Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Tuesday, June 12, 2007

Into the Briar Patch

Over at First Things, Hadley Arkes notes the push by some pro-choice advocates, in the wake of Gonzales v. Carhart, to have state legislatures shore up the right to abortion.  This is not an entirely unwelcome development, in his view:

But behold: With this panicky recoil from the holding in Carhart, the liberals are now behind the push to have the states start legislating again on abortion. With each move, they affirm the premise that the legislatures may indeed legislate on this subject. Their aim, of course, is to vindicate the right to abortion, but they will find that, as they try to shape that right, they will also be marking, unavoidably, the limits of abortion. And those limits, they will discover, will be drawn far less broadly than any “limits” that can be found in the law of abortion as it has been shaped by the federal courts. The champions of abortion rights fancy they are taking the initiative, resisting the Court that has been altered now by the presence of John Roberts and Samuel Alito. But in the face of these initiatives, the pro-life side might well bring back that old line from Br’er Rabbit in the Uncle Remus stories: “Please don’t throw me in that briar patch.” But, of course, Br’er Rabbit, in the briar patch, was in his element. For the liberals to bring the issue of abortion into the arena of politics, in the legislatures, is to bring us into the briar patch, where they are likely to suffer some disagreeable surprises.

It also bears noting that Arkes is not too impressed with President Bush's work in this area:

The melancholy side of this situation is that the pro-life side should be playing defense at all. In the aftermath of Gonzales v. Carhart, a pro-life president could have induced real strains in his adversaries by offering a moderate follow-up to the case: Even many Democrats, including Harry Reid, voted for the federal bill on partial-birth abortion, a bill containing criminal penalties. Mr. Bush could have come forward with the proposal that we enforce the bill with measures short of criminal penalties: We could simply withdraw federal funds from all hospitals and clinics that housed the surgery. That measure, too, would command massive support in the country. Even people who regard abortion as a legitimate “personal” choice have been unwilling to regard it as “public good” that has to be paid for by everyone else. And yet, with a step of that kind, the president would throw the pro-abortion party into the most grievous tensions. The Democrats surely know that, if Congress could use its power over spending to restrict abortions, it could legislate on abortions every step of the way, without even appearing to legislate. After all, if hospitals and clinics do not accept the federal money, they are still free to do the surgeries and put the burden of litigation on the government. But if the Democrats resist, they resist on a terrain that is heavily, sharply tilted against them.

All of this might have taken place if there were a White House genuinely interested in taking even modest initiatives in advancing the pro-life argument. But quite apart from the aversion of this president to doing that sort of thing, there is the most curious want of political reflexes. Any move of this kind taken by the president creates strain for the Democrats in Congress. And any strain for the opposition will impair them on other matters as well. It would keep them off balance in dealing with the war in Iraq, or in their campaign to bring down the U.S. Attorney General, or to undercut the measures of this administration in waging the war against terrorism. We may count this as the season of paths newly opened, of leverage newly discovered. But it also the season of unfolding revelation about an administration that will not defend its measures, not defend its own people, and where it declines to take costless initiatives, even when they would divide its enemies and hearten its friends. It is the season of deficits in political leadership, made ever clearer with each passing week.

Monday, June 11, 2007

God-Talk in Politics

Sightings  6/11/07

Pious Parties
-- Martin E. Marty

Sightings on Mondays does not "do" partisan politics, so if you read out of this or into this a partisan endorsement or non-endorsement, I am not making myself clear.  It is a comment on media and history.

First, media: The mantra or codified way of treating Democratic presidential candidates' public expressions of religion in 2007, as in last week's TV special, is to say that they are playing catch-up ball against Republican candidates, reaching for the religious constituency that the secular-minded modern Democrats abandoned.  That may or may not be true in respect to strategy.  But it is historically inaccurate to suggest that this is a new virus.

To review the history: After Woodrow Wilson's overplaying of the religious hand, Republican presidents Harding (Baptist), Coolidge (Congregationalist), and Hoover (Quaker) added little to public discourse about public religion.  But in World War II Roosevelt began to restore such discourse, manifesting and promoting the life of prayer, demonstrating a kind of Episcopal serenity when facing crises.

