Wednesday, February 4, 2009
So, according to this, teenagers are not having sex as much as they used to (or, as much as we were told that they were). Ann Althouse and others think about why.
Also relevant, is this essay, by Ryan Anderson, from Public Discourse, about student-led responses to the "hook up" culture on college campuses.
"Law's Eschatology", by former Notre Dame law student, Andrew Hiller. Check it out. Some cool clips of St. Thomas More in film, and more to come.
Rob's question is exactly right. As a descriptive matter, the tendency to reach for analogies, I suspect, frequently derives from the fact that abortion analogies are used as cheap rhetorical cudgels with which to beat one's opponents into submission. (This is, obviously, not true of everyone who uses analogies, but it is quite common to use them in this way and for this reason.) "Abortion is like slavery," so if you equivocate on its legal status, you are like the weak-kneed politicians of the 19th century who opposed slavery but refused to press forward towards abolition out of fear of the social unrest it might generate. "Abortion is a holocaust," so if you think other issues are weighty enough to justify voting for a pro-choice candidate, then you are like those who sat by silently while the Jews went to the gas chambers. And on and on... If, however, abortion is sui generis, as Rob (correctly, in my view) suggests, then it becomes much harder to reject as out of bounds (or per se unreasonable) certain conclusions concerning how to weigh it against other issues. And, of course, since talk is cheap, using these analogies imposes no costs on the person wielding them to act as we think those people who lived through the Civil War and the holocuast ought to have acted. If you doubt my reading of the motives for using analogies in this area, I invite you to take a look at some of the comments in the story to which Michael P. linked below about Leslie Tentler's discussion of the recent election.
Prof. Bruce Ledewitz's blog, "Hallowed Secularism", might be of interest to MOJ readers. Lots of interesting stuff. This post, from back in 2007, gives you a sense of the enterprise:
This blog will track the progress of a new way of life in this society, a way of life that may come to be known as Hallowed Secularism. In the short run of the next few months, I will be writing a book that describes this way of life, at least as I see its future. But, in the longer run, others will decide the future of hallowed secularism by living it. There are many religious people who live holy and fulfilling lives. But there are others, like me, who do not fit, or do not quite fit, any of our religions. Such people are secular by definition, at least in popular understanding, but they are not necessarily atheists. Is it possible to live a life of holiness without any of the religions? The easy answer is yes, of course. But, believe me, it is not at all easy even to imagine such lives. Much less live them. Our lives are easily dominated by the power of the everyday, by the mall and the news and the media, and money. A grubby and unfulfilled life. The same sort of life lived by most religious people. But imagine a different life. A life of power, awe and mystery. The sort of life the Bible promises. A taste of the world to come. But not one run by the conventional wisdom of what our religions have become. It is a little hard to believe, but it is possible.
... but the issues remain. Many MOJ readers will be interested in this piece, published yesterday in NCR online: Bishops who called Obama vote a sin challenged (here).
(Is that title an intentional double entendre?!)
Most MOJ readers know that Amy Welborn is a pioneering and thoughtful Catholic blogger and author. Her husband, Michael (also a writer) has died, quite suddenly and unexpectedly. God bless him, and her.
