Sightings 1/10/08
Protecting Freedoms in Alberta
-- Wayne A.
Holst
Recent studies
released by Statistics Canada and the Conference Board of Canada confirm what
Calgarians and many Albertans have suspected for some time: The
lure of an unprecedented, prolonged oil boom has made Alberta the most
attractive Canadian destination of in-migration from other provinces and a large
draw for new Canadians from other countries. Until 1947, the
province of Alberta, which celebrated its
centennial two years ago, was largely a "have-not province of farmers and
ranchers" where the aboriginal peoples were met by pioneering and homesteading
freedom-seekers from other parts of Canada and the world.
But sixty years ago oil was discovered at Leduc, just south of
Edmonton. In the
subsequent six decades, Alberta has evolved into the
richest, most dynamic province of Canada. Calgary, a small to mid-sized
city for almost a century, recently entered the Canadian metropolitan
big-leagues with Toronto, Montreal , Vancouver, Ottawa, and Edmonton when its population
surpassed one million. In addition, it was reported in early
December that Calgary topped a list of twenty-seven Canadian cities, and enjoyed
a North American third-place standing (after Washington and Austin) for
attracting "the best and brightest" because of the economy, innovation,
environment, education, health, society and housing.
Social transformation
of this nature and magnitude is bound to profoundly impact established residents
and newcomers alike, as it strongly influences politics and public values.
The venerable Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta, in power
for four decades, is in the midst of a scramble to come to grips with reality,
as traditional Albertan values — conservative and strongly influenced by an
underlying "bible belt" religiosity — are increasingly under scrutiny.
Enter from stage right
Craig Chandler and Stephen Boisson. Chandler was selected to
represent the riding of Calgary-Edgmont in the provincial election anticipated
next spring. Early in December, however, the still-reigning party
decided not to allow the controversial talk-show host to represent them.
The official announcement was made a day after the Alberta Human
Rights Commission (AHRC) ruled that a letter written by a former executive
director of Concerned Christians Canada (CCC), a group Chandler founded, exposed
gay people to "hatred and contempt."
Chandler says the media and
the Conservatives have unfairly linked him to a letter published in a
Red
Deer Alberta newspaper, the
Advocate, written in 2002 by CCC director Pastor Stephen
Boisson. Boisson's article called gay activists "perverse,
self-centred and morally depraved individuals" who are "just as immoral" as
pedophiles, drug dealers and pimps. Two weeks after the letter
appeared, a gay seventeen-year-old boy was assaulted in that
community.
Darren Lund, education
professor at the University
of Calgary (a Lutheran, formerly
from Red
Deer)
filed a complaint with the AHRC shortly thereafter, suggesting the Boisson
missive fostered an atmosphere of violence and intimidation toward gays. The AHRC stated in its ruling that "the (Boisson) letter serves to
dehumanize people who are homosexuals by referring to them in a degrading,
insulting and offensive manner." It also stated that "there is a
circumstantial connection between the hate speech of Mr. Boisson and the CCC"
and the gay bashing of the Red Deer teen. Thus, within a matter of days, the pastor and the aspiring politician
were both condemned by the AHRC: Boisson is no longer in the
ministry and Chandler cannot represent the
Conservatives in an election.
A satisfied
Lund says the ruling sends
a clear message: "It confirms we all have rights to free speech in
Alberta, but there are also
responsibilities that come with these privileges if we want to keep this a safe
place for everyone. It reminds us that people in positions of authority have a
special responsibility to protect the dignity of especially vulnerable people."
For his part, Chandler was quoted as saying:
"(The Conservative brass) told me my faith in Jesus Christ would interfere with
how I could be a good member of the legislative assembly. Is that fair?"
The Chandler-Boisson
episode suggests that Alberta 's human rights
standards are evolving for the better. But Chandler's assertion that his
religious rights are being curtailed illustrates how variously "for the better"
can be understood, and suggests that such evolution cannot be taken for granted,
as there will always be those who challenge it. Thus, freedoms
require vigilance if our province is to mature as a safe place for
everyone.
[Wayne A.
Holst,
formerly from Ontario but a proud Albertan
for almost three decades, teaches at the University
of
Calgary and at St. David's
United Church.]
----------
Sightings
comes
from the Martin Marty
Center at the University of
Chicago Divinity School.
In response to Rick's comment about the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape: I don't follow this area closely, and perhaps the Court will just apply Coker. However, apparently four states since 1997 have added the death penalty for child rape, and I had heard talk that this might be that case where the "society's developing views" approach might turn around and uphold a death-penalty statute. It's all up to Anthony Kennedy's gut feeling, and who knows what that is.