Then there was Truman, to whom I paid attention while living briefly in his Washington.  "I am not a religious man," he would say, "Mrs. Truman takes care of that."  He despised what he thought was the political use of religion, but evidenced a Baptist Sunday School-boyhood grounding in biblical knowledge and did some public praying, without advertising or fuss.  During the interregnum, Eisenhower said, "I am the most religious man I know."  But back to Democrats, our subject today: LBJ, a member of the Disciples of Christ (Christian) Church was at ease with faith, while JFK (Catholic -- did you notice?) found his religion a public subject, whatever his personal faith might be.  Jimmy Carter?  How can mass communicators think and act as if the new candidates are inventing religious language in public life?  Bill Clinton -- like Carter, a Baptist -- was a regular worshiper, and was accused of hypocrisy when he took a Bible to church, as most Baptists do.  He was at home with it.  And one year we heard of Reverend Jackson; Mondale, from a ministerial family; and ex-seminarians Gore and Hart and who knows who else running.

Why the perception of non-religion among people of that pious party?  1) Maybe things have changed, and there's been a secular take-over, causing religious amnesia in the party.  2) It could be that in reaction to Nixon-Reagan-Ford-Bush-Bush styles of public piety and the perceived "use" of religion, Democrats backed off.  3) If there were signs of verbal ungainliness in the pious sections of last Monday's CNN show -- Peter Steinfels found them in the three candidates' words (see "References," below) -- it may be because the planners of the program (Jim Wallis and company) wanted to stress how specific religious convictions do or should affect policy (for example, on poverty).  Having to be creedal and confessional and pious does make many, including many of us who are not candidates, a bit nervous.  Diffidence here is less a matter of faith than style.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer and other theologians have counseled some restraint in public God-talk.  Since both parties' candidates are Bible folk, maybe some of them are responding to Sermon on the Mount text: Matthew 6:1, 5-8.  You could look it up.  Baptist scripture memorizers Truman and Carter and Clinton wouldn't have to.  And while the Bible is open, note how Isaiah 58 shrieks out at a "prayerful" nation.

References:
Peter Steinfels's article "A Tentative First Step in Addressing Faith and Politics" (New York Times, June 9, 2007) can be read at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/us/09beliefs.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fS%2fSteinfels%2c%20Peter.

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

Income Inequality and Catholic Social Theory

Does CST have anything to add to the debate now going on (raging would be too strong a word) about growing income inequality?  This piece, from yesterday's NYT, reports on the debate:

Economic View

Income Inequality, Writ Larger

INCOME inequality is a hot topic in politics and economics. The rising economic tide is lifting a bunch of yachts, but leaving those in simple boats just bobbing along.

Two professors  — Thomas Piketty of the Paris School of Economics and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley — have found that the share of gross personal income of the top 1 percent of American earners rose to 17.4 percent in 2005 from 8.2 percent in 1980.

Many economists, especially those who find themselves in the Bush administration, argue that the winner-take-all trend is fueled by other, unstoppable trends. After all, globalization, information technology and free trade place a premium on skills and education. “The good news is that most of the inequality reflects an increase in returns to ‘investing in skills’ — workers completing more school, getting more training and acquiring new capabilities,” as Edward P. Lazear, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, put it last year.

It takes an optimist to find good news in the fact that the top 1 percent have steadily increased their haul while the other 99 percent haven’t; after all, many more than one in every 100 Americans are investing in skills and education.

[Read the whole piece, here.]

Jesus and the Rabbis on Law

My young colleague Chaim Saiman has just posted a fascinating new article on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992280. It is entitled "Jesus' Legal Theory-- A Rabbinic Interpretation." Here is the abstract:

This article locates the ancient debates between Jesus and the Talmudic rabbis within the discourse of contemporary legal theory. By engaging in a comparative reading of both Gospel and rabbinic texts, I show how Jesus and his rabbinic interlocutors sparred over questions we now conceptualize as the central concerns of jurisprudence. Whereas the rabbis approach theological, ethical and moral issues through an analytical, lawyerly interpretation of a dense network of legal rules, Jesus openly questions whether law is the appropriate medium to structure social relationships and resolve interpersonal conflicts. Through an examination of Talmudic sources, this paper argues the controversies between early Christianity and the nascent rabbinic Judaism (summarized by Paul in terms of Letter vs. Spirit) have the same argumentative architecture as the ongoing debates over law vs. equity, procedural vs. substantive justice, rules vs. standards, formalism vs. instrumentalism, and textualsim vs. contextualism. Moreover, the contrast between the Gospels and the emerging rabbinic discourse brings Jesus' bold claims about the role, rule and domain of the law to the fore. Thus while the mainstream representation of Christian legal theory tends towards rules, procedural justice, formalism and textualism, this analysis of primary sources shows that Jesus argued for exactly the opposite.