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Earlier today I posted an excerpt from CNN that included a rather odd characterization of Robby George's views on selective reduction. Prof. George writes to clarify:
[The reporter's characterization of my position] is very misleading, though I don't think she intended to mislead. It was a very long interview that unavoidably required the introduction of some complicated scientific and philosophical issues. At the beginning of the interview, I explained why I and others are opposed to IVF in principle in the first place. I then explained the health and safety issues that exist even if we lay aside the question of the morality of IVF -- issues having to do with the safety of mothers and the health of children they may conceive by IVF. Then I explained the European regulations that limit the number of embryos that may be implanted and said that if IVF is permitted by law at all, then regulations such as these should be imposed. I further explained that the creation of so-called "spare" embryos that might either be destroyed or placed in cryopreservation is a grave violation of the rights of those embryonic human beings. Then I tried to explain to her at great length the distinction between direct and indirect abortions, not to justify indirect abortions (which, as I explained, are sometimes justified -- e.g., in the case of removal of a cancerous but gravid uterus -- but usually not), but to show her that in the case of indirect abortions questions of fundamental fairness or justice are what control the moral evaluation. I think that this is what she had trouble following, despite my efforts (and what I'm sure was her good faith). It is, after all, a complicated business for people who are not accustomed to thinking through issues like this philosophically and who aren't acquainted with the long western and Catholic tradition of casuistry about the ethics of actions that cause death. In my opinion, which I explained to her, "selective reduction" need not be, and often is not, "direct killing." (I am using "direct" here as it is used in philosophical analysis--for a good explanation see Germain Grisez's famous article entitled "Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing." In natural-law ethics, killing in self-defense and killing advancing enemy combatants in a justified war are examples of "indirect" killing.) But even in those cases in which it does not violate the norm against direct killing, it is still wrongly causing death (because there is a violation of fundamental justice) and it is therefore an offense against the rights of the child or children whose lives are taken. That's why I oppose it. It is true that it is often not the same (though in some cases it is the same) as a social indication abortion, and I conceded that. (The motivation can be different, as can be the orientation of the will. The ultimate goal may be to save the life of the mother and/or the lives of the remaining children in circumstances in which the number of children being gestated creates a grave risk that the pregnancy will fail prior to their viability.)
But the norm against direct killing is not the only norm that is relevant, which is why even indirectly causing death (i.e., performing an act that one knows or believes will cause death even where death is not the precise object of one's act) is wrong (fundamentally unjust) in most cases. When the reporter tried to compress all this into one or two sentences, I'm afraid it came out sounding rather odd and ambiguous. My mistake, I guess, was in offering a level of philosophical depth and detail that just isn't suitable for inclusion in a newspaper article. Incidentally, on the question of whether selective reduction is morally justified, I didn't say that I "probably" support the woman's choice to carry her babies to term. Notice that she didn't quote me on this, it is her characterization. I think I know what went wrong on this point. At both the beginning and end of the interview (which was about the whole spectrum of issues raised by the case of the woman with octuplets, and not just the question of "selective reduction"), I told her that what I would say would have to be reported as tentative because there was a lot of uncertainty about the facts of the case and there had been some conflicting reports in the media. She probably stuck in that term probably" (which, again, she didn't quote, it was her characterization) out of respect for that request. It's too bad, though, because it makes it sound like I'm unsure. In fact, I haven't any doubt that what the woman did in refusing selective reduction was right. To have done otherwise would have been wrong.
Survey results here.
Returning to the question of analogies for legalized abortion, Greg Popcak asks:
No analogy is ever perfect. All analogies are “good enough.” In fact, searching for a perfect analogy is a common rhetorical device used to delay responsibility for making change. Thirty years into the abortion debate, it is at least time for us to agree on an analogy. What is abortion MOST like? And what action steps are required by that comparison?
In the end, we can’t settle for the analogy the makes us comfortable. We must settle on the analogy that most accurately—albeit imperfectly—approximates the reality. And we must, then, act in accordance with that analogy.
If progressives, or “casuists”, (or whatever), don’t think “murder” or “holocaust” are the best analogies, they must either rise to their own challenge and present a more appropriate and compelling analogy, or accept that “murder” and holocaust” are the best analogies available and commit to the actions required by those analogies. To do less is to make an idol out of their subjective discomfort and use their feelings, not only as an excuse to do little or nothing about the injustice they are failing to describe, but to denigrate the motives and efforts of those whose actions are dictated by the best analogy that is currently available, not just to social conservatives, but to everyone.
Why do we need an analogy in this case? Why stretch the facts to "approximate" the reality -- why not just describe the reality? Aren't the facts of legalized abortion enough to make the case, standing alone? If not, why not? I find Justice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg to be powerful and persuasive, and no analogy was needed. Abortion is wrong, but it's not the Holocaust or slavery or the Spanish civil war. Why do we need to pretend that it is?
by Sister Joan Chittister
[NCR, 2/3/09]
"Stealing is a sin," we teach to our children and preach to our converts and enshrine on the tablets of Ten Commandments we display in our public institutions. But don't worry, we don't really mean it. We don't believe it. We don't practice it; we don't argue for it and we don't protect it. In fact, use enough legislation and enough god-talk and, in certain well defined arenas, it can be absolutely virtuous to steal. Ask any woman.
