Mirror of Justice

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

Question on Scalia/Death Penalty

Prof. Dave Douglas (William & Mary Law) sent me the following email:

I am preparing a talk on the views of various religious groups -- including the Catholic Church -- on the death penalty. In an essay published in the May 2002 issue of First Things, Justice Antonin Scalia writes the following about the discussion of the death penalty in the papal encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, and the catechism:

So I take the encyclical and the latest, hot–off–the–presses version of the catechism (a supposed encapsulation of the “deposit” of faith and the Church’s teaching regarding a moral order that does not change) to mean that retribution is not a valid purpose of capital punishment. Unlike such other hard Catholic doctrines as the prohibition of birth control and of abortion, this is not a moral position that the Church has always or indeed ever before maintained. There have been Christian opponents of the death penalty, just as there have been Christian pacifists, but neither of those positions has ever been that of the Church. The current predominance of opposition to the death penalty is the legacy of Napoleon, Hegel, and Freud rather than St. Paul and St. Augustine. I mentioned earlier Thomas More, who has long been regarded in this country as the patron saint of lawyers, and who has recently been declared by the Vatican the patron saint of politicians (I am not sure that is a promotion). One of the charges leveled by that canonized saint’s detractors was that, as Lord Chancellor, he was too quick to impose the death penalty.

I am therefore happy to learn from the canonical experts I have consulted that the position set forth in Evangelium Vitae and in the latest version of the Catholic catechism does not purport to be binding teaching - that is, it need not be accepted by practicing Catholics, though they must give it thoughtful and respectful consideration. It would be remarkable to think otherwise - that a couple of paragraphs in an encyclical almost entirely devoted not to crime and punishment but to abortion and euthanasia was intended authoritatively to sweep aside (if one could) two thousand years of Christian teaching.

I am wondering what you think of the second paragraph of this excerpt from Scalia's essay, particularly his claim that the language in the catechism and in Evangelium Vitae about the death penalty do "not purport to be binding teaching -- that is, it need not be accepted by practicing Catholics, though they must give it thoughtful and respectful consideration."
Is that a correct reading of the catechism and Evangelium Vitae as they deal with the death penalty? How does one distinguish between that which is "binding teaching" and that which is not?

I couldn't remember whether there had been any discussion on MOJ about this particular Scalia essay, but we have had substantial discussions about questions of hierarchical authority and the death penalty, and I thought Dave would benefit from the responses of people here.

Interesting Year at the Movies

By Michael Scaperlanda

This year we had three (IMHO opinion) good movies in which a main character faces an unplanned and unwed pregnancy: Knocked Up (I liked it despite its vulgarity), Bella, and Juno. I was pleasantly surprised to see Juno nominated for Best Picture, Best Director, and Best Actress.

Update: My son, Christopher, reminded me that Juno has also been nominated for Best Original Screenplay.

Interruptions

By Elizabeth Schiltz

For some reason, I get particular spiritual nourishment from insights that bring home the reality of Christ's humanity. (For example, during a particularly protracted toilet-training struggle with one of my children, it ocurred to me that Mary had to toilet train Jesus. This idea still bemuses and comforts me in all sorts of situations.)

I just came across this passage in an excellent Catholic critique of American secular culture, particularly the liberal feminist movement, Joyce Little's The Church and the Culture War: Secular Anarchy or Sacred Order. It struck me as not only a wonderful insight into Christ's humanity, but also a good reminder, in general:

Henri J. Nouwen in his book Out of Solitude quotes a professor at Notre Dame as saying, 'I have always been complaining that my work was constantly interrupted, until I slowly discovered that my interruptions were my work.' Those of us who pursue a career are all too prone to define for ourselves where the importance of our work lies. We are constantly tempted to dismiss the demands others make on us as a waste of time, their needs as far less significant than the projects to which we have committed ourselves. We can become quite convinced that we are doing what God wants us to do and that he himself would not wish to see that work disrupted by the paltry loose ends of other people's lives.

