Legally speaking, no groom could ever satisfy the criterion of assent necessary for a binding contract; he only understands the content of the vows he has made long after he has uttered them.

To speak more metaphorically, what vowing spouses are doing is putting up a fence around themselves so that the seeds of the relationship will have the protection and space needed to grow. In a negative sense, they are barring the exits, but they are doing so because the positive goods to be attained—for them, their children, and society—are too good and often too unexpected to be entrusted to fleeting feelings of fidelity. As horse farmer and communitarian author Wendell Berry observes, marriage—like friendships, families, and neighborhoods—“is a form of bondage, and involved in our humanity is always the wish to escape. . . . But involved in our humanity also is the warning that we can escape only into loneliness and meaninglessness.”

Compare this to the essay by Jeff Redding that I posted a couple of days ago, in which the self-transcendence of marriage is dismissed as a "mausoleum" and marriage participants as being "held hostage."  Now ask, which view is more firmly grounded in an authentic vision of human nature?  The marginalization of marriage cannot help but marginalize the understanding of the human person as a social creature who is capable of -- and suited for -- relational commitments that are deeper and more foundational (to both personal identity and society) than those that are entered into based on readily discernible and calculable self-interest (especially to the extent that self-interest is equated with short-term gratification).