About a month before Proposition 8 passed in California Nov. 4,
taking away an array of human rights, and the U.S. bishops decided to
team up with the Knights of Columbus to make the “preservation of
marriage” one of its key focuses for the next five years, my partner,
Ariana, and I made our commitment to one another.
Our marriage was not “legal” by terms of the state of California or
the official Catholic church. Yet, in our eyes and in the eyes of our
friends and family, our union is indeed holy.
As society has not yet defined the norms for our relationship the
way it has for those of heterosexual couples, we had the freedom to be
the architects of our own journey. And so, when Ariana and I initially
realized that we were building a lifelong partnership, we had the
opportunity to choose whether or not we needed or wanted a ceremony to
mark our commitment.
After many discussions, we decided that not only did we want to have
a wedding ceremony in order to express our love and commitment to each
other in the presence of the Creator, our friends and our family, but
we also wanted to take the year before the ritual to traverse through
our version of a Pre-Cana marriage preparation program.
Our Pre-Cana was quite different from the Pre-Cana courses that many
heterosexual couples go through kicking and screaming. Diann Neu,
codirector of the Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics, and Religion,
walked with us through the journey.
She challenged us with questions we had not thought to ask or were
afraid to ask. We discussed everything: finances, children, fair
fighting, spirituality and so on. We tackled the last-name debacle and
settled on a combination of our mothers’ maiden names. We came to new
levels of understanding -- and, sometimes, new levels of
misunderstanding.
After we had journeyed through several months of our Pre-Cana,
realizing that the work of communication would never be finished, we
turned our focus to our ceremony. Diann helped us understand that we
were the priests of our wedding. With great care, we crafted every
moment of the ceremony to reflect a delicate balance of Ariana’s
Unitarian Universalist tradition and my Catholic faith tradition. We
each chose a reading -- my pick was from the Book of Ruth, while her
choice was Alice Walker’s “While Love Is Unfashionable.” The songs --
“Morning Has Broken,” “Water Is Wide” and “Swimming to the Other Side”
-- each signified an important aspect of our relationship. With Diann’s
expertise, we even managed to create a beautiful eucharistic prayer
that was inclusive of our faiths and the faiths of all who celebrated
with us. In the end, we had a ceremony that was truly us.
Kate and ArianaThe
year of preparation flew by and before we knew it our friends and
family were arriving from all over the world for the affair. The
ceremony, held at a local Swedenborgian church, was everything we had
imagined it would be from the moment our families lit the candles to
our tear-filled exchange of vows to the closing prayer when our family
and friends raised their hands to bless us.
And, of course, no wedding would be complete without a party to
follow. We led the parade of guests to a small restaurant around the
corner for dinner. At the reception, folks shared songs and poetry,
laughter and tears. From the deep holiness of the ceremony to the
lighthearted humor and love of the reception, Ariana and I both felt
blessed to have had the opportunity to marry one another surrounded by
those closest to us.
In the days following our holy union, fully sated by our love and
the love of our community, we did not necessarily feel any change in
our relationship. For us, our marriage was and is about the journey,
and the ceremony was one marker along the path. However, our story is
just one of many. And surely, other stories will vary greatly, as what
it means to be family comes in a multitude of shapes and sizes. Still,
common themes will certainly arise — love, commitment, passion,
devotion and so on.
Indeed, this past month has offered many challenges to the LGBTQ
community and society at large. The institutional Catholic church and
the state cannot take away our commitment to each other. However, as my
legal right to marriage and family has been called into question, I
have felt that attack on my life and the lives of my friends deeply. My
only hope is that these stumbling blocks on the road to justice will
help open the dialogue, compel more people to tell their stories of
love, and bring our church and our world closer to a discipleship of
equals.
(Kate Childs Graham writes for ReligionDispatches.org[1] and YoungAdultCatholics-Blog.com[2].
She also serves on the Women’s Ordination Conference board of directors
and the Call to Action Next Generation Leadership Team. )
One student remarked that so many students are responding to the blog today because ANYTHING is better than studying for finals. Here is another student's take on the human dignity question:
"The real problem is, indeed, a modern philosophical shift, but not necessarily the one people are talking about. Modern philosophy begins with the outlying case: can there be human dignity for the human person that doesn't act, look, or smell like a person? Classical philosophers began with the norm, and then accounted for outlying variations. They established principles that were generally true of a type, while dealing in individual cases with the failure of some to have certain traits that otherwise seem characteristic of the type.