What we fail to understand is that if these interruptions are a waste of time, then Christ's life was a waste of time. For when we read the Gospels attentively, we discover that the story of his life is one long sequence of interruptions. The blind Bartimaeus interrupts his departure from Jericho, a woman interrupts his dinner in the home of Simon the leper, a centurion interrupts his entry into Capernaum, Jairus interrupts his meeting with the crowd, the woman with the hemorrhage interrupts his attempts to get to Jairus' daughter, his disciples interrupt virtually everything; even Mary interrupts his enjoyment of the wedding. The list could go on and on. One might even say that the crucifixion interrupts what could have been a splendid messianic career. Those were not interruptions, of course. They were precisely the people he came to help, the things he came to do. When so much of his work consisted of attending to those who interrupted him, why should we suppose our own lives to be any different?

Defiant Birth

By Elizabeth Schiltz

If you want a taste of what's in the Defiant Birth book that was the subject of Rick's recent post, it includes a slightly edited version of this essay I wrote about my experiences with prenatal testing. With that self-interest disclosed, I have to say that the book is truly excellent. The introduction by the editor, Australian pro-life author and activist Melinda Tankard Reist, is a rich source of data and information about the eugenic trend of much of prenatal care. The essays in the collection consist of contributions from women all over the world, conveying how universal and widespread these eugenic attitudes are.

Philpott on "The Stillborn God"

By Rick Garnett

My friend Dan Philpott (Political Science, Notre Dame) has this review, over at The Immanent Frame (a really good blog), of Mark Lilla's, The Stillborn God. Here's a bit:

The idea of modern liberalism depends decisively on a jettisoning of theology as a source for arguing about politics: If there is one claim to which Lilla returns again and again from different angles, this is it. So if there is one phenomenon that most decisively calls Lilla’s argument into question, it would be a positive relationship between traditional, orthodox political theology and key features of liberal politics, especially separation of religious and political authority and religious freedom. To the degree that such a relationship is found, it weakens the case that liberalism – particularly, its separation between religious and political authority, freedom of religion, etc. – depends crucially on a divorce from political theology. But in fact, ample evidence exists that traditional political theology has contributed vitally to incubating, sustaining, and expanding liberal democracy, in thought and in practice, before, during, and after the early modern religious wars. Unquestionably, political theology has also begotten the bizarre, the violent, and the illiberal. But its positive contribution is large enough to raise serious doubts about Lilla’s thesis. . . .

My point here is only to demonstrate historically a strong symbiosis between traditional Christian political theology and the idea of modern liberal democracy. If such a symbiosis indeed exists, then does it not sharply call into question Lilla’s contention that the rise of modern liberalism depends precisely on a great separation between traditional political theology and political thought? . . .

The story of Catholicism corroborates the finding. Lilla ignores this story, which he justifies in a footnote (see page 12) saying that the Church was hostile to modern society until the twentieth century. Of course, there is much truth to that. But even in the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church by and large prospered in America (despite outbreaks of anti-Catholic prejudice) and came to accommodate the American church-state relationship on a provisional if not deeply principled level. . . . [P]ope Benedict XVI himself has credited the Enlightenment with promoting the dialogue that brought the Church to embrace human rights and democracy. But when it did embrace them, it did so on the basis of its own theology and tradition of thought – a possibility that Lilla does not adequately recognize. . . .

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Frances and Kate—35 Years Later

By Robert John Araujo, SJ

Today’s Los Angeles Times has a fascinating op-ed essay by Frances Kissling and Kate Michelman, emeritae respectively of their former posts as Presidents of Catholics for a Free Choice and NARAL Pro-Choice America. The title of their opinion piece, published on the 35^th anniversary of Roe is Abortion’s Battle of Messages—It’s not 1973. Pro-choice forces must adjust to regain the moral high ground. [HERE]

The intention of my post today is to comment on the Kissling-Michelman claims presented in their fascinating opinion piece. But before I do, I must comment on their title: it is not only inconceivable but impossible for the “pro-choice forces”, i.e., abortion advocates, to regain the moral high ground. They never had it, and I doubt they ever will. But I digress from my commentary on their essay.

