John Allen reports (here and here) on Pope Benedict's criticism of capitalism in Brazil. If the growing gap between rich and poor is considered a problem by Pope Benedict, does that mean that it should be considered a problem by Catholics? Or is this an example of the pope imprudently speaking about issues that are beyond his area of expertise?
Monday, May 14, 2007
Benedict Minds the Gap
Reconciliation
Over the years, I've posted dozens of times about the nuances of subsidiarity. Apart from Patrick Brennan and a couple of corporate law types who think I'm talking about the regulation of subsidiaries, folks don't get too fired up. This weekend I've learned that the way to light up my inbox is to say something heretical about the sacrament of reconciliation. My question about the exclusivity of reconciliation as the certain path of God's forgiveness prompted a flurry of uniformly helpful (and charitable) responses, all of which concluded that my RCIA training was a bit off the mark. For those who need a refresher, John Paul II explained:
[F]or a Christian the sacrament of penance is the primary way of obtaining forgiveness and the remission of serious sin committed after baptism. Certainly the Savior and his salvific action are not so bound to a sacramental sign as to be unable in any period or area of the history of salvation to work outside and above the sacraments. But in the school of faith we learn that the same Savior desired and provided that the simple and precious sacraments of faith would ordinarily be the effective means through which his redemptive power passes and operates. It would therefore be foolish, as well as presumptuous, to wish arbitrarily to disregard the means of grace and salvation which the Lord has provided and, in the specific case, to claim to receive forgiveness while doing without the sacrament which was instituted by Christ precisely for forgiveness.
Sunday, May 13, 2007
What does it mean to be a Catholic…
Over the past several days, a number of distinguished MOJ contributors provided an abundance of presentations on various topics that share a common denominator: Catholic identity. These postings have addressed diverse issues including: speakers invited to educational institutions that claim a Catholic identity; public officials who identify themselves as Catholics; and the development of legal theory that professes a Catholic character and nature. Our discussions on this site frequently raise facets of this general and important question, what does it mean to be Catholic, in other contexts. I will have to delay addressing this core issue today (what does it mean to be a Catholic…) since I would like to contribute to the rich discussion that has preceded me during the past week.
Since we are in the midst of commencement speakers’ season, it may be useful to address this subject first. I would like to think that administrators, faculty, students (graduates), and families who are most involved with either inviting or hearing a commencement speaker at an educational institutions that uses the moniker Catholic also consider themselves to be disciples of Jesus Christ. I would also like to think that most of them would consider themselves faithful sons and daughters of the Church. I realize that I cannot expect that all persons associated with commencement speaker activities at Catholic campuses would identify with these categories of personal identity, but surely there is nothing wrong to think that a strong, large percentage of them do. If my thinking has some meritorious foundation, then I can rightly conclude that persons who are Catholic hold, cherish, and follow the Churches teachings—some of which are very clear and others which are less clear as previous contributors have noted.
There is something in our human nature—perhaps it is an understandable sense of pride—that leads us to believe that we would like to attend a commencement event in which some famous person is asked to speak. This inclination would lead us to invite or want to invite holders of important public office (Presidents, governors, legislators, judges) or other individuals who are well known because they are major sports figures, entertainers, or leaders of industry or the learned professions. In some cases, these famous persons may have publicized views on issues that intersect moral questions on which the Church’s teachings are clear; in other instances, the views of some of these celebrities may be undisclosed especially if their fame is based on something that does not require them to disclose their own take on these issues. However, even famous sports figures and entertainers have had the occasion to volunteer their personal perspectives on issues such as abortion, matters involving sexual mores, and medical science. A good example of this would be the recent event in which Ms. Sheryl Crow was asked to perform at the charity event for the benefit of the Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital in St. Louis
Regardless of whether the celebrity holds public office or not, Catholics should ask the question what would justify inviting a speaker whose views on any, some, or all of these moral issues are not in accord with the Church’s teachings to a commencement at which he or she is to be honored with a degree honoris causa or some other award, such as a medal or distinguished citation of merit? The scrutiny of this individual also needs to consider the strong likelihood that the speaker will probably be viewed as a “success”—a model for the audience, but especially the graduates, to emulate. The matter at issue thus goes beyond endorsement of this person and his or her views. I do not think that Catholics and Catholic institutions can turn a blind eye to the dissident views of such would-be invitees without some further examination of why this person should be honored and emulated.