As such, Aristotle was able to say that duties were owed to all other persons in so far as they were people, without tying the dignity that creates the duties to any particular trait. (I am being a bit anachronistic here, since Aristotle didn't really deal with "dignity" per se). He does acknolwedge that the thing that makes the genus human different is reason (like Kant) but says that we owe the duty to all others in the genus, regardless of whether they share the particular trait.
The difference is a belief that things have essences. Unfortunately, for this to make sense, we have to consider the age-old (really many ages old) debate over nominalism. That is, the debate is about whether the distinctions that separate categories of things are a recognition of real phenomena or merely nominal distinctions drawn by humans in recognition of certain common traits. If distinctions are recognitions of real differences in kind, then things of a kind share a common essence. And those things within the group ought to be treated alike. Thus, in the present case, human beings ought to be treated with dignity because they have the same essence, even if they lack certain characteristics that are definitive of human beings. But if distinctions are merely nominal, then when we say that we treat alikes alike, we have to look to certain characteristics that might grant (or not grant) the status of being alike.
An illustration that may or may not be helpful: a layman's definition of a dog is a creature with four-legs, a tail, and fur that barks. If a dog were to lose a leg, its tail, its fur, and its vocal chord in some terrible accident the classical philosopher would have no problem recognizing the creature as a (rather sad) dog that has lost certain characteristics, and would treat it as she would treat any other dog. But the nominalist would have to make a very real inquiry into whether the traits lost somehow made it so the dog no longer meets the definition of being a dog, and this could have a very real impact on how he treats the dog."
MOJ-reader Jonathan Watson sends this response to David Weiss's piece on committed same-sex relationships and sodomy:
" Dear Prof. Weiss,
"I find your piece on committed same-sex relationships interesting, though I think flawed in its reasoning. You begin with the premise that, "Not in this text—nor in any other biblical text—is there a condemnation of committed same-sex relationships. Not one. Not anywhere. There are a small handful of texts that condemn same-sex prostitution in pagan temples, and perhaps military rape and pederasty. But nowhere in the Bible is there a single word that condemns committed same-sex relationships." In your bare assertion, I believe you are correct. Nowhere in the Bible is there a condemnation of committed same-sex relationships, and in fact, the legal use of the term sodomy in our country might be mistaken in the reference to the Sodomites. In fact, I suspect Christ lauds (for example) two brothers living together, raising an orphan. However, since your email / post specifically refers to homosexual couples and Prop. 8, it is worth noting what the Bible says about same-sex relations. I believe I can safely assume that you do not separate same-sex coupling from sexual activity.
"To begin with some examples from the bare text, Leviticus 18:22 states: "'Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; that is detestable." Leviticus 18:24 reiterates the command even more strongly. It is even repeated in Leviticus 20:13, which states "If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads." Second, the men of Sodom sought to "know" Lot's guests in the Bible. One could argue that he simply sought to defend their guest rights, but the point is very debatable. St. Paul understood this in writing to the Corinthians that "Know you not that the unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God? Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, Nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God." If that is not enough, St. Paul condemns homosexuality more directly in Romans, saying, "And, in like manner, the men also, leaving the natural use of the women, have burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men working that which is filthy, and receiving in themselves the recompense which was due to their error."
"I believe that suffices for a bare textual argument against homosexual acts. It is interesting to note that the New Testament contains more direct condemnation (as in divorce) against homosexual acts. Oddly, there is no mention of pagan temple prostitution, military rape, or pederasty (except as other sins, of course). Turning to some of the earliest Christian writers, we find their understanding that the various texts outlined above DID refer to homosexual acts. For a Catholic, it is impossible to ignore the interpretation of these writers.
"So, while I agree that using majoritarian power is unjust to certain ends (sending all homosexuals to live in camps in western deserts, for example), it is not acting as a Sodomite to refuse to enable, or refuse to bless with legal entitlement and recognition, sinful action."
