I appreciate Rob's recent queries about the cash value of my understanding of the principle of subsidiarity. Before I can turn to Rob's three points, there's a threshold issue. My paper is a deliberate attempt to apply the principle as understood in the Church's social doctrine to a concrete social problem of contemporary America. Where would the Church's principle get us in terms of allowing poor parents to give their children the education they (and the Church) judge that they should have. I may well be wrong in my understanding of the magisterium's teaching about the principle (indeed, on reason to steer clear of subsidiarity in trying to advance the discussion in Catholic terms is that the term has been used in too many senses, including by the popes), but there are texts to consult, parse, interpret, and, of course, judge for whether or not they articulate a true principle. I think I do affirm as true the principle as articulated in the magisterial teachings, and I would add that Rob's version of the principle seems to me different from the magisterium's. For purposes of the present discussion, however, let's leave behind what the magisterium has said about subsidiarity. Let's just ask what people mean by subsidiarity and whether those propositions are true.
If we're not talking about the Church's understanding of the principle, then what are our sources for saying what the principle is/means. Common usage? I would agree with Rob that in common usage, the principle is (roughly) that ruling authority should devolve to the lowest level at which it can be exercised competently. But is this true? Is it true that power should devolve to the lowest level at which it can be exercised competently? Rob seems exclusively to be asking whether the principle is "helpful" or useful. I'm asking whether it is true. Of course, I do believe that the true is both useful and helpful, in a very deep sense, but there's no guarantee of its convenience or utility.
My answer to my last question is no. That is, there does not exist a true moral principle that calls for the devolution of power to the lowest level at which it can be exercised competently.
Why? As I see things -- that is, I affirm as true that -- we confront a world in which ruling authority is always already distributed, at least in potency. Subsidiarity, furthermore, is a derivative principle that describes the relations that do or should obtain among those ruling authorities. The common conception of subsidiarity as calling for devolution makes the assumption that ruling authority starts at the top (in "the state") and should then be made to devolve according to a criterion of competence/efficiency. The conception of subsidiarity I am affirming as true proceeds from a prior judgment that authorities are plural and primordial to begin with, never the sole possession of the sovereign state, then it then to parcel out and downward. From the prior judgment, about ruling authorites that are already out there (at least in potency), I derive the the principle of subsidiarity that provides a norm for relations among those authorities.
But it's that prior judgment that is the stumbling block for most people, I suspect. So, to take Rob's third point, a sufficient reason that the state shouldn't force the Church, as a condition of assisting in any adoptions at all, to assist with adoptions to same-sex couple, is that to do so would be to trench on the Church's ruling authority that the Church posssesses not as a concession of (or conditional devolution from) the state.
The question is always whether there is, at least in potency, genuine ruling authority. When there is, subsidiarity kicks in, if you will. So, what about Rob's second point, concerning "local empowerment?" The question I would ask about a local group is whether it is posessed, at least in potency, of genuine ruling authority. I would reach different judgments about trade unions that seek just wages and well-organized lnych mobs. I'm sure job would too, but my point is that "local empowerment" is not a freestanding norm.
On the principle I affirm as true, authority derives, in part, from conformity with the true and the good. So, finally, with respect to Rob's first point, I'm not making an argument in favor of "imposing truth claims." Communities that possess genuine authority must in fact co-exist with other communities, according to judgments of "prudence," but not every group we have to co-exist with is possessed of genuine authority. The world stage is ample evidence of this. Power is different from authority.
I suspect Rob and I disagree, at least in part, about the contents of the ontology that precedes the possible operation of the principle fo subsidiarity. Some of what I affirm as the contents of that ontology I reach based on the contents of Christian revelation, some on basis of natural morality. Which leads me back to one issue in Rob's third point. I don't believe that the Church's affirmation of a right to religious liberty contains a right to conduct that violates natural morality. It may be prudent to tolerate such conduct, and of course -- and this is the point -- we argue argue even among friends about the contents of natural morality, but this much at least, I think, is true: the Church teaches that there is a naturally accessible morality that is binding on all rational humans.
