I'm still trying to track down some of the speakers at last Friday's symposium here at UST School of Law on "Restructuring the Workplace to Accommodate Family Life" to make sure they finally got home through the mess of Friday's snow and ice storm out East. (Especially surreal for me to be worrying about that from the Twin Cities this weekend, as I basked in the bright sunlight of an absolutely beautiful Saturday, watching my (Croation, Polish, German, Slovenian, Luxembourger) daughter dancing with her Irish dance troop in the St. Paul St. Patrick's Day Parade!)
But I did want to report briefly on the symposium itself which, if I do say so myself, turned out to be an extraordinary day, bringing together diverse and fresh perspectives on the topic from a collection of gifted scholars. All I can offer in a post are some impressionist highlights. The volume of published papers is going to be an incredible resource for anyone looking at this area.
The day began with a Keynote Address by philosopher Sr. Prudence Allen, St. John Vianney Theological Seminary in Denver, who drew on her background in Existential Personalism to offer reflections on laws affecting family life and workplace structures from three different perspectives -- the application of analogy & complementarity to order positive law to better reflect the reality of workplace and family lives, how the philosophy of the person and conscience might help heal ruptures between conscience and truth in the practice of law, and the application of the common good to the accommodation of the family in workplace structures.
This tour de force was followed by a panel on "Feminist Legal Theory: Dialogue Across Faith and Philosophical Perspectives." First, Marie Failinger of Hamline Law School suggested that Lutheran theology supports traditional feminism's turn toward contextual approaches to analyzing facts and applying laws, citing Luther's insight about the finite as the bearer of the infinite, filtered by the humility that ought to accompany our realization that our perceptions of reality are clouded by our sinful and limited powers of reason and will. Marie also laid out some powerful arguments about how the Lutheran notion of work as participation with God in the co-creation of the world and of work as always relational can help explain distortions in the workplace that subordinate women, remind women of their responsibilities in public life and their responsibilities to other workers they themselves hire for domestic work, and serve as the basis for valuation of even the most mundane aspects of care work. MOJ-er Susan Stabile then presented a primer on Catholic feminist legal theory, beginning with a discussion of its theoretical underpinings in (1) an understanding of the human person as relational in two dimensions -- towards God and towards each other; (2) the centrality of the traditional family; (3) acceptance of sex complementarity; and (4) the Catholic concept of work as vocation. She then applied these concepts to a Catholic legal theory analysis of issues relating to women in the workplace, contrasting them to traditional, secular feminist analyses, covering issues such as how different conceptions of "equality" play out in structuring pregancy benefits and mandatory contraception benefits, and ways in which Catholic theory offers stronger arguments for family-freindly workplace policies than traditional feminist theories. Following these two presentations, philospher Eva Feder Kittay from SUNY at Stoneybrook commented from the perspective of a secular feminist philosopher. She sketched out her secular philosophical justification for many of the same propositions laid out by Susan and Marie, based on a theory of justice that is grounded not in each human's equal capacity for independent reason, but rather in each human's shared experience of dependency at some stage(s) of life. She also offered some critiques of the faith-based arguments, including a sharp critique of what she considered a overly narrow conception of a 'family'. (Maybe Susan will have something more to say about that panel?)
[UPDATE: Professor Kittay offers the following suggestion for a fuller explanation of her objection to Catholic feminist notion of family:
I make the critique in a more detailed way directed at the "new communitarians" in "A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy", Ethics, vol. 111, no. 3, April 2001 pp. 523-547. The article can just as well be directed at Catholic feminists who spoke at the conference.]
Our second keynote address by Joan Williams, U.C. Hastings, then plunged us out of the theoretical into reality. Focusing mostly on the current legal workplace, she first painted a rather bleak picture of the burgeoning hourly demands at most law firms, the decreasing numbers of women with children who are able (or willing) to keep pace with those hours, and the continued reluctance of the legal workplace to offer more flexible arrangements. Then, she got slightly more encouraging by presenting the strong economic case for more flexible work arrangements (though, in questions after her talk, she admitted to pessimism about whether legal employers were willing to accept the economic arguments in the way some other industries were beginning to do).
The next panel considered policy prescriptions. First, Gregory Acs, Economist from the Urban Institute, summarized recent empirical research on the situation of the working poor in the United States and the impact on children of workplace structures affecting their parents. He also offered policy prescriptions, stressing the importance of parental leave during the first year of a child's life and some minimum flexibility to deal with family emergencies without loss of job. (This is going to be a great resource once it's in print.) Next, MOJ-er Michael Scaperlanda spoke about current and proposed immigration policies, focusing primarily on their impact on families of undocumented workers. He gave powerful examples of unrealistic waiting lists for family reunifications under current visa regimes, families torn apart in immigration raids, and the dilemmas facing undocumented immigrants wanting to get married in the United States. Kirsten Davis of Arizona State U then spoke about the importance of the rhetoric of arguments for workplace restructuring. She argued against using the term "accommodation" in describing desired reforms, demonstrating how interpretations of this term in other legal contexts, such as the ADA, might suggest limitations to what can be accomplished or what needs to be provided by employers. She suggested use of "negotiation" or "facilitation of family life" as less loaded, and perhaps more empowered, terminology.