It is a day for law student responses. Oklahoma law student, Nicholas Bender responds David Weiss' "Sodomy and Civil Rights" posted here:
"David Weiss defines sodomy this way: "Sodomy happens when any group uses their majority or their power to abuse and marginalize another group." He says this is what happened when people in California and other states voted to ban legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
To me, his argument seems faulty on several levels. First, he makes a huge leap in logic. He reasons that if people voted "yes" on Proposition 8, then they were using "their majority power to abuse and marginalize another group." It seems to me that voters could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to abuse and marginalize. For example, voters could have reasoned that the marriage relationship between a man and a woman is an institution that society has deemed valuable for many reasons, including for its ability to form the intimate mini-community on which society is built: the family. Amongst the many relationships in our society that might arguably contend for privileged status, the traditional marriage relationship has been selected as most worthy of promotion. Same-sex couples are, therefore, arguing not to be treated like the rest of the varied societal relationships that exist, but to be given the exceptional status that has traditionally been extended to opposite-sex couples. While certain rights can be granted to relationships that differ in form and function from the traditional marriage relationship, voters may have concluded that only marriage in the traditional sense should be incentivized to a degree greater than all other relationships because of the return to society on the investment. Now, whether one agrees or disagrees that families headed by wedded, opposite-sex couples provide the optimal basic conditions for a successful family is another issue. But certainly, voters could have drawn that conclusion, without notions of abuse or marginalization motivating their decision.
Second, Mr. Weiss' argument seems to attack the democratic project itself. Using Mr. Weiss' sweeping reasoning, one could argue that anytime the majority expresses it's will on a particular subject, then it is abusing and marginalizing another group (i.e. the minority). A democracy necessarily includes winners and losers. Voting decisions based on one's beliefs (even those grounded in religion) are not, and should not be, precluded in a properly functioning democracy. I guess I would ask Mr. Weiss to further define "abuse" and "marginalization."
George Mason law student Mattias Caro weighs in the question:
"I was intrigued by the Glendon quote you put up, in part because I spent a good deal of the summer working with Glendon's book on Eleanor Rosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Glendon does a masterful job in her book of laying out how individuals from so many different parts of the world could actually come together and approximate a common understanding of the values and truths that must necessarily undergird human society. Taking aside the utility of rights talk itself, which Glendon has also impressively criticized, the Universal Declaration was a moment for humanity in expressing a necessary natural law underpinning to any human, social enterprise. The problem lays here I think: in 1776 our Founding Fathers expressed their natural law theory in one simple phrase "self-evident truths that all men are created equal and endowed with certain unalienable rights which among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In 1948, it took the world well over 40 separate points to flesh out the same truth.
Rather than indicate a deeper understanding and appreciation for the natural law, I think it expresses exactly the opposite. The natural law is most operative in the people when its principles are ingrained within custom, habit, and social structure. What's changed? Glendon is right: the competing views of human nature offered by Kant and Rouseau has left political theory profoundly confused: can man have a telos? Is he fundamentally a good creature and evil exits outside of him? Competing in this framework, the imago dei stands no chance because it both asserts that man indeed has an extrinsic, intelligible end (contra Kant) and that indeed man's free choice can be the source of evil (contra Rouseau). But in reading Glendon, I don't think she's making a fideistic argument that faith is the necessary ingredient for belief in the imago dei. I simply think the way things have shaken out in intellectual history, if a person does not have some sort of theistic background, they'll look for other grounds (i.e. enlightenment thinker rationalizations) to confirm their beliefs on human nature. But I'm not so sure a pre-Christian natural law thinker (such as say Cicero) would 100% object to the terms Glendon uses.
So the conversation certainly isn't one about believers vs. non-believers. But there is a lot of intellectual ground to catch up on to even begin to have a conversation on the imago dei."
This post, by Alabama law student Abe Delnore, responds to this post, which is also discussed here and here:
"I wonder if Rick Garnett's former student--the Bob Jones alumnus--suggests an answer to your student's question. That is, divine creation not so long ago was considered by some the basis for denying the dignity of some humans. So while Kant and Rousseau may seem to leave gaping loopholes, it is a historical fact that the divine account has been perverted--and it may be again.
The alarming implications Glendon reaches from Kant and Rousseau are not conclusions those philosophers reached themselves. Her characterization of Rousseau's empathy kind of bothers me, actually; his empathy is not a transient emotion. If Glendon's quarrel is with imaginary Kant-lite (Peter Singer) and Rousseau-lite (?), then she has to deal with the use of Christianity to justify slavery and racism, the Church's centuries of failure to realize the implications of human dignity, etc. Maybe she does; I haven't read this essay of Glendon's.
