Explaining my "no"

Michael P. has raised (in e-mail) a question about my "no" vote on the contraception-subsidy proposal about which he blogged the other day.  Regarding this passage from my post:

"[A] young college man ought not to pressure his pregnant girlfriend to get an abortion, and a young college woman ought not to procure an abortion, even if their inability to shoulder the burden of paying full-price for contraceptives is one of the reasons they face the decision.  And, it seems to me that policymakers may and should take very seriously the possible negative consequences of a law whose expressive function might be to suggest otherwise."

Michael has pressed me:  "I don't understand how does this passage counts as a reason to vote no.  Can you elaborate a bit for me?"

The contraception-subsidy proposal reflects, it seems to me, this thinking:  We all know that college students are going to have sex -- even if we tell them (assuming they are unmarried) that they shouldn't.  And, we all know that some of these students are going to get pregnant.  Finally, we all know that some of these students will choose abortion, even if we try to teach them that they should not.  So, those of us who want there to be fewer abortions should support the contraception-subsidy proposal because -- by making contraception cheaper -- it would reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies and, therefore, the number of abortions. 

In my post, I assumed for the sake of argument that fewer abortions among college students would, in fact, be a result -- a good result -- of adopting the proposal.  But, are there reasons why even those of us who regard "fewer abortions" as a "good result" might still oppose the policy?  It seems to me that there are.  Fr. Araujo has discussed (with more care and eloquence than I did) some of these reasons.  The reason I was trying to articulate in my earlier post is consonant, I think, with Fr. Araujo's third and fourth reasons.  I start with the view that law has not only a direct, social-control function but also "expressive" and "pedagogical" functions (and effects).  The contraception-subsidy proposal involves, among other things, the expression-through-law of a position that, it seems to me, we might want to avoid expressing-through-law.  Joined with the reasons discussed by Fr. Araujo, this fact (assuming it is a fact) seems to provide a reasonable basis for someone who opposes abortion to nonetheless vote "no" on the proposal.