Intrinsic Evil, Moral Perspectives, and Cultural Messages: A Catholic Layman's Response to Professor Kaveny

In her America article, Professor Cathleen Kaveny argues that characterization of a particular matter as representing an intrinsic evil offers little assistance to faithful Catholic voters in evaluating the positions of political candidates on such issues as abortion. Once the concept of intrinsic evil is properly understood as a technical theological term focused upon the objectively disordered nature of the act, Professor Kaveny explains that classifying an act as intrinsically evil tells us little about the magnitude of that evil. (Our Mirror of Justice colleague, Michael Perry, has posted excerpts of her article here. Peter Nixon had previously made similar remarks on the Commonweal site.) At the end of her America article, Professor Kaveny concludes: “For many pro-life Catholics, the issue of voting and abortion comes down to this: what does one do if one thinks that the candidate more likely to reduce the actual incidence of abortion is also the one more committed to keeping it legal? The language of intrinsic evil does not help us here.”

Professor Kaveny’s article is interesting and thought-provoking as a dissertation on the theological origins of the concept of intrinsic evil and how to think critically about the comparative wrongness of immoral acts. I appreciate her contribution to our better understanding of Catholic moral teaching. I take to heart her encouragement of more careful use of terms in debate about matters of public moment from the perspective of Catholic teaching. Nonetheless, I did not find Professor Kaveny’s article to be directly responsive to the arguments of Church leaders and other prominent Catholics about the public policy implications of the Church’s consistent and emphatic teaching about the human rights of the unborn. Moreover, even taking the article on its own terms and adhering to a technical understanding, I suggest the full import of the concept of intrinsic evil in public discourse may warrant further development when we encounter political platforms and candidates who re-define acts of evil as a matter of free choice and a constitutional right.

Jumping to the bottom line on abortion pragmatics, readers of our previous debates on the subject at the Mirror of Justice (here, here, here, here, and here) will not be surprised to learn that I am doubtful about the basic premise behind Professor Kaveny’s ultimate conclusion. I continue to find implausible the suggestion that abortion rates will decline with the election of a pro-choice President who promises to launch federal funding for abortions, to make legislative enactment of pro-choice absolutes the inaugural act of his administration, to strip away restrictions of abortion in the states, to overturn informed consent statutes, to deny protection to health care providers who conscientiously object to abortion, and to appoint judges who will strengthen and extend the supposed constitutional right to abortion. Given that we appear likely to undertake this national experiment, however, I genuinely hope that Professor Kaveny’s assurances to the contrary will prove correct. Every one of us concerned for the sanctity of human life must hope that an Obama presidency, which is likely to come to pass, will truly usher in an era of plummeting abortion rates.

While I do endorse the complementary value of health and social welfare support for women and children as essential to any general initiative to provide protection to unborn human life, I just don’t believe that we as a nation can simply buy our way out of the Culture of Death. Even in the event that enhancement of social welfare programs under an Obama administration were to bring down abortion rates, and even further assuming that aggressive pro-choice policies do not offset any such benefit, the pressing question would remain how the effects of an Obama administration are likely to project themselves into the long-term future. A marginal reduction in abortion rates for a short period, while to be celebrated, must be weighed against the possibility that forceful and pervasive pro-choice policies will entrench the Culture of Death for decades longer and cost many more millions of lives in the long-run. We should ask whether the day that human rights for the unborn will be honored is likely to be advanced or delayed by electing the eager and loyal candidate of Planned Parenthood to our nation’s highest office.

I also suggest that an academic debate about the proportionality of evil in general is of passing relevance to the peculiar question of abortion and the unparalleled harm caused to the most vulnerable among us. Professor Kaveny observes that, even when speaking about the taking of human life, “[i]ntrinsically evil acts do not necessarily make for the worst form of homicide.” Likewise, she well explains that accepting the characterization of an act as intrinsically evil does not lead ineluctably to a conclusion that the such an evil outweighs the gravity of other evils, even other acts that are not intrinsically evil in nature. But such an argument about comparative magnitude is out of place when we are speaking about the regime of violence committed against the unborn in our society.

Whether or not faithful Catholics, including bishops and theologians, have on occasion mistakenly connected the concept of intrinsic evil directly to that of incommensurate iniquity, the Church has not been ambiguous or equivocal when insisting that the sanctity of innocent unborn human life is not just another political issue. Professor Kaveny acknowledges that the concept may take on a “prophetic tone” when used by the Church to advocate for a Culture of Life, but she argues that “this use of the term ‘intrinsic evil’ has moved far beyond the technical use normally employed in Catholic action theory: it is evocative, not analytical.” Perhaps. But the Church’s teaching does not turn on technical terminology nor does the power of the message depend on a particular turn of phrase. Rather, it is a life and death question for untold millions. It is the most important human rights issue of our time.