I am sure Chaim would appreciate comments either on MOJ or directed to him here at Villanova Law.

-Mark

Sunday, June 10, 2007

"An Islamic Test for Turkey"

I'm in Arizona with family, eating great food, and getting ready to talk with a hundred or so rising second-year law students (Blackstone Fellows)  about religious freedom.  So, I'm a bit behind passing on this opinion piece, by Michael Gerson, "An Islamic Test for Turkey."  Check it out.  (Also, if you haven't, read this novel -- "Snow," by Orham Pamuk --  about Turkey, Islam, poetry, and other things.)  It got me thinking somewhat uncomfortable thoughts, about whether, perhaps, my own firm commitment to religion and religiosity in the public square is one that exists independently from my confidence that this presence is quite consistent with -- indeed, it nurtures -- political freedom and stable pluralism.  But, what if it weren't?   

Equal Access Case: A "Perfect Storm" for Granting Certiorari?

Every five years or so the Supreme Court has to grant certiorari in a case in order to force a recalcitrant government entity and lower court to allow private speakers to engage in religious expression on public property on the same terms as speakers with nonreligious viewpoints.  This petition, Faith Center v. Glover, filed Friday by the Alliance Defense Fund, has many features that make it very suitable for the Court's next intervention.  It involves equal access for religious worship services, a right many of us thought was settled by Good News Club v. Milford School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  In the current case, a county library opened its meeting rooms to numerous community groups for "educational, cultural, and community-related programs and activities," but denied access for "religious services" -- in the case a "prayer, praise and worship" meeting by an evangelistic group -- while maintaining that it would allow access for "religious speech" such as a workshop on how to pray.  A Ninth Circuit panel held, 2-1, that the exclusion of the worship service from the library's forum of meeting rooms was permissible because the service fell outside the forum’s subject matter, rather than presenting a viewpoint on issues within the subject matter.  462 F.3d 1194.  The en banc CA9 denied rehearing, with seven judges dissenting.  480 F.3d 891.

It takes a while to list the host of reasons why the CA9 decision is wrong and the case cert-worthy.  The "educational, cultural, or community-related" subject-matter of the library's forum is so broad that to exclude religious services from it is both implausible on its face and hostile to religion –- as if a worship service is not among the many activities that could contribute to a community’s life and culture.  (The library had previously allowed the county Democrats, the Sierra Club, and numerous other groups to meet.)  The panel opinion says that officials can deny access, or pull the plug, if a religious meeting constitutes "worship" rather than simply “speech” –- perhaps, that is, if the speaker invites the audience to participate a little too much, or they get too inspired and enthusiastic?  Because of the hopeless and improper line-drawing this requires, the Supreme Court long ago in Widmar v. Vincent (1981) explicitly rejected the religious speech/worship distinction –- a rejection that the panel majority dismisses as “dicta” (!).  Church services are at the core of religious expression, not the periphery; and when the service occurs in a public building only because of a general community-access policy benefiting many groups, this doesn't entangle the state with worship in any substantial sense (rather, the more entangling course is to try to distinguish worship or services from religious speech).

As to cert-worthiness, the CA9 decision conflicts not only with SCT cases but with with several other court of appeals decisions, most directly Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003), which held that a church service could not be excluded from school rooms opened for general community purposes.  And it's a recurring question, as churches around the country use or seek to use schools and other public buildings for services because of restrictive zoning laws and high real-estate costs in residential areas.  (These are almost all evangelical churches, but I can imagine some situations in which Catholic services could be affected by this issue as well.)