The first act of the new president, Barack Obama, was to sign into law a new Equal Pay for Equal Work Act. A similar act had been signed 46 years before, but it took another act of Congress to make it operable. In the meantime, from then until now, the stealing -- and the lying that made it possible -- went on.
The new bill did not really attract much attention. The passing and the signing of the Act was almost as quiet as the dishonesty in which it was rooted and the sanctimonious underpinnings that supported it. After all, it was basically about women -- whom God, after all, had made "equal but different." Equally qualified to do physically hard or intellectually difficult work but different -- read female -- and, therefore, unworthy of being treated equally.
The 1963 Equal Pay for Equal Work Act years before this one required that a person being paid a discriminatory wage -- wages that were less than others doing the same work were paid to do -- launch their complaint about the situation within 180 days of having received the first discriminatory paycheck.
Problem: Few people could get actual proof of the difference between what they were being paid to do a job and what others doing the same job in the same corporation were also being paid.
Take Lilly Ledbetter, for instance. It took 19 years to prove her case. Lilly was hired by Goodyear Tire and Rubber in 1979 at the age of 48 as one of four online supervisors. There were three men and herself each heading one of four different teams of workers and all of them doing the very same work.
Lilly was paid $3,600 a month; each of the men were paid from $4,300 to $5,200 for performing the same service on the same assembly line for the same number of hours every month.
But though Lilly had always suspected there was a difference in the pay scales of the four of them, there was no way to be sure. And after all, believe it or not, they had all been instructed not to talk about their pay to anyone but their families. It was a "don't-ask,-don't- tell world" for everyone: for gays, for children, for minorities, for women workers.
Only as she neared retirement, almost 20 years later, did some anonymous person secretly deposit a copy of the company's pay rate scale on her desk. "I lost my composure," she says. 'It was sort of like falling. I looked to see if anyone was looking at me as I read the note."
A lower court ruled in her favor but the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled against her. That Court ruled that she did not qualify for redress unless she had protested the discrimination within 180 days of the first discriminatory pay check 19 years before. Despite the fact that she had no proof of the discrimination until she was almost ready to retire.
So, more than 40 years after the signing of the first Equal Pay Act, she took her case to Congress to change the law.
Yes, the lower court had awarded her $3.8 million but, given the fact that wage discrimination compensation is only granted on the last two years of employment, her award was capped at $300,000. Her lawyers were to receive 50% of that amount and she would be liable for taxes on the remaining amount "in lieu of wages."
Then, the Supreme Court wiped even that amount out completely.
Clearly her march on Congress was not about the money. As she said, "It was always about the right thing to do..." As she talked about the boxes of letters she got from people all over the country in all professions who had gone through the same thing, she added, "People told me to keep up the struggle." And she did. For years.
A sad story? Indeed. Lilly Ledbetter was a mother of two children, one in high school, the other in college when she went to work in a society in which a one-paycheck household can barely put food on the table, pay the mortgage and educate children, all at the same time.
A tragic story? No doubt about it. For 20 years, this woman -- and an entire population like her -- was demeaned as a person, diminished as an employee and doomed to a lower standard of living than the men she worked with side by side all her working years.
A criminal story? Clearly. It was white-collar stealing, supported by an equal-but-different theology, legislated by the courts and ignored by corporations who are the icons of ethics in this culture.
Lilly Ledbetter -- do the math -- not only received anywhere from $896,800 to $1,033,800 less in lifetime earnings than her male counterparts, she is left to live out her retirement based on the pension and social security figures computed on those lower figures. This kind of corporate theft has affected her entire life.
Surely, equal-but-different does not mean to imply that God had poverty in mind for women. Surely "thou shalt not steal" does not really mean that you can rob a woman and claim moral innocence. Surely no law is meant to imply either.
From where I stand, it seems clear to me why Barack Obama wanted this particular bill to be the first piece of legislation to launch his new presidency. After all, who else, besides descendants of people who had been forced into slavery and out of the social mainstream really knows the effects of legal discrimination. Who else is brave enough to admit that slavery will not really be over until women have all the rights of men -- as blacks for years sought those of whites.
The question is when will the rest of us realize it, too, -- and say so.
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