June 22 is the feast day of both St. John Fisher and St. Thomas More, both of whom are, I expect, admired by, and inspiring to, many MOJ readers -- not only for the obvious reason (More and lawyers), but because of their courageous stands for the freedom of the Church as against the overreaches of the "state".
Don't forget, though, June 23, which is the feast day for, inter alia, St. Thomas Garnet, an English Jesuit who was martyred 400 years ago this year, after being tortured by officials seeking information about his uncle, Fr. Henry Garnet, S.J. Garnet was told his life would be spared if he took the Oath of Allegiance, but he refused. He was executed at Tyburn, insisting that he was "the happiest man this day alive." (As it happens, June 23 is also the birthday of my son, Thomas Garnett. And, as it happens, St. Thomas Garnet's father -- Richard Garnet, Henry's brother -- was expelled from Balliol college, thus ending his hope for an academic career, after a statue of the Blessed Mother was found in his rooms.)
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I don't really have a Catholic Legal Theory hook for this, but I cannot help it. My uncharacteristic (but, perhaps, welcome?) blogging silence during the past few days is a result of a just-concluded trip to Arizona with my son. It's quite something, watching a 7-year-old's face when he sees the Grand Canyon for the first time:
Saturday, June 21, 2008
Now that it is been a few weeks since a number of us gathered in Seattle for the Conference on Catholic Legal Thought, I have had some time to reflect on the experience. Most of the programming looked like any other academic conference. We spent the first day with Fr. Frank Sullivan, S.J. considering Church authority and its implications for us as law professors and Catholics. This discussion became a backdrop for subsequent conversations regarding pedagogy, legal theory and scholarship. What made this conference different for me was the sense of solidarity. It was clear that each of us struggled to engage Church teaching with meekness and respect. Although, we represented a diversity of cultural and policy perspectives, we agreed on the importance of the Gospel message and the Magisterium's role in our community. This was clearest to me in our times of prayer, worship and reflection. It gave me hope that meaningful understanding, solidarity and unity are still possible in this fragmented world. I would like to offer warm thanks to all those who attended or participated in the conference. I hope that many more of you will be able to join us next year when we will meet back on the East Coast.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Theologian Robin Lovin predicts (and says it's already been) "a change election for religion and politics":
Just where all of this is going is still unclear. We may get a religious movement that is both socially conservative and globally aware in ways that refuse to line up neatly with the available political options. Instead of being a reliable part of someone's base, religious voters may become the new swing vote. Or the new generation may compel the politicians to redefine what the political options are. That will not happen quickly, if it happens at all, but the rhetoric of change that we now hear from both presidential candidates shows that they are alert to this possibility, and the results of the general election in November may give us hints of what this new politics will look like, or at least help to identify who will be shaping it.
Tom
Discussions of interest here and here regarding "theophobia" -- what NYU law prof Rick Hills calls "the academic’s irrational fear of, or intense discomfort around, theist and, in particular, Christian, beliefs."
After some behind the scenes email, the MOJ conversation on sexual ethics is back on. We are going to start by focusing on Margaret Farley's book, "Just Love," with these two questions in mind: to what extent is her analysis helpful in shaping the questions that Catholics must face as they think about how the Magisterium's teachings on sexuality will be received / understood / framed within the broader culture; and how to dialogue on these issues in that context. For others who are interested in participating and/or following the conversation, we plan to blog on this starting the second week of December.
Michael P., Michael S. and Amy
Dale Carpenter's typically thoughtful post argues that one shouldn't oppose same-sex marriage on the ground that it creates "novel" threats to religious liberty, religious liberty concerns are no reason to oppose same-sex marriage, in large part because the conflicts between religious liberty and gay rights in multiple contexts predate any recognitions of same-sex marriage. I agree with the subordinate point. But the problem with his conclusion is that these other conflicts, although distinct, can be affected by the recognition of same-sex marriage, for a couple of reasons. (These are apart from any new religious-liberty challenges that gay marriage itself may raise.)
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Hopefully one significant contribution of Catholic legal education to the profession is to maintain a focus on the moral dimension of legal practice. I find it especially encouraging when I find a scholar affirming the basic impetus of our project from a secular perspective. In that regard, I recommend a wonderful recent paper by Harvard law prof Joseph Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers. I'm going to assign portions of the paper to my first-year students because it so clearly lays out the problems we have in legal education when we attempt to avoid moral reasoning. Singer explains why we can't escape the need for normative engagement through traditional approaches such as doctrine, efficiency, rights, democracy, or critique. Here's an excerpt:
As a law professor, I have noticed this problem acutely among my students. They quickly learn to make sophisticated arguments about interpreting precedent and statutes, making analogies and distinguishing cases, debating the judicial role (active or restrained), and discerning the advantages and disadvantages of rigid rules versus flexible standards. They also learn to use cost-benefit analysis, measuring the expected consequences of alternative rules of law in monetary values and adding up the costs and benefits to determine which rules appear to maximize social welfare. But when I ask my students to make or defend arguments based on considerations of rights, fairness, justice, morality, or the fundamental values underlying a free and democratic society, they are mute. They get out the first sentence: "I have a right to use my property as I see fit" or "I have a right to be left alone." But then they go silent; they do not have a second sentence – they do not know how to go on. Their silence is partly caused by their not knowing what to say; they cannot figure out what vocabulary to use or how to make the argument. But the underlying reason for this uncertainty is their fear that such arguments are merely matters of opinion that have no objective basis. They know that others can disagree and they feel they do not have way to defend their arguments or ground them.
Those who are interested in the moral dimension of legal reasoning should read this paper, and those who are not interested in the moral dimension of legal reasoning must read this paper. For my much less eloquent exploration of the topic, you can check out one of these papers.
