Patrick's Reply

I'm relieved by Patrick's reply to my question.   I don't believe my reading of his post was "sill[y]" or "concoct[ed]."  But his explanation of his reasons for referring to the Pope's discussion of excommunication of pro-choice Catholic politicians in reference to Kaveny's editorial help me to understand his post in a different light. 

That said, I continue to disagree with his reading of Kaveny's editorial.  I understand Kaveny to be simply discussing the degree to which the law should try to codify our moral obligations (whatever they may be) and so I don't think she is really challenging the fundamental moral principles to which Patrick refers.  I don't read her reference to physical integrity to be tipping its hat towards integrity-based arguments against any regulation of abortion, and perhaps this is where my reading differs from Patrick's.  I read her argument as making a narrower point by comparing a woman who carries a child to term at risk to her own health or life to someone who risks his own life to save another.   I do not see her actually offering a judgment about whether there is a moral obligation so to act (in either case).   The law does not compel a person to act in the latter instance, and the question is why it ought to in the former. 

Since all pregnancy involves a degree of risk, Patrick has a point in questioning whether the analogy she makes can be cabined.  But I think meaningful distinctions about risk can be drawn here, and I think the analogy is an interesting one.  Even if one agrees with the Church's position that a woman is in fact obligated to carry the child to term, does the gap between what is moral and what portion of that category it is wise to try to enforce by law provide room to disagree about whether the state ought to insert itself into a woman's decision in this narrow category of cases?