Perhaps it's at the level of this last claim that our disagreement begins. On the position I'm taking, it is because we -- individuals and socieities have naturally- and supernaturally-given functions to perform that we can have genuine authority, and it is from the marvelous plurality of such authorities -- from schools, families, Church, unions, etc. -- that the principle of subsidiarity is derivative. Rob worries (point two) that if people agree about morality and act accordingly, subsidiarity will go out of business. On my position, a world of morally upright actors would contain authorities beyond numbering, and subsidiarity would faciliate their interaction.
There's much more to say about this (especially about this notion of "functions"), and I'm conscious of not having done justice to Rob's points. It's amazing how much two people who both want to use the word subsidiarity to benign purposes can disgree about. I know I agree with Rob that very often the "lowest level" will in fact be where ruling power should be located -- but we get there by very different routes, and my route depends an an ontology of authority that Rob probably won't find acceptable. Again, there's a lot more to be said about this, some of which is in long text of my "Harmonizing Plural Socieities" paper. (Btw, thanks, Rob, for your respectful attention to the paper). On authority specifically, there's more -- from a different angle, however -- in my "Locating Authority in Law" paper, which is posted on the right here.
Rob asked about the relationship between religious liberty and truth and wondered why truth doesn't limit the operation of religious liberty. I think Dignitatis Humanae does make it clear that religious liberty must be understood in light of and is limited by the objective moral law. According to Father Brian Harrison, Dignitatis Humanae's reference to the objective moral law was inserted after an intervention by then-Archbishop Karol Wojtyla. This linkage between freedom and truth was a key theme for Pope John Paul II throughout his pontificate, in particular in Vertitatis Splendor.
The Catechism (at 2108-2109) makes this point in this way: "The right to religious liberty is neither a moral license to adhere to error, nor a supposed right to error, but rather a natural right of the human person to civil liberty, i.e., immunity, within just limits, from external constraint in religious matters by political authorities. This natural right ought to be acknowledged in the juridical order of society in such a way that it constitutes a civil right. The right to religious liberty can of itself be neither unlimited nor limited only by a 'public order' conceived in a positivist or naturalist manner. The 'due limits' which are inherent in it must be determined for each social situation by political prudence, according to the requirements of the common good, and ratified by the civil authority in accordance with 'legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order.'"
Dignitatis Humanae did not endorse Casey-style reasoning about individual moral autonomy.
Richard M.
Thursday, March 29, 2007
This quarter, I am teaching a course called "Law and the Catholic Social Tradition." (I posted the syllabus here, a few days ago.) What I thought would be a small seminar has grown quite a bit; it looks like we'll have about 30 in the "seminar."
On Tuesday, Chicago's archbishop, Cardinal George, was generous enough to join us for dinner at the Law School, and to share his thoughts on the Compendium generally, and the "CST and the law thing" more generally. On Wednesday, we had our first meeting, and I am excited and optimistic about the class. The students are a very diverse and, it appears, engaged group. I suspect that I will be sharing some of their thoughts with MOJ readers in the weeks to come, so stay tuned. . . .
I recommend reading Patrick Brennan's article in the current Journal of Catholic Legal Studies titled Harmonizing Plural Societies. Of particular interest to me is his criticism of my past explications of subsidiarity. I have written that:
If we claim that subsidiarity renders localization in a particular context valid only to the extent that the local body’s approach contributes to the common good, as defined by the truth claims of the moral anthropology [of the Church], we have emptied subsidiarity of its real-world meaning. If localization’s validity is measured against a standard derived from a contested vision of the good, subsidiarity becomes a simple prop, justifying whatever vision of the good happens to hold sway in the political and legal spheres.
Patrick counters that:
As understood in the tradition of Catholic social thought subsidiarity is not a principle that justifies subversion of claims on behalf of universal truths about the good for human and group persons. Magisterial Catholic social thought affirms plural societies and their respective authorities, and it does this on the ground that each possesses a munus proprium, a share in the divine rule, which, as the ontological principle subsidiarity attests, is irreducibly its own in concert with other genuine societies. . . . Any genuine authority is a share in divine providence, and the legitimacy of its exercise depends upon its being ordered to the good of individuals, group persons, and the common good.
