Defining "Torture"

We have talked often on this blog about torture, its immorality, and (the problem of) its definition.  A reader, Geoffrey Turecek, passes on this online essay, "The Catholic View on Torture," which might be of interest.   Here is the concluding paragraph:

Every human being, guilty or innocent, must be treated as someone who is made in the image and likeness of God, who loved us so much that He gave us free will. Torture is always an attempt to break down this God-given free will.  Such violence is a direct attack on an integral part of human nature. As such, it is additionally a vicious attack against the Author of our nature.  It is morally unacceptable for any Catholic to condone or approve any torture in any way, for any reason.

Earlier in the essay, he writes this:

Because God gave humans free will, it is an offense against the individual man and human nature itself to attempt to force what He has made free, for any reason, whether it be through means that are physically, psychologically, or morally violent in any degree.

I wonder, have the definitional difficulties simply been "pushed back", from "torture" to "force"?  The right answer cannot be, it seems to me, that it is immoral -- i.e., that it is "torture" -- to engage, say, in tough plea-bargaining, in which -- for example -- a prosecutor . . . incentivizes a suspect to plead guilty to a particular charge by indicating her willingness to prosecute a more serious one.  "Physically" violent means are (relatively) easy to identify; I'm not sure, though, that terms like "morally violent" move the ball all that much.  What does a prohibition on "morally violent" means mean to an interrogator?