Some Comments from Brian Tamanaha

In the ongoing conversation about (what I call) the morality of human rights--in particular, about the question of the ground of the morality of human rights--Brian Tamanaha sent me these comments.  I thought some MOJ-readers would be interested (and may themselves want to comment).  Brian's reference to "Sarah" is to an (imaginary) person in my paper; I use Sarah as an example of someone with a particular worldview.

Several weeks ago I read an extraordinary article in Time about a forthcoming book on Mother Theresa taken from sixty or so years of correspondence with confessors and priests and others in the Church (preserved by the Church despite her wishes that the letters be destroyed).  Apparently she lived with unrelenting doubt about God and Christ for six decades.  She was for long periods unable to pray, and felt entirely empty.  She considered herself to be a fraud when she spoke to others about the love of God.  The voice and presence of God and Christ were silent to her, and she felt forsaken.  She continued in this state until her death.  Agonizing passages from her letters were quoted at length in the article.  It is a wrenching story of human pain.

Now, we can interpret this in many different ways.  The Church takes the view that her perseverance with her mission in the face of this overwhelming doubt makes her all the more saintly, and I tend to agree (I find her sacrifices all the more impressive).  But I don’t have anything to say about that.

I raise Mother Theresa because I read this article in the course of the blog discussion over your argument, and naturally I wondered what if Mother Theresa was Sarah.

 You say below that Sarah’s advantage is that she can articulate a world view that grounds her belief in inherent dignity.  Indeed she can do that.  It is not obvious to me that an atheist is unable to articulate a world view that grounds her belief in inherent human dignity (I have a reasonably well worked out existentialist view that supports my commitment to human dignity, although it has not deeper “foundation” that my commitment), but never mind that.

The point I want to make is that while Mother Theresa (Sarah) can indeed ground her belief in inherent human dignity in her religious views, she nonetheless cannot escape her doubt about that very foundation (religious views).  This is not about Mother Theresa (Sarah) trying to persuade others about religion or about human rights (as you agree below). 

It’s just about Mother Theresa (Sarah), her religious beliefs and her commitment to human rights: they are all of a piece, and her commitment to the latter cannot be severed from her unrelenting doubts about the former.  This is not just a hypothetical assertion.  Apparently, owing to her doubt, Mother Theresa contemplated whether she should give up her mission to serve the poor.  To her credit, she chose to continue with her life’s work despite her doubt (though we are not told why in the article), but my point is that she perceived her commitments, religious beliefs, and doubts in an integrated fashion (they were connected).

Going back to your argument—I get it.  I understand everything you assert below, and if the only question is whether belief in human dignity can be planted in a more foundational set of beliefs, then you are correct that religion provides a better grounding for human rights than an atheist has to offer.

But if we think about Mother Theresa (Sarah), her complex of beliefs and her doubts, your narrow focus strikes me as artificially constrained in a way that screens out the very core of what matters to her has a person who is committed to human rights.  Mother Theresa (Sarah) is fraught with doubt about her religious beliefs, and this doubt inevitably touches (infects, penetrates) whatever they serve to ground (including belief in inherent human dignity).

Until your argument accounts for this, in my view it will be correct in a very narrow sense that fails to account for the integrity and interconnectedness of human belief systems.  Or to put it more forthrightly: you are right that religion provides a superior grounding for inherent human dignity, but not in a sense that really matters.