Anscombe on Hudson on torture

A reader responds to my post of Deal Hudson's (reported) application of just war theory to torture:

Hudson's comment (assuming it's accurately rendered) moves (without justification) straight to application of just war criteria and altogether ignores that the prohibition on torture is an exceptionless moral norm according to Gaudium et Spes (27), Veritatis Splendor (80), and the Catechism (2297-98). I should hope that Catholics would remember Elizabeth Anscombe's warning against creeping consequentialism about these matters in "Mr. Truman's Degree" (1956):

 

I have been accused of being “high-minded.”  I must be saying “You may not do evil that good may come,” which is a disagreeably high-minded doctrine.  The action was necessary, or at any rate it was thought by competent, expert military opinion to be necessary; it probably saved more lives than it sacrificed; it had a good result, it ended the war.  Come now: if you had to choose between boiling one baby and letting some frightful disaster befall a thousand people—or a million people, if a thousand is not enough—what would you do?  Are you going to strike an attitude and say “You may not do evil that good may come”?  (People who never hear such arguments will hardly believe they take place, and will pass this rapidly by.)

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We can now reformulate the principle of “doing evil that good may come” Every fool can be as much of a knave as suits him.

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I get some small light on the subject when I consider the productions of Oxford moral philosophy since the first world war, which I have lately had occasion to read.  Its character can easily be briefly demonstrated.  Up to the second world war the prevailing moral philosophy in Oxford taught that an action can be “morally good” no matter how objectionable the thing done may be.  An instance would be Himmler’s efforts at exterminating the Jews: he did it from the “motive of duty” which has “supreme value.”  In the same philosophy—which has much pretence of moral seriousness, claiming that “rightness” is an objective character in acts, that can be discerned by a moral sense—it is also held that it might be right to kill the innocent for the good of the people, since the ”prima facie duty” of securing some advantage might outweigh the “prima facie duty” of not killing the innocent.  This sort of philosophy is less prevalent now, and in its place I find another, whose cardinal principle is that “good” is not a “descriptive” term, but one expressive of a favourable attitude on the part of the speaker.  Hand in hand with this, though I do not know if there is any logical connection, goes a doctrine that it is impossible to have any quite general moral laws; such laws as “It s wrong to lie” or “Never commit sodomy” are rules of thumb which an experienced person knows when to break.  Further, both his selection of these as the rules on which to proceed, and his tactful adjustments of them in particular cases, are based on their fitting together with the “way of life” which is his preference.  Both these philosophies, then, contain a repudiation of the idea that any class of actions, such as murder, may be absolutely excluded.  I do not know how influential they may have been or be; they are perhaps rather symptomatic.  Whether influential or symptomatic, they throw some light on the situation.

It is possible still to withdraw from this shameful business in some slight degree; it is possible not to go to Encaenia; if it should be embarrassing to someone who would normally go to plead other business, he could take to his bed.  I, indeed should fear to go, in case God’s patience suddenly ends.