The last panel considered perspectives across generations and genders. First, Allan Carlson of the Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society presented a fascinating historical survey of the rise and fall of the family wage in the United States. He described the strong support of family wage by trade unions in the early 20th Century, leading to the widespread adoption of family wage structures by most Americans by the 50's and 60's, and then its ultimate demise in the 70s. Some of his most fascinating data dealt with inverse correlations between widespread family wage structures and overall income inequality in the United States. (Again, this is a paper I'm most anxious to see in final printed form.) Next, Michael Selmi of George Washington (currently visiting at Boston University) and Kathy Baker of Chicago-Kent Law School took fascinatingly different cuts at the sorts of data and trends that Joan Williams laid out in her keynote address. Michael argued, among other things, that there was still significant amounts of discrimination against women going on the workplace, and that employers were unlikely to ever accept the "business case" for flexible work arrangements; however, he argued, employers might be forced to change if they got enough demand from such change from employees, and argued for parents to keep up the pressure to do so. Kathy ended the day with fascinating data about trends in unpaid domestic labor in familes. On a positive note, data shows that all parents (including fathers) are spending more time with their children than they used to. On the other hand, the imbalance between the total amount of time spent by mothers than fathers on total unpaid domestic work seems to persist. Kathy struggled with the implications of this fact, as well as with the implications of data showing increasing numbers of mothers relatively wealthy, privileged families (the only ones who can afford to, given our country's relatively stingy child support policies) leaving the paid job market.
As usual in these conferences, the discussions in the question and answer sessions, the breaks between panels, during the receptions and dinners and drinks preceeding and after the sessions, were as insightful as the presentations. But at least the presentations will be memorialized soon in what is sure to be an invaluable resource for those interested in these difficult issues.
On this Solemnity, I thought I'd encourage people to read Pope John Paul II's Apostolic Exhortation on St. Joseph. Here. I think it is unfortunate that this document is so little known. The short section on "work as an expression of love" is valuable for those of us who toil in "secular" occupations.
If you're interested in an analysis of morality and the judicial role that relies on Catholic social thought to challenge the perspectives of legal luminaries like Robert Cover, Justice Scalia, and (former) Chief Justice Roy Moore, check out my new paper, Professional Identity and the Contours of Prudence. Here is the abstract:
This article was presented as part of a symposium on Catholic social thought, prudential judgment, and public policy. I use the virtue of prudence as a lens through which to analyze the relationship between conscience and professional identity, asserting that prudence requires a consideration of the context in which an actor's conscience is to be exercised. In many of our current disputes over conscience, our understanding of an actor's context will require an understanding of an actor's professional role. This article will endeavor to elucidate the relevance of prudence to professional role by comparing and contrasting the roles of judges and lawyers. In this context, at least, the contours of prudential judgment are informed by market dynamics: lawyers are market actors; judges are not. The professional's stance toward those whom they serve, and our evaluation of the way in which they serve, will turn on this distinction. The application of principles such as solidarity, subsidiarity, reciprocity, and the common good lead to sharply different conclusions regarding the prudent role of personal moral convictions in the work of a judge versus that of a lawyer.
BRASILIA, Brazil, MARCH 18, 2007 (Zenit.org).- Debate continues over so-called homophobia legislation, which seeks to criminalize anything considered a condemnation of homosexuality, including priests who speak against the practice in homilies.
Priests could face two to five years imprisonment for preaching against homosexuality. And a rector of a seminary who refuses admission to a homosexual student could face three to five years.
Thursday, Brazil's Senate declined to vote on the legislation. Instead, the senators decided to form a work group, which will organize public audiences to hear specialists on the subject.
According to ZENIT sources, a number of citizens voiced opposition to the law, motivating in part the senators to form the study group.
Specialists say the "homophobia law" would essentially imply a legal frame for religious persecution.
One source told ZENIT: "In addition to the rights established in the constitution for all people, the homosexual, by the simple fact of being homosexual, would gain privileges."
Maria das Dores Dolly Guimarães, lawyer and president of the Paulist Federation of Movements in Defense of Life, explained: "Whoever dared to criticize such behavior would be treated as a delinquent." ZE07031828
Leif Enger's "Peace Like a River" (2001) is a wonderful novel. (I cannot believe it took me so long to read it.) It's a bit of To Kill a Mockingbird, a bit of A Hundred Years of Solitude, a bit of Shoeless Joe, a bit of Flannery O'Connor -- it's got faith, love, pain, laughs, and evil. Run, don't walk (or, click quickly) and get it. (They're making it into a movie; pray they "get it.")
