Simplicity, Knowability, and Law

MOJ-reader Jonathan Watson shared with me some interesting thoughts about natural law, on the one hand, and simplicity and knowability in the positive law, on the other:

One of the important, and it seems to me, underdiscussed, aspects of classical jurisprudence is the idea that before a law may bind, it must first be promulgated. That is, those who are to be bound by the law must be aware of it. It thus is reasonable to assert that there are certain aspects of a law which would assist promulgation. Among these, at the very least, comprehensibility among the group to be bound seems to be important. What I mean by this is, there are some laws that by their nature apply to all people, equally, while others apply only when engaged in particular activities. For instance, there are laws generally against murder, theft, and so forth (criminal laws), others regarding business associations, of which the average person may have some knowledge, but is usually not bound by them for not being engaged in any arena where such a law would have jurisdiction. So, perhaps we could call these laws of general jurisdiction versus specific jurisdiction; this is not to deny that there are other aspects of law which also exist, but I focus on this one aspect.

Natural law should be an important consideration in the drafting of laws of general jurisdiction. Aquinas discusses the importance of the agreement, the obediance, of the written, or positive law, to the natural law. One result of this obediance, especially in regards to the promulgation aspect of law, is that the individual person knows and can obey the law with little interpretation, and thereby, with less chance that the law will be or can be applied unjustly. Problems arise when laws are so such in nature that even those who fall under their application more or less naturally are unable to comprehend them, or entirely unaware of them, and are therefore penalized. Even if the penalty in itself seems not unjust, it is in applying the law to someone who is unaware that the law binds that injustice results.

I think there is something to the idea that the great lawgivers in history have been known as those who synthesized the law and stated it clearly for all to see. The worst tyrants are not those who apply the law with great rigor, or impose heavy-handed measures, but those who have made law arbitrary - made it unstable, complex, unknown. This is where law seems so far from natural action - we give our children certain rules to follow - it is when the rules are broken that children received discipline. Is not making rules so complex that they are incomprehensible to children the same, in the end, as no rules and arbitrary punishment?