In their very first sentence they state, “the Supreme Court affirmed in Roe v. Wade that women have a fundamental right to choose abortion without government interference.” The Supreme Court, through Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion, said no such thing. It would also be a long stretch to suggest that this is what Harry Blackmun’s opinion could be reasonably construed as asserting. Why? Look at the innovative but flawed trimester theory which Justice Blackmun developed and upon which he and the majority relied to justify what they did. Under their rationale, with the passage of time, the woman’s physician’s (and, therefore the female patient’s) “rights” decreased and those of the state, including its interest to protect the unborn, increased. It is clear from Justice Blackmun’s view of the Constitution that neither the physician nor the woman had the same protection at the end of a pregnancy as at the beginning of the same pregnancy. Moreover, Justice Blackmun acknowledged the right of the state to interfere at some point when he, and a majority of the justices, stated:

subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.

In my view, these words do not lead to the conclusion that Mss. Kissling and Michelman plead us to accept without further ado. Blackmun himself asserted that the state, under the circumstances he and his majority colleagues agreed, can interfere and stop at least some abortions by declaring them illegal, albeit on a variety of grounds. That is not a particularly strong pro-life (or “antiabortion” if you accept the nomenclature of Kissling and Michelman) view, but it is not what Kissling and Michelman argue it is—namely, “that women have a fundamental right to choose abortion without government interference.”

Within the same paragraph, Mss. Kissling and Michelman take the opportunity to criticize the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Gonzales v. Carhart by declaring that this “decision on so-called partial-birth abortions was an unprecedented infringement on physician autonomy.” If they respected Roe, they could make no such claim. Gonzales v. Carhart liberally protects the opportunity to perform many abortions as long as they are not of the kind prohibited by the legislation reviewed and upheld in Gonzales.

They also argue that public opinion in the United States “has been relatively stable and favorable to legal abortion.” This is a fantastic but unrealistic claim when one considers the numerous legislative efforts of state legislatures and Congress to mollify and regulate the effects of Roe and its progeny over the past thirty-plus years. They also claim that “[e]arly efforts to overturn Roe failed miserably.” I suppose when one considers that judges were emboldened to declare any regulation of abortion “unconstitutional”, their contention has some merit. But neither the advocates for these judicial decisions nor the judges who rendered them were true to the Constitution or to Roe. If one were to follow faithfully the Kissling-Michelman rationale, one could also argue that people and interest groups that attempted to overturn Dred Scott and Plessy failed miserably, too—until Brown.

Mss. Kissling and Michelman then proffer an interesting assertion,

Given this reality [that efforts to overturn Roe “failed miserably”], the anti-choice movement changed tactics. It no longer focused primarily on banning abortions but concentrated on restricting the circumstances under which abortion would be available. It succeeded in shifting public attention from broad support for legal abortion to strong support for restricting access. Twenty years ago, being pro-life was déclassé. Now it is a respectable point of view.

Well, if pro-life citizens and public officials were judicially frustrated time after time from reversing Roe legislatively or judicially, I suppose, consistent with what Pope John Paul II stated in Evangelium Vitae, the next thing they could do was to argue from Roe itself and seek to legislate the regulations that Roe permitted if one were following what the Roe court said. It was not being déclassé; rather, it was trying to follow a particular judicial precedent, albeit a terribly flawed precedent, that many pro-life citizens elected to pursue. I hasten to add that their view was always respectable and never déclassé. But, again I digress.

It is now necessary to study a remarkable concession made by Mss. Kissling and Michelman regarding the argument from science. Justice Blackmun and his majority refused to acknowledge what the child, whose life was being terminated by an abortion, was. Justice Blackmun labored hard to dispel the State of Texas’s contention that “the fetus is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,” but in the end he was forced to conclude in honest fashion that “this conclusion [the majority’s rationale], however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.” In short, the majority failed to, refused to, could not answer the question posed by the State of Texas: is the fetus a person? So, the majority dodged the bullet, for the time being, and moved on to other matters. This sets the stage for the peculiar statement of Mss. Kissling and Michelman in where they question if “those opposed to abortion simply respond more effectively to the changing science as well as the social shift from the rights rage of the ‘60s to the responsibility culture of the ‘90s?”

Science was always with the pro-life side in the abortion debate that began with Roe, and the “responsibility culture” is based on it. It appears that only lately have these two high-profile pro-abortion advocates come to realize that objective medical science did not and does not support the claims proffered by Justice Blackmun upon which they rely. That is why Justice Blackmun had to avoid the question about the status of the unborn child when he said “this conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.”