I'm in no position to quibble with Patrick's reading of the Magisterium, but his criticism prompts one comment and two questions.
First, I don't read subsidiarity to justify the subversion of any truth claims; rather, I read subsidiarity to justify a degree of hesitation before imposing truth claims on unwilling subcommunities. Maybe this is a function of prudence, not subsidiarity, but I guess I have a hard time separating subsidiarity in operation from judgments grounded in prudence.
Second, if subsidiarity only contemplates the devolution of authority to the extent that the authority is exercised in keeping with the Church's understanding of the common good, of what practical relevance is subsidiarity? To me, subsidiarity is helpful because it calls for local empowerment, even if the local bodies refuse to abide by the majority's norms. Catholic social thought aims to bring the majority's norms in line with the moral anthropology, but if we succeed in that endeavor, then is subsidiarity no longer a pressing concern? In other words, we'll invoke subsidiarity to justify excusing ourselves from conforming to unjust societal norms; but once we render the societal norms just, subsidiarity is no longer a justification for subcommunities who disagree with our norms?
Third, if the Second Vatican Council was right on the question of religious liberty -- not just as a matter of prudence, but as a substantive vision of the good -- why shouldn't the good also encompass the freedom of subcommunities to pursue their own erroneous conceptions of the moral life? For example, I believe that Massachusetts is wrong, based in large part on the principle of subsidiarity, to force Catholic Charities to provide adoption services to same-sex couples. If the policy was reversed and Catholic Charities was allowed once again to discriminate, should the Church turn around and seek to ban a secular non-state agency from including same-sex couples in their services? Assume, for the sake of the argument, that the only evidence of "harm" resulting from same-sex adoption is that children will grow up less likely to believe that homosexuality is immoral. In other words, assume that there is no evidence that the children's well-being is negatively impacted other than well-being as defined in the Church's own (contested) moral claims. Just as religious liberty facilitates "harm" -- it allows children to be raised without any exposure to the Gospel, for example -- why shouldn't subsidiarity facilitate "harm" -- allowing subcommunities to pursue lives in defiance of the Church's moral teaching? To make a rambling inquiry (hopefully) more concise: why does Truth limit subsidiarity's operation, but not religious liberty's operation?
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
When James Dobson talks, it makes me think that maybe John Rawls' "public reason" requirement is not such a bad idea. Dobson is skeptical of Fred Thompson's possible presidential run because:
"Everyone knows he's conservative and has come out strongly for the things that the pro-family movement stands for," Dobson said of Thompson. "[But] I don't think he's a Christian; at least that's my impression," Dobson added, saying that such an impression would make it difficult for Thompson to connect with the Republican Party's conservative Christian base and win the GOP nomination.
Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Thompson, took issue with Dobson's characterization of the former Tennessee senator. "Thompson is indeed a Christian," he said. "He was baptized into the Church of Christ."
In a follow-up phone conversation, Focus on the Family spokesman Gary Schneeberger stood by Dobson's claim. He said that, while Dobson didn't believe Thompson to be a member of a non-Christian faith, Dobson nevertheless "has never known Thompson to be a committed Christian—someone who talks openly about his faith." "We use that word—Christian—to refer to people who are evangelical Christians," Schneeberger added.
The Los Angeles Times provides an overview of the recent controversies in Minneapolis over Muslims' claims of conscience in the workplace.
In the Weekly Standard, David Blankenhorn has an article on same-sex marriage based on his new book, The Future of Marriage. He argues that:
When it comes to the health of marriage as an institution and the legal status of same-sex unions, there is much to be gained from giving up the search for causation and studying some recurring patterns in the data . . . . It turns out that certain clusters of beliefs about and attitudes toward marriage consistently correlate with certain institutional arrangements. The correlations crop up in a large number of countries and recur in data drawn from different surveys of opinion.
Dale Carpenter responds here and here. Though Carpenter describes Blankenhorn's book as "deeply wrong," he also calls it "probably the best single book yet written opposing gay marriage."