In the context of public officials, there may be some justification for inviting those whose views do not precisely mirror all Catholic teaching if they are the kind of office holders addressed by Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae who realize that they cannot simply undo or negate the element of public policy that offends the teachings of the Church but nonetheless pursue courses of action that will minimize the impact and the evil consequences that would otherwise result from the general policy that they cannot overturn. However, when the office holder’s public record demonstrates an ongoing conflict with Catholic teaching, the justification for any invitation to be honored evaporates. Of course, there would be other individuals, not holders of public office, who have devoted a large part of their professional lives to challenging the Church’s position of moral issues. The example of Kate Michelman was presented earlier by Michael Perry. I would add to this nonexclusive list Frances Kissling and Daniel Maguire. Inviting them to a Catholic campus for an honor at commencement or other event would be a cause of scandal. Why? First of all, the invitation would confuse many of the faithful who might be led to believe, as a result of the invitation, that a school that is a prominent element of the Catholic community is holding this person up as an individual meriting accolade and emulation.
The suggestion of inviting the celebrity to be a part of a debate has been examined by other MOJ contributors this past week. In some contexts this invitation may enable the dissident to be invited to the Catholic event without serving as a cause of scandal IF the Church’s view is responsibly presented by other speakers during the debate. Taking account of the practical problems raised by other MOJ contributors that the debate format may not be possible in some particular instances, it might be possible to have a lecture series in which a dissident may be invited if the series were to present speakers whose views and presentations accord with Church teachings. Having presented this alternative, I must hasten to add that this, for me, would not justify any invitation to Ms. Michelman, Ms. Kissling, Professor Maguire or other anti-Catholic advocates to the campus. Their views can be responsibly examined and critiqued in the context of alternative campus activities in which their published positions are explored by students, faculty, and other members of the academic community. Hence, there is no need to give this kind of dissident voice a platform on a Catholic campus to present their anti-Catholic rhetoric. The life and work of Larry Flynt could have been explored at Georgetown Georgetown Georgetown
Some MOJ contributors have discussed their concerns over commencement speakers such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at Boston College St. Vincent Georgetown Boston College
There is nothing in Catholic teaching that would preclude a responsible and objective examination of the views of even the most diehard anti-Catholic on a Catholic campus. But it is quite another matter to argue that commencement and other podiums must remain widely open. The ability to examine on Catholic campuses even the strongest positions opposed to Catholic teachings remains intact. But having to provide a platforms and honors to these advocates is quite another matter. RJA sj
Saturday, May 12, 2007
More on Speakers
I noted that in Richard's cogently-put argument for a Catholic school refusing to have as commencement speaker a noted figure who is pro-abortion-rights, the only alternative Richard suggested to recognize such a person's contributions to the pursuit of truth was to pit them in a debate against someone else (Cuomo vs. Hyde, Singer vs. George, Sobrino vs. Pope). If this is the only alternative, schools would forego every such speaker who was unwilling or too costly to go into a debate format (a significant restriction, even if one argues it's worth bearing). RIchard also puts these people into debates over the very issue at which they're at odds with the official Church teachings (Singer on infanticide, Sobrino on liberation theology). He doesn't mention a situation like a conference keynote address or a stand-alone lecture on a non-abortion topic where the speaker is in sync with (even quite admirable to) the Church, and is not a general honoree (although the featuring itself involves a kind of honoring). E.g., Al Gore keynoting a conference or lecturing separately on global warming (see Zenit, May 12, 2007, for the Vatican's view on the moral seriousness of this problem, and stipulate for argument's sake that Gore's position on it is generally quite admirable). RIchard's not mentioning this situation as an alternative makes me wonder if he or others see it as no different than the commencement speaker or award recipient.
A related question, as 2008 approaches, is whether there is an objection to inviting a pro-abortion-rights officeholder or candidate in the relevant jurisdiction in his/her status as the officeholder/candidate (given appropriately equal visits by other candidates), not as an honoree.
I raise these questions because we've had discussions of them at St. Thomas.
Tom
"Tolera[nce]"
With respect to Michael's friendly suggestion that I "get with it" -- First, I wish I were authentically old-school enough to smoke a pipe! Then I could kick back, sport fraying tweed, drink Old Fashioneds, and complain about modernity full time. =-)
Second, it says a lot about politics, and about the New York Times, that we are told by the Times, "Giuliani said that Republicans needed to tolerate dissenting views on abortion rights, gun control and gay rights if they wanted to retain the White House." "Tolerate" means, apparently, "roll over entirely and abandon long-standing, winning positions in order to better align one's views with the editorial staff of the New York Times."
