The culpability of a lobbyist

Regarding Fred Thompson's lobbying work on behalf of abortion rights, another MoJ reader observes:

It seems to me that one cannot confidently equate the position advanced by a lawyer who zealously represents his client's interests and the public policy position such a lawyer might advance if elected to a legislative or executive office.  In Senator Thompson's case, a more reliable indicator of how he is likely to execute his office if elected president is his record on abortion legislation while serving in the senate.

On a more theoretical level, would your query extend equally to a criminal defense lawyer who represents one accused of murder?  How about a lawyer who represents a man seeking a civil divorce from his wife so that he might wed the woman with whom he had carried on an affair?  Can the first lawyer, without contradiction, claim that he abhors murder and believes that those who commit it deserve to be punished by the state?  Can the second lawyer justifiably claim that he believes in the sanctity of marriage?  Perhaps, however, you believe that a faithful Catholic cannot be a criminal defense or divorce lawyer.  Surely you wouldn't contend that a Catholic lawyer may only defend someone he is confident did not commit the crime of which he is accused or may only represent someone seeking a divorce whom he is confident will not remarry, lest he materially cooperate in the commission of sin?

The Boston Globe made a similar point about Thompson, reporting that Christian conservatives have "defended any work [Thompson] may have done as merely a lawyer working for a client."

First, let me be clear that I don't think a Catholic is morally precluded from voting for Thompson.  As someone who has voted for only one pro-life presidential candidate (and that was mainly because, as a senior in high school, I was reacting to the photo of Dukakis in a tank), far be it from me to throw stones.  There might be great reasons to vote for Thompson, his magnificent voice being near the top of the list. 

But I resist any suggestion that we can look past the causes a lawyer chooses to take on.  I agree that a position advanced by a lawyer's client is not the same as the policy position advanced by an elected official.  And I would generally not find fault in a criminal defense lawyer who represents a guilty client.  There are significant structural values furthered in those representations.  But on the civil side -- especially on the lobbying side -- the structural values are less significant, and the market of lawyers is much more robust, at least for clients who can pay.  As I've argued elsewhere,   

When lawyers within a functioning marketplace introduce extralegal norms into the advice they give clients or as the basis for declining a representation, they do not close down the divergent paths by which the common good is realized. In fact, lawyers who bring conscience to bear on their professional identities can help expand and enrich the common good by challenging the presumptions of the governing legal paradigm, whether by critically engaging the substance of the positive law or the objectives that the client wishes to pursue through the positive law.

Granted, I still struggle with the implications of Pope John Paul II's statement that Catholic lawyers "must always decline the use of their profession for ends that are counter to justice, like divorce."  At the very least, though, it's a clear signal that lawyers are accountable for the causes to which they devote their time and talents.  That does not mean that lawyers should only represent "good" clients; often the value of the work derives from the overarching good made possible by the lawyer fulfilling his responsibilities in our system of justice.  Approached by an abortion rights advocacy organization that could afford any number of high-priced lobbyists, I'm not sure what overarching good comes from accepting the representation.  Again, this does not mean that Catholics should not vote for Thompson; but it has to be part of the inquiry if we want to take the moral dimension of lawyering seriously.