And what does medical science contend about the status of the unborn? What did it say on January 22, 1973 and what does it still say today? It says this: the target of abortion is life, and it is human life without qualification. Let us be clear on the nature of the embryo, the fetus, the unborn: “It is to be remembered that at all stages the embryo is a living organism, that is, it is a going concern with adequate mechanisms for its maintenance…” [O’Rahilly and Műller, Human Embryology and Teratology (1996)] These same medical textbook authors continue by stating that: “life is continuous, as is also human life, so that the question ‘When does (human) life begin?’ is meaningless in terms of ontogeny. Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.” In similar fashion, Moore and Persaud, the authors of another prominent medical text book on human embryology note: “The intricate processes by which a baby develops from a single cell are miraculous… Human development is a continuous process that begins when an oocyte (ovum) from a female is fertilized by a sperm (spermatozoon) from a male. Cell division, cell migration, programmed cell death, differentiation, growth, and cell rearrangement transform the fertilized oocyte, a highly specialized, totipotent cell—a zygote—into a multicellular human being.”

Justice Blackmun offered no scientific justification for his use of the term “potential life” when he tried to dismiss the constitutional claims made on behalf of the unborn child who would be the target of abortion. The reason is that scientific evidence inexorably denies the claims he advanced with his anomalous terminology “potential life.” His scientific error undermines his legal theory that the unborn child, which he acknowledges is carried in the “mother’s womb”, is at best “potential life.” Yes, Frances; yes, Kate; the entity whose life you believe can be snuffed out by the precedent of Roe is just like you, me, Justice Blackmun, and anyone else: it, no, he or she is human. May I suggest that science has not changed, but perhaps Frances Kissling and Kate Michelman have insofar as they have finally come to realize that they were wrong after all these years, if I may borrow from Stanley Fish’s critique of Ronald Dworkin. But I must add that it was not simply science that facilitated the “swing of the pendulum,” it was the truth about the nature of the human person in the form of the yet-to-be born child whose position we all shared—me, you, Frances Kissling, Kate Michelman, Harry Blackmun, et. al.

Mss. Kissling and Michelman suggest that these “changes” in knowledge have given “antiabortionists an advantage.” Really? Is it an advantage to present the truth against falsehood and argue that the truth, rather than falsehood, should be the foundation of the law?

Since we at Mirror of Justice are joined in the enterprise of developing Catholic Legal Theory, I would suggest that Mss. Kissling and Michelman may, at long last, have come to realize that they have been wrong not only about the law but also about what their faith (they both assert that they are Catholic) has to say about Roe and the legalization of abortion. They argue toward the end of their essay that,

Advocates of choice have had a hard time dealing with the increased visibility of the fetus. The preferred strategy is still to ignore it and try to shift the conversation back to women. At times, this makes us appear insensitive, a bit too pragmatic in a world where the desire to live more communitarian and “life-affirming” lives is palpable. To some people, pro-choice values seem to have been unaffected by the desire to save the whales and the trees, to respect animal life and to end violence at all levels. Pope John Paul II got that, and coined the term “culture of life.” President Bush adopted it, and the slogan, as much as it pains us to admit it, moved some hearts and minds. Supporting abortion is tough to fit into this package.

Thus, Mss. Kissling and Michelman concede that the time has arrived to “support a public discussion of the moral dimensions of abortion.” I am all for that. But, let us also remember that any such discussion, if it is to be a sincere and fruitful one, must be based on the truth, the truth which includes the fact that since Roe was decided somewhere between forty and fifty million young Americans were denied the opportunity to be like you, me, Frances Kissling, and Kate Michelman. Unfortunately, a further examination of their concluding remarks reveals that Mss. Kissling and Michelman do yet want this discussion and the debate that will ensue because they express their wish to defer this debate sine die with these words: “If pro-choice values are to regain the moral high ground, genuine discussion about these challenges needs to take place within the movement. It is inadequate to try to message our way out of this problem.”