As someone who has not yet been able to kick the habit of watching the two parties' conventions, it strikes me that the GOP "tolerate[s] dissenting views" on these matters obsessively, and with a vengeance. (Remember Arnold and Rudy in 2004?) The Democrats, on the other hand . . . not so much. I'm waiting for a Democratic presidential candidate to lecture his or her party's base -- with the Times' approval -- on the need to "tolerate dissenting" pro-life views, i.e., to nominate a strongly pro-life candidate. . . . I'm still waiting . . . .
Karen Stohr Responds
For earlier posts, click here, here, and here.
Karen responds:
First, let me suggest that is useful to keep the question of whether a proposed speaker counts as a publicly dissenting Catholic from the question of whether a proposed speaker holds views that the Church considers immoral. As I lack the qualifications to address the first question, I’ll stick with the second. Besides, President Bush and Senator Clinton can hardly be rejected as speakers on the grounds that they are bad Catholics. We also want to remember that the moral status of abortion/ESC research does not immediately transfer to the act of voting to support or uphold legal abortion/ESC research (or voting for people who vote to support or uphold legal abortion/ESC research.)
Let us assume that the proposed controversial speaker would confine her speech to the typical banalities and platitudes of commencement addresses. And let us assume that being asked to deliver a commencement address really is an honor, particularly when accompanied by an honorary degree, as Richard has noted. Richard makes the following remark, with which I agree:
“While the honor doesn't necessarily mean that the school endorses everything the person has ever said or done, the choice to honor someone who disagrees with Church teaching on very important issues has the potential to interfere with the clarity of the message that the school ought to be trying to communicate.”
Of course, “has the potential to interfere with” does not mean “will interfere with”, and in the case of abortion, the Church’s stance is about as clear and unequivocal as it gets. I would not expect much confusion. But I don’t think that confusion is really the issue anyway. I do think it’s about endorsement, and more specifically, whether it is possible to honor someone for her contributions to some aspects of political life while remaining sufficiently distant from the others to avoid cooperation or scandal. And I think that this depends a great deal on the speaker’s actual commitments and the extent to which her achievements and accomplishments are wrapped up with the controversial views. Presumably, a Catholic institution could not bestow an honorary degree on someone like Kate Michelman (who probably wouldn’t accept it) without engaging in formal cooperation, for it is hard to see what else she might be honored for other than her efforts to keep abortion legal. But not all politicians with pro-choice voting records fall into this category.
The judgment that a speaker’s achievements cannot be separated from her pro-choice voting record on abortion or embryonic stem cell research must be based in the principle that having that voting record is such a grave moral error that it cannot be overlooked or set aside. I know that this seems plausible enough to many people, and yet I would urge caution here. For the judgment to hold, it has to constitute not just moral error, but moral error so culpable as to render the person a morally inappropriate choice for commencement. Pro-choice politicians mostly fall into two camps: (1) those who do not believe that embryos and fetuses have full moral rights, and (2) those who believe it, but who believe it on theological grounds and hence, take themselves to have no arguments against abortion that they can properly bring into space of public reasons. (I will grant that some insincerely claim to be in (2) when they are really in (1), but I will not grant that this is always the case.) Either way, the Catholic remedy should be a thoroughly convincing natural law-based secular argument against abortion and ESC research, but these are not so easy to come by, and anyway, it’s unclear to me that people are appropriately held culpable for unfamiliarity with philosophical arguments.
I’d rather leave the commencement podium fairly (though not completely) wide open on all sides. It just strikes me as, well, more Christian. But on this point, I certainly see how reasonable people might disagree.
Is God's Forgiveness Limited to the Confessional?
I do not believe that God's power to forgive my sins is constrained by a need for a priest to tell me I'm forgiven. That said, I've found the sacrament of reconciliation to be beautiful and powerful because it has been explained to me as the priest standing in the place of the Christian community and facilitating my reconciliation with the community. But then, in today's paper, I see this quote from Bishop Donald Trautman, the chair of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on the Liturgy: "Only in the confessional do I have the absolute guarantee that God has forgiven me."
Does this still represent the official Church teaching? If so, is it any wonder that many Catholics find evangelical churches more conducive to fostering a personal relationship with God?
Friday, May 11, 2007
Hey, Rick, get with it!
"Rudolph W. Giuliani said that Republicans needed to tolerate dissenting views on abortion rights, gun control and gay rights if they wanted to retain the White House." Put that in your pipe and smoke it! :-)
[To read the whole NYT piece, click here.]