Rick also asks why "taking a life by execution cannot be appropriate redress for a crime that does not involve the taking of a life" (my proposition). I'm no expert on this either, but ... I would think that the only retributive argument for the death penalty that can succeed in maintaining the value of human life is the argument that unjust taking of a life is so serious to society that only the response of taking the aggressor's life can communicate that seriousness. (The "disorder introduced," to employ the terminology of the Catechism 2266-2267, is so serious that only the death penalty can "redres[s]" it.) I don't buy that argument in our context; I agree (see here) with those who say that because of poor legal representation, racial disparities, vengeful chants outside prisons during executions, etc., the use of death penalty tends to communicate more that some human lives can just be thrown away. But whatever one thinks about those points, the different argument that "we should take the defendant's life because s/he has done a really, really horrible thing" seems to me far, far less likely over time to preserve the sense of the value of human life, and far more likely to erode it. "A really horrible thing" is a pretty fuzzy standard that could encompass different acts for different people, even if the rape of a stepchild is a clear case. I would think that Catholics -- and even those who want retribution to be more determinative than it is in the Catechism -- should want a bright line, as Rick posited the Court might want on the constitutional issue, to constrain society's resort to the taking of life.
Tom
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Tom asked (and asked again) what people thought of the possibility of justifying the death penalty for non-homicide crimes. A few quick thoughts:
First, it seems likely that the Court will invalidate the Louisiana law under review in the Kennedy case. (See here for more details.) It will be interesting to learn why, though. Will the Court say, "here's a bright-line rule: the death penalty is never constitutional absent a conviction for a homicide crime." If the Court does say this, what's the theory? Certainly, it is possible for someone who intentionally (and wickedly, heinously, evilly, gruesomely, etc., etc.) rapes a child to be more blameworthy -- in terms of subjective culpability -- than someone who causes another person's death in a way and under circumstances that make him death-eligible. I suppose the Court could just cite Tison and Coker and be done with it (ignoring the tone-deafness of that opinion with respect to the harm involved in the crime of rape, and also the fact that Coker talks about the rape of "an adult woman." We'll see.
Second, with respect to Tom's statement that "taking a life by execution cannot be appropriate redress for a crime that does not involve the taking of a life": Why not? I mean, I am inclined to agree, but why? What is meant by the word "redress" here? Tom's statement, it seems, highlights what has long been, for me, a troubling aspect of the Catechism's "protect society" approach. Because the Catechism does not say -- and the Church has not yet taught (has it?) -- that "it is never -- no way, no how -- morally permissible for the public authority to punish an offender by executing him", we are stuck wondering whether it could ever be the case that execution was necessary to "protect society" from someone who has been convicted of child-rape.
So, Tom . . . why not? (See above.)
Here is Prof. Robert George's open letter to Anne Rice (of vampire-novel fame), regarding her endorsement of Sen. Clinton's campaign for the presidency (an endorsement that was, Ms. Rice stated, animated by her Catholic convictions). A taste:
. . . For now, what I hope you will consider is simply this: The child in the womb either is or is not a human being–a member of the human family. If he or she is, then he or she is entitled as a matter of basic justice to the protection of laws and, indeed, to the equal protection of the laws. For a voter or public official to seek to deny to the unborn elementary legal protections against killing that we favor for ourselves and others we regard as worthy is a gross and appalling injustice. There is no way around this. Once one concedes the humanity of the child–as one must in view of the plain facts of human embryogenesis and early-intrauterine development–the principle of the profound, inherent, and equal dignity of every member of the human family requires the legal protection of the unborn.
Yet today the unborn are denied any legal protection and are slaughtered (there really is no other word for what is going on) at the rate of more than one million per year in our country. The scope and gravity of this injustice surely demands that we make the fight against it central in our own deliberations and actions as citizens. It is true that law cannot prevent all abortions; but unless the law recognizes the humanity and rights of the child in the womb we cannot begin doing what you and I wish to do–namely, end the horror of abortion. Recognizing what abortion is–the killing of an innocent human being–is the first step; and that step cannot be taken while we legally protect abortion and even confer on it (as the Supreme Court did) the status of a constitutional right. Our regime of law, as things stand, speaks loudly, clearly, and falsely. It proclaims that no being who matters–no creature possessing dignity and human rights–is destroyed when we tear off the limbs, burn off the skin, or suck out the brains of a human fetus. . . .
A few days ago, Mirror of Justice went over the one-million-page-views mark. I know, I know . . . this is piddly compared to Volokh, Reynolds, Kos, Sullivan, and the rest, but . . . not bad! Thanks so much to all readers and bloggers, these past four years.
If you read and enjoy MOJ . . . tell your friends!
I've had no response, from blogger or reader, to my earlier post asking if anyone tries, under Catholic thought, to justify the death penalty for a non-homicide crime (including the horrific crime of child rape, the issue now before the Supreme Court in a case involving a man's rape of his stepdaughter). It may be simply that no one was moved to respond, but I'll posit that it's because there is no cognizable justification for execution in such a case: that is, that even if one rejects John Paul II's "imprisonment is enough to protect society" argument and finds the death penalty could be appropriate in some cases as a matter of redressing the disorder caused the offense, taking a life by execution cannot be appropriate redress for a crime that does not involve the taking of a life. But there must be some Catholic legislators voting for these laws in the four states that have enacted them since 1997, and some Catholic prosecutors involved in the two Louisiana cases (including the one before the SCT) in which death sentences were imposed.
Tom