But let me set aside the above objections for remainder of this posting, instead focusing more directly on Professor Kaveny’s evaluation of the concept of intrinsic evil and its value in making electoral decisions. Even taken on the technical account that she well outlines, I ask whether Professor Kaveny’s analysis gives adequate weight to another crucial element of importance to pro-life Catholics in considering the public statements and records of candidates on the question of abortion: the nature and competence of the candidate’s moral perspective and the effect that endorsement of that perspective has on the Church's witness and on our culture.

Professor Kaveny notes that “[a] defender of the [intrinsic evil acts] category’s usefulness might say that the fact that a candidate does not disapprove of an intrinsic evil reveals an unworthy character.” She then argues that other attitudes, such as callousness toward the victims of war or indifference to starving children, might also demonstrate an unworthy character. Fair enough. But then I am unaware of any candidate for political office who consciously displays callousness toward the victims of war or indifference toward the starving, much contends that such denigrating treatment of other human beings should be regarded as a matter of unfettered personal choice or be enshrined as a constitutional right.

Professor Kaveny then argues that “[t]he person with the best moral character may not be the best president.” I am not so sure that moral character is unimportant, given that the occupant of the Oval Office is likely to encounter unanticipated problems and new situations, meaning that the person’s character may be the primary moral resource upon which he or she can draw. But my concern here is less with the moral character of the person, in terms of his or her own behavior, than with what we say as a nation and what message is embedded into the culture, and especially what it means for our witness as faithful Catholic citizens, if we endorse a candidate who calls evil “good” (or at least is unwilling to call evil “evil”). By adopting a largely economic and utilitarian matrix for evaluating a political candidate’s views on abortion, I fear that we do not adequately consider the broader moral implications of a political candidate’s affirmative position on a matter that we as faithful Catholics with a well-formed conscience must agree does constitute an intrinsic evil.

To illustrate my point, let me build upon an example that Professor Kaveny offers in her article of how something that is intrinsically evil may not be of greater gravity than something wrongful that is not intrinsically evil. Professor Kaveny, writes: “Some acts that are not intrinsically evil (driving while intoxicated) can on occasion be worse both objectively and subjectively than acts that are intrinsically evil (telling a jocose lie).” Professor Kaveny’s balancing of these two acts and her suggestion that the not intrinsically evil act may be morally worse than the intrinsically evil act is well-taken. But our assessment of the situation would change dramatically if the person had not only lied but affirmatively defended lying as a legitimate practice—and especially if the lie was not merely made for amusement (jocose) but for another reason. If a candidate for political office was found to have lied about having had an extramarital affair in the past, while his opponent has just been arrested for drunk driving, I might agree that the latter episode deserves greater attention in evaluating the character of the candidates. My calculus would change if the candidate who lied sought to elevate his dissembling to the status of a positive good or a morally-neutral and legitimate choice. And I would be deeply troubled by the cultural impact if we as citizens were to endorse that viewpoint by conferring our votes on the candidate who characterized lying as something morally acceptable.

To carry the example of lying as an intrinsic evil further, consider President Clinton’s false testimony during his civil case deposition about his sexual activity with an intern. Looking back at this episode a decade later, I expect that most people today would no longer deny that Clinton’s statement was the equivalent of perjury or something close to it. At the same time, I suspect that people would still disagree, and reasonably so, about whether a perjurious denial of a sexual affair justified the drastic step of impeaching and removing a president from office. In other words, to extrapolate from Professor Kaveny’s articulation, President Clinton’s lie may have been an “intrinsic evil,” but one might conclude that it was not “a serious evil.”

But suppose Clinton had not merely lied, but had defended himself by insisting that the choice whether to tell the truth or lie should be protected as a matter of privacy. Suppose further that he then called for the repeal of perjury laws as impairing the individual right to lie. Would that position not be untenable and demand the strongest rebuke from faithful Catholics? While reasonable persons might reach different conclusions about the seriousness of and appropriate response to a person’s error in committing an act that constitutes an intrinsic evil, no person with a well-formed conscience could support or defend a public figure person who denied that such an act was wrongful at all. (To be sure, one's reaction might depend on how gravely wrong was the particular intrinsically wrongful act, but, again, anticipating my eventual tie-in of these examples back to the abortion question, such an argument is not available to faithful Catholics with respect to the taking of innocent unborn human life.)

As Professor Kaveny explains, with quotation from John Paul II’s encyclical, “The Splendor of Truth,” an intrinsically evil act “radically contradict[s] the good of the person made in his image.” So understood, ought we not vehemently reject a political message that stands in radical contradiction to the good (and thus also reject the messenger)?

To carry the discussion further, consider hypothetical positions that a candidate for federal office in the United States might take on another (and not so hypothetical) subject of intrinsic evil that directly and publicly affects the basic dignity of the human person—the persistence of human slavery in certain parts of the world. One can postulate at least four different positions that candidates for federal office might take on this issue:

● The Abolitionist: The candidate is unalterably opposed to slavery, forthrightly recognizing that it is an evil. She is committed to bringing to bear the influence and power of the United States government, within prudential limitations, to root it out wherever it emerges in the world.