A great book for understanding our laws and political institutions is Harold Berman's Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Here is a nice review, by Victor Muniz-Fraticelli, of Berman's follow-up, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition. Here is a bit:
Harold Berman made a significant mark in legal historiography with the first volume of Law and Revolution (hereafter LR1). In it, he challenged the standard periodization of Western history, which held that "modernity" began in the sixteenth century and that it was preceded by a long, undistinguished, and largely undifferentiated "middle age" throughout which not much of consequence occurred (LR1, p. 14). Such periodization reflected the historians' disregard for law "as an independent factor, one of the causes, and not only one of the results, of social, economic, political, intellectual, moral, and religious developments." (LR1, p. 44) To focus on the history of the Western legal tradition, Berman argued, would show that the first modern Western legal system can be traced to the end of the eleventh century. Hildebrand's revolutionary assertion of ecclesiastical independence from imperial authority in 1075 helped establish in the Roman Catholic Church a jurisdiction separate and parallel to the many secular jurisdictions of the day (LR1, p. 107ff). This newfound independence coincided with the discovery of the Emperor Justinian's compilations of the law of the Roman Empire, and their methodical study in European universities. Over the next two centuries, under the influence of Papal authority and scholarly method, the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church was systematized and transformed into the first modern legal system (LR1, p. 120-23, 253-54). By the same token, secular authorities were stripped of spiritual power and constrained to the functions of government familiar to us today: "the maintenance of peace and the establishment of justice in [the] realm" (LR1, p. 534). The Western legal tradition was born out of the plurality of jurisdictions—and, in particular, the competition between the ecclesiastical and the secular legal systems—that characterized the later part of the Middle Ages (LR1, pp. 273ff, 531ff).
If LR1 is the tale of the triumph of the Papal Revolution, Law and Revolution II (hereafter LR2) is the tale of its demise. (LR2, p. 39) The Papal Revolution had divided the spiritual jurisdiction from the secular and allowed them both to coexist; the Protestant Reformations abolished the ecclesiastical jurisdiction altogether and put many areas of spiritual law—church liturgy, marriage, schooling, moral discipline, and poor relief—back in secular hands (LR2, p. 179). The result was a dramatic transformation of the Western legal tradition. Some have characterized it as a secularization of spiritual realm, but, as Berman notes, it was simultaneously a spiritualization of the secular (LR2, p. 64).
An anti-begging law was ruled unconstitutional by the Ireland Supreme Court last week. MOJ friend Gerry Whyte (Trnity College Dublin, Law) thought the news report about the decision would be of interest to MOJ readers. Click here and then click on "Begging law struck down".
"83. Here it is important to consider what the Synod Fathers described as eucharistic consistency, a quality which our lives are objectively called to embody. Worship pleasing to God can never be a purely private matter, without consequences for our relationships with others: it demands a public witness to our faith. Evidently, this is true for all the baptized, yet it is especially incumbent upon those who, by virtue of their social or political position, must make decisions regarding fundamental values, such as respect for human life, its defence from conception to natural death, the family built upon marriage between a man and a woman, the freedom to educate one's children and the promotion of the common good in all its forms (230). These values are not negotiable. Consequently, Catholic politicians and legislators, conscious of their grave responsibility before society, must feel particularly bound, on the basis of a properly formed conscience, to introduce and support laws inspired by values grounded in human nature (231). There is an objective connection here with the Eucharist (cf. 1 Cor 11:27-29). Bishops are under the obligation to repeat these precepts without ceasing; for this is part of their duty toward the flock entrusted to them. (232)."
Thus Benedict's Apostolic Exhortation Sacramentum Caritatis on several of the questions that have been most worried on this our blog about the meaning of the Catholic religion for Catholics in public life. I couldn't be more in agreement with the contents of par. 83, of course, but one has to wonder . . . Will those who refuse to accede to the truth about the natural ends of human life, marriage, and family be moved by a magisterial pointing out of those ends' connection to a supernatural mystery of Christian faith? Perhaps we can begin by hoping that -- even now and late in the day, when most American Catholics are persuaded, or at least concvinced, that they are called upon to be principled (!) relativists in public life -- the American bishops will begin to "repeat these precepts without ceasing?" If the faithful don't hear it from their pastors, they won't hear it. And if they don't hear it, how can they be "faithful?"
On the topic of the Prothero essay, Joe Knippenberg makes the interesting point that the student's motive matters in our approach to teaching religion. If our motivation is to become a better citizen, the outcome of the exploration is going to be much different than if our motivation is to satisfy a deeper existential longing. So can a perceived need for greater civic virtue ever be a proper ground for "authentic" religious education?
