"The Seamless Garment Reconfigured"

This long post by Nicholas Frankovitch, over at the First Things blog, is intriguing, and difficult.  A few excerpts, and thoughts:

Pare away [from pro-choice arguments] the politicking and posturing and anti-Catholicism, the circumlocution and the bumper stickers designed to distract us from the train of thought set in motion by the unique and almost unspeakably profound intimacy of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her gestating child—pare all that away and what remains is the opinion that what is wrong with the effort to enshrine in law your right to life is that by itself it’s unbalanced.  You also have a right to die, which, when you were literally an infant (that is, incapable of speech, of articulating your right to anything), you required a proxy to weigh and consider. That was your mother. What could possibly be the rationale for designating anybody else?

I've read the full post several times, and I am afraid that I am not quite getting the claim.  Frankovitch's theme, I think, is that "the right to die happens to be the ground of the right to abort."  No doubt, there are important and instructive similarities between the arguments for abortion rights and those for a "right to die."  They both draw from premises about autonomy, individualism, etc.  But the suggestion that what happens in an abortion is that the unborn child's "right to die" is being exercised-by-proxy by the mother seems not-right. Is this the suggestion?  I'd welcome thoughts from others.  What, exactly, is Frankovitch claiming?  And, what should we make of the claim?