Finally, there's almost a "perfect storm" of circumstances why the Court realistically would be inclined to take the case (this is what interested me most in blogging about it).  It's from the Ninth Circuit, for starters; the Justice Department has supported Faith Center's position in the lower courts; there was a panel dissent and a seven-judge en banc dissent; and one of the two judges in the panel majority clearly doesn’t believe in the equal rights of religious speakers in the first place (writing in a concurrence that allowing a religious group to use generally available school rooms impermissibly “subsidize[s]” religion and thus that every one of the Supreme Court’s “equal access” rulings for the last 25 years is wrong).

The fly in the ointment may be that the issue can be seen as interlocutory: it involves appeal from a partial reversal of a preliminary injunction, and the appellate panel expressed some hope that on remand the trial court could fashion an injunction that would exclude religious services without entangling the library impermissibly in defining concepts like worship.  On the other hand: as I understand the rules, the interlocutory nature of a petition is not a bar to granting cert but merely a factor to consider; the issue seems a straight legal question not likely to be affected by any fuller record; and the idea that the library could avoid future entanglement seems more of a hope than a likelihood.

Tom

More on Death Penalty and Juror Exclusion

Thanks to Michael for blogging about last week's SCT decision, Uttecht v. Brown, on the death penalty and jurors.  If prosecutors and trial judges run with this decision as a means of excluding jurors, it will make absolutely stark the incompatibility between official Catholic teaching and participation in the death penalty system.  The prospective juror in the case, when first asked about the death penalty, said he thought it would be appropriate for cases when the convicted murderer would kill again if released -- a position that is close to the official teaching that execution is appropriate only in the "very rare, ... practically non-existent" cases where "this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor."  Catechism 2267.  (There's no indication whether the juror was Catholic.)   And when the juror learned that the alternative sentence was always life without parole, he said he'd "have to give it some thought" whether he'd be willing to impose death given that alternative sentence.  However, eventually the juror said that he "could consider" imposing death even in cases where the defendant would otherwise be locked up for life, "if I was convinced that was the appropriate measure."

I would have thought that even the juror's initial suggestion that death would be inappropriate when life without parole was an available sentence was within the range of permissible positions for a juror to take under the Washington death-penalty law, which says that a juror "may consider" (among other mitgating factors) "whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the future," and that the jury should reject a death sentence unless it's "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency."  Wash. St. 10.95.070, 10.95.060.   The permissiveness of the Washington language ("may consider") would seem to leave room for the position of the juror who closely follows Catholic magisterial teaching.  But now we are told by the SCT that this juror was "substantially impaired" in his ability to follow the law and therefore excludable for cause.  And what's more, we are told that this was so even though the juror pretty quickly stated that he would be able to consider a death sentence over life without parole -- and who clearly, like most jurors, was just beginning to think about these things in detail rather than having a rigidly formed opinion.

If this decision is taken seriously, it appears to state that making even a nod in the direction of the magisterial Catholic position on the death penalty is ground for disqualification from the jury -- even if the juror ultimately emphasizes his willingness to follow the law.  There are factors in the case that could lead it to be read narrowly: a degree of deference to the trial court's decision to exclude, the asserted lack of an objection by defense counsel (although interestingly for justices who generally claim to follow state procedural policy, Washington law doesn't require such an objection).  But if the decision is read to provide a blueprint for juror exclusions in future cases, it would indeed be sadly ironic that a ruling justifying the exclusion of anyone making even a nod in the direction of the magisterial position was a ruling issued by five Catholic justices.  (To say nothing about how, as Michael's post notes, such an expansion of the idea of a "death qualified" jury expands juries' willingness to convict in the first place.)

Tom

Saturday, June 9, 2007

What came first, secular Europe or small families?

Mary Eberstadt has fascinating piece in the Hoover Institution's Policy Review called "How the West Really Lost God", suggesting a different explanation for the securalization of the Western world than the one posited by Ross Douthat in the Atlantic article Michael P. recently posted ("a symbolic statement against the religious right").  It's a really rich essay, and my synopsis below won't do justice to the depth of her arguments, but here's the basic outline.