I also don't see why she believes we must choose among accounts of human dignity's origin. Surely if God did create humans with inherent dignity, then what Kant and Rousseau noticed is also true. Kant and Rousseau made powerful arguments one should not abandon lightly."
A student posed a question here and Fr. Araujo responded here. This is a response from Richmond law student John O'Herron:
"Your most recent post and the question it poses are fascinating. I am a law student at UR so my thoughts on this may be of little more value than your other students. I did take a good deal of philosophy in college though (Christendom) so I am somewhat familiar with the issue presented.
The question obviously has massive implications for life issues: abortion, stem-cell, etc. One cannot claim that human stem-cells and unborn children have human rights (like the right to not be destroyed) if you accept Kant's reading of it. So, Kant is out the door. But I don't think the only alternative is faith-based. Surely it is true that we have human dignity because we are made by God and in His image. But I think its the case that we also have human dignity because of something distinct, yet related: our souls.
To understand the soul in a non-religious way (i.e., it isn't just the thing that shows we are made in God's image) is necessary. If we understand the human soul to be the life-animating thing that gives us our intellect and will, we see that humans alone have this "thing." It is the very thing that makes us unique and the nature of that capacity make it something to be protected (sacred if you will, though not in the religious sense). It is the soul that gives us those gifts. However, not all people with souls have those gifts (the disabled etc.). But those people still have that "thing" that makes humans special and unique.
It is the existence of the thing, and not necessarily the gifts that it imparts, that gives humans their dignity. Therefore, those people so disabled as to not be able to exercise their intellect or will still retain their human dignity-they still have the very thing that makes them human, their soul.
This isn't a fully developed argument, which would also require a foundation for what the soul is. But I think that the general answer to your students question is that we can use the human soul as the basis for discussion and the basis for human rights. We can make this argument to non-believers as well. They too can (stress can) see that humans have an intellect and will that no other creature has. Unless they are willing to say that disabled people have a different soul entirely (a different kind of thing that only gives life but not intellect and will), they must recognize that all people have this animating "thing.'' This conclusion has obvious implications for abortion as well (which is why the secular and philosophical argument for life works).
I hope some of this made sense. At a minimum, perhaps MOJers can discuss how we can discuss human rights in terms of the human soul without arguing faith.
Yesterday, in my "Catholic Social Thought and the Law" seminar, we talked about a group of readings having to do not so much with the "what does CST tell us about what law and / or policy should be, in a political community likes ours?" question, but with the "how do I go about constructing and living an integrated life as a Catholic lawyer?" question. And so, we read my colleague Amy Barrett's 2006 Notre Dame graduation speech; Greg Kalscheur's 'Ignatian Spirituality and the Life of the Lawyer", Lisa Schiltz's "Should Bearing a Child Mean Bearing All the Cost?", John Breen's "The Catholic Lawyer and the Meaning of Success", and (I hearby declare an honorary MOJ-er) Tom Shaffer's "Roman Catholic Lawyers in the United States". Lots of fun.
Thanks to Michael S. for raising the interesting and important question raised by one of his students over Mary Ann Glendon’s valuable analysis of the Kantian and Rousseauian perspectives on human dignity. Ambassador Glendon is right on target in identifying the debilitating fault line that runs through Kant and Rousseau. Although there has been some previous discussion of the subject of human dignity here at Mirror of Justice, I would like to draw attention once again to a point made by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical letter Centesimus Annus where he said there is something “which is due to man because he is man.” Jacques Maritain offered a similar insight into the nature of every human some years earlier. I would like to take this mutual thought of John Paul II and Maritain and suggest that regardless of who anyone is—which takes into account all kinds of physical, emotional, social, economic, age, sentient, and all other statuses—each human is to be accorded the protection of his or her existence because he or she is human. This is not necessarily a religious argument, although it reinforces the Catholic doctrine on the issue of human dignity. It is, however, an argument based on reason, an explanation that transcends the problems with the views of Kant and Rousseau that Ambassador Glendon identifies. As I stated earlier, there is something that is innate to the human and this integral character is the dignity which is the guarantor of everyone’s existence that begins with the moment of their first being. With each’s being there is the commencement of the individual’s dignity that needs to be preserved. If one’s dignity is assaulted, what is to prevent the forfeit of anyone else’s dignity?