● The Pessimistic Abolitionist: The candidate is opposed to slavery, forthrightly recognizing that it is an evil, but concludes that use of American influence and power to address the problem are not likely to be effective or may have other counter-productive effects. He is willing to speak the truth about slavery and do so forcefully, but is reluctant to take any actions to address it.

● The Pro-Choice Candidate: The candidate does not affirmatively support slavery but neither is she willing to characterize it as an evil. She further believes as a matter of international relations that the question of slavery must be left to the free choice of each independent nation.

● The Pro-Slavery Candidate: The candidate not only resists any use of American influence or power to suppress slavery in other parts of the world but affirmatively supports slavery as a justifiable economic and social choice.

The hypothetical candidate with the Abolitionist position on slavery fits most comfortably within Catholic teaching about the evils of slavery, both as an intrinsic evil and in terms of its gravity, as well as Catholic expectations regarding the public responsibilities of the Catholic faithful. The Pessimistic Abolitionist might be acceptable, depending on the strength of the prudential arguments against the use of American power or influence. Of course, justifiable Catholic support would at least demand that the Pessimistic Abolitionist forthrightly, consistently, and prominently express his abhorrence at slavery, bringing fully to bear the bully pulpit of his office to encourage moral condemnation of this evil.

By contrast, are not both of the other candidates simply beyond the pale for the Catholic faithful due to their disordered positions on a question of such fundamental moral importance? To be sure, the Pro-Slavery Candidate is the most despicable. That's the easy case. But should we not also separate ourselves from the Pro-Choice Candidate, who is willing to accept an intrinsic evil, to allow some human being to use other human beings as a free choice, and who is even willing to promote protection of that evil as a matter of right? Shouldn’t any person who would refuse to condemn the intrinsic evil of slavery be disqualified from holding high public office? And wouldn’t support by the Catholic faithful for such a candidate, however commendable his or her positions on other issues, undermine the Catholic witness against slavery?

Let’s also more directly compare the Pessimistic Abolitionist and the Pro-Choice Candidate: From the standpoint of pragmatic outcomes for slavery in certain parts of the world, both candidates might produce the same results, that is, is a failure to reduce the incidence of slavery in the world. In fact, one could imagine circumstances in which the Pro-Choice Candidate’s policies might result in greater reductions in the number of slaves, such as by supporting increases in foreign aid that make slavery a less economically viable practice.

And yet the Pro-Choice position surely remains anathema, right? Does not a worldview that enshrines slavery into a protected right of sovereign nations demand our public repudiation? Speaking for myself, I would conclude that a person who is agnostic about whether slavery is an evil is not a person who should be trusted with the moral choices that will be made by a public servant. But just as importantly, I would fear that we would undermine and make a mockery of our moral witness against slavery by being associated with such a candidate, by either endorsement or a vote. Am I misguided in so concluding? Would anyone really disagree with me and suggest that support for the Pro-Choice candidate on slavery is acceptable, however meritorious the candidate and her positions on a host of other matters?

Returning to the prophetic or witness element of the matter, both the Abolitionist and the Pessimistic Abolitionist would send a consistent message of disapproval of slavery, thereby provoking the consciences of fellow citizens, withholding respect from those who practice such an intrinsic evil, and refusing to associate on positive terms with slave holders. By contrast, the Pro-Choice candidate would undermine public disapproval for the practice of slavery, conferring great legitimacy on the conduct. By openly associating with slave holders, the Pro-Choice Candidate, just as much as the Pro-Slavery Candidate, would create greater opportunities for the practitioners of this evil to participate in respectful society and gain greater influence.

For faithful Catholic voters, then, why would the evaluation of political candidates and their position on abortion not be the same? Now some might argue that abortion and slavery are not both intrinsic evils or even evils at all. That option is not available to Catholics of course. Next one might argue that slavery is a proportionately greater and more harmful evil than is abortion. Given that abortion involves the very taking of human life and at a rate that far exceeds the persistence of slavery in some other countries in the modern world, the proportionate argument would be a non-starter. In any event, comparative evilness is not responsive here, because the question is not whether slavery is worse than abortion (and indeed why we would ever want to engage in such a debate). Rather, the question is whether a candidate who openly tolerates something that is both an intrinsic evil and that is gravely harmful to fellow human being—whether it be the subjection of other human being to slavery or the denial of the sanctity of human life by accepting the abortion of other human beings—can be an acceptable electoral choice for a Catholic with a well-formed conscience.

So the impertinent question remains: How do we as faithful Catholic evaluate a candidate for public office who refuses to characterize abortion as an evil and who indeed goes well beyond merely being “pro-choice” by instead arguing for further embedding an unfettered license to abortion as a constitutional right that should be publicly funded? Do we not inappropriately honor such a disordered moral perspective by elevating the holder to high political office? Can utilitarian prognostications about short-term effects of other policies on abortion rates provide us with a legitimate means of escape from the fundamental moral implications of this question? I recognize that some of my friends here on Mirror of Justice are struggling in good faith to thread the needle on these questions. But perhaps such careful stitching is not possible without tearing the fabric?

Greg Sisk