I am willing to attend “messaging” school, if need be, to assist Mss. Kissling and Michelman so that they may finally join a real debate about abortion that investigates the truth about human existence that is essential to the law. But, in the meantime, I shall pray for them as I do for all the young Americans who never had the chance to pursue the blessings of liberty that the Constitution promises to all of us who were endowed by the Creator, i.e., God, with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. RJA sj

Judging Decisions Not to Abort

By Susan Stabile

I haven't read the book discussed at Vox Nova, to which Rick refers in his post, but have certainly read of, and am troubled by, the expectation on the part of some medical personnel and others that a women who discovers her child has a birth defect will abort. I thought of this issue earlier today as I read a post by David Cohen on the Feminist Law Professors blog commenting on the recent films in which women don't get abortions (Waitress, Knocked Up and Juno). What struck me was that, in describing the films, Cohen found it "troubling that the most common medical procedure for women (over 1.2 million per year) gets pushed aside in situations that clearly call for, at the very least, very serious consideration of it." So it is not just the mothers of disabled children who are somehow deficient if they don't abort their babies. In addition, women trying to get out of abusive marriages or otherwise suffering economic hardship or women who conceive after a one-night stand simply must give "very serious consideration" to abortion. And I take from his "at the very least" and from his (unsupported) statement that "many, if not most, women in those situations would opt to have a safe, legal abortion" that Cohen really means not just that such women should seriously consider the option, but that they ought to take that option. The idea that women are being told that there are circumstance in which they simply must abort is more than a little troubling.

Abortions and Safety Nets

By Thomas Berg

The reduction in abortions that was reported by the Guttmacher Institute, and Rick's and Eduardo's posts on it, bring me back to the question whether a strengthened social safety net on matters relating to pregnancy, child care and raising, etc., is likely to contribute to reductions in abortions. John Breen's article, "Modesty and Moralism: Justice, Prudence, and Abortion -- A Reply to Skeel and Stuntz," which was noted here a while back, argues that safety-net measures don't help much. John's is a really fine article that thoroughly undermines the claims that prohibitions on abortion won't reduce the numbers and rates. And John supports safety-net measures in themselves, as a matter of justice and solidarity with those in need: but he doubts they will have much effect on abortions.

On the last score, I think that there is a flaw in John's argument. He bases the argument on the fact that although Western European nations have more developed safety nets than America, abortion ratios -- abortions per 100 pregnancies -- are not much lower in Western Europe (although they are somewhat lower). But the argument doesn't take into account the fact that belief in the immorality of abortion appears to be significantly less widespread or deep in Western Europe than in America. In that context it seems to me striking that European abortion ratios are nevertheless lower at all than America's, and that the stronger European safety nets could be having a significant effect.

"Defiant Birth: Women Who Resist Medical Eugenics"

By Rick Garnett

More at Vox Nova. Check it out.

A Debate About the Morality of Abortion

By Michael Perry

[This from the Catholic News Agency, 1/22/08:]

Professors’ abortion debate attracts hundreds at University of Colorado

Boulder, CO, Jan 22, 2008 / 03:11 am (CNA).- A Catholic-sponsored debate about the ethics of abortion packed hundreds into an auditorium on the University of Colorado campus in Boulder, CO this past Friday night. The debate featured two prominent philosophy professors—Drs. Peter Kreeft and David Boonin—who defended their views on the ethics of abortion.

Listeners filled all 288 seats of the auditorium, while others sat in the aisles. Still more sat in the overflow seating in the basement hallway, and even crowded the stairs leading up from the basement, a total audience easily surpassing 400 in number.

The debate, sponsored by the Thomas Aquinas Institute for Catholic Thought, addressed the question "Is abortion morally justifiable?" Dr. Peter Kreeft, of Boston College, answered that it could never be while Dr. David Boonin of the University of Colorado argued that abortion was sometimes a moral choice. Both professors offered many reasons and counterarguments defending their position.

The professors are both prominent in their field and in the public eye. Kreeft has authored more than 45 books dedicated to defending Christian beliefs and understanding suffering, morality, philosophy, life, and God. Dr. Boonin’s 2003 book “A Defense of Abortion” won an honorable mention from the American Philosophical Association. Boonin is also the chair of the University of Colorado's philosophy department.

Dr. Kreeft opened the discussion with an "intuitional" appeal, saying "more people in fact are convinced by seeing, by experiencing, than by arguing." He noted that people usually change their minds through personal relationships rather than through strictly rational analysis. He advised the audience to listen to the "inner shock" of conscience.

Shifting to an explicit rational argument, Kreeft took the position that a human fetus is a person possessing many rights, including the right to life. He also argued that people cannot rationally deny the right to life of the unborn without denying the right to life of newborns.