She challenges a particular step in the "conventional story line about how and why religion collapsed in Western Europe" -- namely the assumption that "religious belief comes ontologically first for people and that it goes on to determine or shape other things they do -- including such elemental personal decisions as whether they marry and have children or not."  Most particularly, she argues that "many Western European Christians did not just stop having chldren and families because they became secular. At least some of the time, the record suggests, they also became secular because they stopped having children and families."

Her arguments are fascinating, beginning with demographic arguments such as, for example, the argument that the widespread use of birth control  in France brought down the total fertility rate to 3.25 per thousand (the same as the Netherlands in the early 1960s) as early as the 1880's!

She rejects the simple counterargument that religious people have more children because of things like the Catholic Church's prohibition against birth control.  That doesn't explain the relatively higher birth rates among Evangelical Christians, Orthodox Jews, or Mormons, none of whom are subject to theological injunctions against birth control (or even, in some cases, against abortion). 

She explores some possible explanations about what it might be about the experience of families that would incline people toward religion -- such as the transcendence of the experience of birth ("the sequence of events culminating in birth is nearly universally interpreted as a moment of communion with something larger than oneself, larger even than oneself and the infant"); the primal connection between parents and children; the intimate connection with another generation that is "literally death-defying -- another feature that might make it easier for those living in families to make related transcendental leaps of the religious variety." 

She makes the interesting suggestion that women's more immediate experience of the act of birth could help explain another puzzling aspect of secularization trends.  She says her theory "ties up another theoretical loose end that should be troubling to the secularizationists, despite having no apparent standing in their discussion.  That is the well-known fact -- one that is curiously unmentioned in the latest vogue of atheism as well -- that women as a whole are more observant than men. . . .If news of God's death is moving throught society slowly but surely, why should it be that one sex in one country and culture after another seems to be getting the news faster than the other?"

She ends with some speculation about what it might mean for the fate of religiosity in the advanced West if she's right.  Noting that fluctuations in birth rates are common (compare the birth rate in the U.S. during the Depression with the rate a few decades later, in the Baby Boom), she suggests that people might start getting seriously worried about the collapse of the social security system and begin appreciating the value of children as sources of support in old age, or that society as a whole might start really heeding the lessons that are causing marriage and childbirth rates to rise among more affluent educated American women, or that perhaps family-friendly political reforms such as "restoration of public education, meaningful tuition tax credit, innovations in home-school networks" could influence family size.

I encourage you to read the full piece.  It's really fascinating.  Here's a final excerpt:

.  .  .  it appears that the natural family as a whole has been the human symphony through which God has historically been heard by many people — not the prophets, not the philosophers, but a great many of the rest. That is why the conventional story of secularization seems to be missing something: because it makes its cases by and to atomized individuals without reference to the totality of family and children through which many people derive their deepest opinions and impressions of life — including religious opinions and impressions.

Buy Your Sunday Times Tomorrow Morning

John Edwards says Americans should care more about economic injustice. Can he turn the plight of the poor into a winning campaign issue?

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These days, capital and goods cross borders with ease. Lant Pritchett says that if the developing world’s workers could do the same, everyone would benefit.

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Larry Summers’s Evolution
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The former Treasury secretary is having second thoughts about how to make globalization work for the middle class.

 

Has the religious right created a more secular America?

[I'm lifting this from The Opinionator, 6/8/07, New York Times online.]

  • Has the religious right created a more secular America? Ross Douthat thinks so.  He writes in the July/August issue of The Atlantic: 

    America’s secular turn actually began in the 1990s, though it wasn’t until 2002 that two Berkeley sociologists first noticed it. In a paper in the American Sociological Review, Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer announced the startling fact that the percentage of Americans who said they had “no religious preference” had doubled in less than 10 years, rising from 7 percent to 14 percent of the population. This unexpected spike wasn’t the result of growing atheism, Hout and Fischer argued; rather, more Americans were distancing themselves from organized religion as “a symbolic statement” against the religious right. If the association of religiosity with political conservatism continued to gain strength, the sociologists suggested, “then liberals’ alienation from organized religion [might] become, as it has in many other nations, institutionalized.”

    Five years later, that institutionalization seems to be proceeding. It’s showing up in an increasingly secularized younger generation: A recent Pew Research Center survey found that 20 percent of 18-to-25-year-olds reported no religious affiliation, up from just 11 percent in the late 1980s.