Of France, Spirituality, Economics, Abortion Rates, and a Richer Understanding of Catholic Social Thought
My friend and colleague Tom Berg dismisses my recent post as “simple France-bashing” (although my e-mail correspondents argue that, if anything, I have understated the level of deterioration experienced in the French economy and society). Yet Tom grudgingly acknowledges the accuracy of my litany of French economic woes, even as he defends (while denying that he is defending) the French Nanny State.
More pertinent to the thrust of my post — which used France as but an illustration of an impoverishment in much of what passes for Catholic Social Thought — Tom fails to seriously question, critically examine, or qualify the supposed advantages of government-centric solutions to social problems. Yes, Tom does refer generally to “imperfections of all social and economic systems,” and he also mentions vaguely “the inevitable trade-offs.” But with respect to the collectivist attractions of the left, he cannot quite bring himself to name those “imperfections” (statism, bureaucratic callousness, economic decline, etc.) or “trade-offs” (social enervation, decline in incentives, weakening of personal responsibility, loss of liberty, etc.) Nor does Tom acknowledge the unfortunate propensity of too many on the Catholic left to elide these counter-factors when they propose yet another government program or endorse a new set of regulations as supposedly compelled by Catholic Social Thought.
Tom also rather quickly passes over the spiritual emptiness that is modern France, saying “[l]et’s set aside the loss of Christian faith, which we can all agree is very bad in spiritual terms.” Well, and other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play? This loss of faith is hardly a tangential point when speaking about the French social welfare state. Is it not likely that the French deification of the state and submissive reliance on government as the answer to all problems has contributed to spiritual decay?
Still, Tom does make one powerful point that captures my attention and, pending further exploration, could win me over as well: that a social welfare system in France which more generously supports child-raising has produced lower abortion rates (and lower infant mortality rates) in that country. Assuming that abortion rates were to be empirically confirmed as significantly correlated with French social welfare benefits and regulations, and that alternative methods of regulating abortion would be neither practical nor superior, that enhancement of human life at its earliest stages would count as a strong mark in my book in favor of this particular set of benefits and regulations. Of course, that would make palatable only one small slice of the huge French pie of government benefits and rules.
And, in any event, acknowledging the potential force of Tom’s limited point about a single government project is not much of a rebuttal of my earlier post that was designed to challenge an unhealthy fixation on collectivism in some accounts of Catholic Social Thought. Contrary to Tom’s accusation that I have painted things in black-and-white terms, I have neither opposed all government programs nor proposed the libertarian ideal of the Night Watchman State as the preferred alternative. (When I do move occasionally in libertarian circles, I am inevitably and rightfully exposed as a heretic who contemplates a meaningful and robust — but still limited and carefully constrained — role for government in economic and social matters.) Rather, I mean to challenge the simplistic association of Catholic Social Thought with a government-centric agenda.
Tom speaks of a middle ground toward which those interested in a just society should strive. I’m not sure that a “middle ground” is a principled or inspirational goal, especially if it results in mediocre results from all standpoints. But I understand Tom’s point to be that we might find some common ground and through our engagement eventually develop a more refined approach to these questions.
Let me take a step in that direction: I have always acknowledged that government has a role to play, including provision of benefits to the disadvantaged and regulation of economic enterprises (at a level to be determined). I do not expect that discussions of social problems in the light of Catholic Social Thought will proceed stripped bare of any proposals for governmental activity.
At the same time, let us speak more deliberately and candidly about the unintended and negative consequences for economic vitality and opportunity, the risk of dependence and entitlement that enervates a society and diminishes individual flourishing, and the decline of freedom that may follow whenever government seizes private resources and imposes legal edicts on others.
Catholic Social Thought is neither a statist philosophy nor a form of laissez faire capitalism. It is so much more than either of these. The Mirror of Justice should be a venue for exploring the greater richness of Catholic Social Thought.
Greg Sisk
honoring Bush
Eduardo has some good questions about the propriety of honoring President Bush. Here is a very quick response. I'd say that Bush's support for the death penalty is not inconsistent with the Church's teaching. I'd agree with Avery Dulles (here) that the Church has not (yet) taken the view that the death penalty is always immoral, and that the decision about whether it is permissible in certain conditions is a prudential judgment on which people can reasonably disagree. On the war in Iraq, we discussed this a bit last year when the issue of honorary degrees came up in the context of Boston College and Condoleezza Rice. Here was my view at that time. I took the view that the administration had not taken a position that was inconsistent with Church teaching and that the area of disagreement about the war (I suspect that my views on this are probably close to Eduardo's) related to prudential judgments. On torture, if the Bush Administration has defended a position contrary to that expressed in the Catechism (2297-2298) than I'd say that would be grounds for opposing an honorary degree.
Richard M.
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