Ecclesiology and Catholic Legal Thought

A number of recent posts including those by Bob, Steve, Michael, and Mike seem to indicate competing ecclesiologies, all of which may have claims to legitimacy.  Deferring to Cardinal Dulles and his standard work, Models of the Church, we could identify six ways to conceive of the Church rooted in scripture and tradition:

Institution

Mystical Communion

Sacrament

Herald

Servant

Community of Disciples

To the extent that "[w]hat is truly needed is objective and moral truth that is not mine or yours but God’s which can be known and conveyed with prayer, with discernment, and with union with the Church in thinking with rather than against her," as recommended by Fr. Araujo, the only model that clearly provides a mechanism for authoritatively pronouncing objective and moral truth is arguably that of Church as institution.  That is one of the great strengths of the insitutional model, and, to the extent that the institutional Church declares teaching to be infallible, it ostensibly creates a bright line defining those within the community.  The teaching of the leaders within the Church that does not rise to that level, while due deference, is not necessarily "objective and moral truth."  So, without resorting to Protestant-style indiviualism, it is possible to humbly dissent from potentially fallible teaching after having attempted to conform our consciences to the teaching of the institutional Church. 

I expect that those on the blog who express less comfort with particular official teachings would also emphasize the institutional model of the Church less than those who have been able to conform their consciences to potentially fallible teaching by Church leaders.  The mystical union, servant, and community of disciples models might instead emphasize the role of scholars, as having a special obligation to think with the Chuch, even when it leads to respectful disagreement.  So, those of us with preferences for unity and consistency might tend to emphasize the Church as institution, while those of us who are concerned that potentially fallible teachings might be erroneous emphasize another model.  Both approaches might be construed as valid responses of conscience within the boundaries of a normative ecclesiology.  Those emphasizing the intstitutional model have valid concerns regarding authority, cohesion, and the intelligibility of doctrine.  Those emphasizing other models may have valid concerns that the Church not defend problematic teachings (as in historical teachings regarding slavery).

I recognize value in these different emphases in ecclesiology and believe that as people of good will and conscience we can engage in respectful dialogue even when there is disagreement regarding potentially fallible teaching by Church officials.  Perhaps a more explicit understanding of our various ecclesiologies would help us in our constructive engagement.