He recounted how he once discussed abortion with "some very intelligent feminists," claiming that they had no argument justifying abortion that would not also justify infanticide.

"After the argument they came up to me and said 'Congratulations, professor, you changed our minds. We didn't think you could do that.'"

"'Oh, good,' I said, 'you're pro-life now?'"

"'No, we're pro-infanticide'," Kreeft finished, prompting surprised laughter from the audience. "So logical consistency can be a two-edged sword," he noted.

Even someone who was unsure if an unborn child is a person, Kreeft argued, would in the absence of certainty have to refrain from having an abortion. To kill someone without knowing if they are human is still homicide. To act in a rash manner that could kill someone, such as poisonously fumigating a room without being sure it was empty of people, would amount to criminal negligence. Barring certain knowledge that an unborn human is not a person, abortion similarly would be blameworthy even if the human fetus were not a person with the right to life.

Dr. Boonin began his remarks with a general comment criticizing the belief that the only arguments against abortion are religious arguments. "In fact, there are a number of distinct arguments, potentially quite powerful arguments," against abortion that do not refer to God and rely on reasonable premises that people on both sides of the abortion debate would accept. He said Kreeft's opening remarks were examples of such reasoning.

Boonin then presented criticisms of some general pro-life arguments and raised some philosophical concerns about Kreeft's arguments. Boonin said that it was "implausible" to many people that human membership automatically entailed having the right to life. One such case is that of an individual whose capacity for consciousness is lost when most of his brain is physically destroyed.

Boonin suggested that Kreeft's argument that any moral uncertainty about moral status of the unborn child meant all abortions were at minimum morally blameworthy could have radical implications if applied consistently. This "appeal to uncertainty," as he called it, could require pacifism, vegetarianism, opposition to capital punishment, and the advocacy of a moral imperative to give all of one’s excess income to those in need.

Boonin went on to argue that "the right to life is not the right to be kept alive by somebody else." If all human beings shared the same right to life, abortion could be justified using this distinction. Proposing a thought experiment, Boonin suggested the audience imagine being kidnapped and forced to donate bone marrow.

"Suppose you walked out in the park yesterday and a doctor caught you and conked you on the head and knocked you unconscious. You wake up, and the doctor has hooked you up to a bone marrow extraction device. The bone marrow is extracted from you and pumped into me. You ask 'What's going on?' The doctor says 'Don't worry, stay hooked into Professor Boonin for the next nine months, he'll be fine. Disconnect yourself now, because of a bone marrow disease, he's going to die.'"

Most people, Boonin thought, would agree that in this case a person would not have a right to be kept alive. He argued the situation was analogous to abortion. "The fetus isn't just sitting in a lounge chair somewhere," he said, but is in the body of a woman who doesn't wish to be pregnant.

Closing the evening, Boonin thanked the Aquinas Institute for hosting him. "There is something quite extraordinary about the fact that the Aquinas Institute invited me to speak this weekend, giving me equal time with a national representative of the views that obviously they are passionately committed to."

Father Kevin Augustyn, pastor of St. Thomas Aquinas Parish, closed the meeting with a description of the lecture series’ aim.

"Reason can lead to the threshold of faith, and once across that threshold of faith, then reason still has a role for us to understand God's word and God's ways in our lives. The Aquinas Institute for Catholic Thought exists for that reason, for the search for truth."

Speaking to CNA at a post-debate reception, Father Augustyn further explained the institute’s goals.

“The Aquinas Institute for Catholic Thought is basically our arm for outreach to both Catholic students that come to us, and the university at large. We're trying to engage an important secular university with the Catholic faith. How do you do that? You begin with dialogue, and what we have in common, and we believe reason is on our side,” he said.

Many in attendance found the high turnout remarkable. The debate had been advertised in flyers, mailing lists, and in the diocesan paper and website. Social networks also spread the word. The event’s Facebook.com page on Sunday evening reported 96 confirmed guests and 48 who said they would possibly attend.

Seth James DeMoor, a University of Colorado senior studying history and education, estimated 600 people heard the debate.

“The room holds 300 people, and there were at least 300 people outside the room. This issue is the issue of the generation, and I think the proof is in the numbers. It just shows that this issue is at the forefront of American culture,” DeMoor said.