Mirror of Justice

A blog dedicated to the development of Catholic legal theory.
Affiliated with the Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School.

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

conscience and democracy, again

Thanks to Steve for his recent post on conscience and democracy. I think a useful way to think about this is to ask whether one's conscience is infallible. In some versions of conscience, it seems that one's conscience can never be mistaken--that it is a capacity to decide about the content of good and evil. (As Pope Benedict has recently stated, this view destroys the categories of good and evil.) The understanding of conscience set forth in the Catechism (sections 1776-1802) and Veritatis Splendor (which, I take it, Steve rejects) is different. In that view, conscience (freedom) is linked to truth. Under this view, one has a duty to follow one's conscience, but that determination can be wrong. The Catechism discusses this at some length under the heading "erroneous judgment." Under Steve's view, is this category an empty set?

I admit to being perplexed by Steve's view that the Catechism's view of conscience is inconsistent with American democracy. Does he mean to say that one could not follow the Magisterium on a disputed moral question without somehow breaking faith with American democracy? Or just that one could not support a law that was consistent with a moral view held by the Magisterium because that would violate the Establishment Clause? There are, of course, many who might react negatively to someone who held the view expressed by the Catechism but I understood Steve to be suggesting something far more sweeping.

Richard M.

   

Embryos, Counterculture, and Natural Law

Robert George on the First Things blog, http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/?p=477, remarked in connection with embryonic stem cell research that, “So, however much one might dislike Republican policies in other areas, it’s clear that the death toll under the Democrats would be so large as to make it unreasonable for Catholic citizens, or citizens of any faith who oppose the taking of innocent human life, to use their votes and influence to help bring the Democratic party into power.” This conclusion reasonably could be said to follow Vatican teaching. To kill an embryo for stem cell research is to kill an innocent vulnerable human being. To kill millions of innocent vulnerable human beings is to engage in acts arguably so heinous as to eclipse all other issues (poverty, torture, war, etc., though George would not necessarily concede that the Democratic party is better overall on moral issues even if abortion and stem cell research ceased to be issues). Let us assume for the moment that this is the most reasonable interpretation of Vatican teaching.

 It seems obvious that Vatican teaching in this respect is far removed from the values of the American people. If Vatican teaching is correct, the killing of embryos should be regarded as first degree murder. Yet, 60 % of the American people favor federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. I would imagine the percentage of Americans that would support murder laws for the killing of embryos is small. To be sure, a majority of Americans favor criminalizing abortion (though, not necessarily murder laws) in a wide variety of circumstances, but the overwhelming majority of people, including an overwhelming majority of Catholics, favor exceptions that they could not possibly accept if they thought an embryo or a fetus was the same thing as a baby (rape, incest, and in some circumstances, the life of the mother).

The first point of my post is to question the coherence of the First Things project (which George may or may not endorse). According to Linker, the purpose of the project is to show that Catholic values are American values. It seems obvious that Vatican values are far more absolute than those of the American people. Indeed this is the point of the epithet about the culture of death. In that regard, the First Things project is in tension with Vatican thinking. The Vatican thinks that American culture is far removed from a Catholic culture. The Vatican is not engaged in a project of American populism.

Another point of my post is to ask how the Vatican’s positions on embryonic stem cell research, abortion, and natural law fit together. The question in part is whether the Vatican’s position can be demonstrated without resort to its authority. If natural law is written on our hearts, the Catholic position should be capable of defense without resort to authority. Robert George argues in conformity with Vatican teachings that embryos are human individuals, that discrimination on the basis of the stage of human development is morally wrong, and that killing for research purposes can not be justified. But, as I have suggested, most people do not accept these views. To be sure, an embryo is a human organism (and I will assume that one can be distinguished from another though that does not fully capture what most think a human individual is). But the intuition of most people is that a microscopic group of cells (even those of a human organism) in a petri dish are not the same as an adult. They in fact believe that discrimination on the basis of human development makes sense (even if they were in favor of criminalizing embryo destruction, they would likely not consider the crime to be the same as infanticide). And they do not regard the failure of embryos to attach to uterine walls to be a health crisis. Perhaps they believe that the capacity to suffer, to feel, and to think are important to what it means to be a human being (even if they regard human life to be of some or considerable moral weight). What does one say to get beyond impasse?

 If the Vatican’s position can not be demonstrated (or defended on more persuasive grounds) to be right without resort to authority (a matter upon which I am eager to learn more), it should be recognized that those with different views have no knockout punches to throw either. This is not mathematics. But there is a truth of the matter. Someone somewhere is right here and many are wrong.

I wonder whether the natural law claim that the law is written on our hearts can hold up on these issues in a profoundly pluralistic society. The law written on the hearts of Vatican Catholics does not appear to be the same as the law written on the hearts of millions of other Catholics and non-Catholics in American society and elsewhere. Ironically the  Vatican takes a countercultural position at the same time it asserts that the truth is written on our hearts. I wonder whether disagreement here can simply be written off as the natural consequence of a “culture of death.” That phrase aptly describes a part of our culture. I would think it would appropriately be applied to someone morally insensitive enough to think that abortion, for example, raises no serious moral issue. Does it explain the range of disagreements on embryonic stem cell research and abortion?

Conscience & Airport Taxis, Revisited

A few weeks ago, Rob posted a story about Muslim cab drivers at the MInneapolis airport refusing to take passengers carrying liquor, citing Islamic prohibitions against alcohol.  The cab drivers were upset because they were being forced to go to the back of the cab line when they refused such a fare. The story noted that the airport officials were trying to work out arrangement under which drivers wanting to refuse passengers carrying liquor could signal that preference with a unique color of light on their cabs; airport officials could steer passengers carrying alcohol to appropriate cabs, rather than forcing a cabbie exercising his conscience to the back of the line.  Rob characterized this effort by the airport officials as "encouraging."

Today's paper reports that the officials have given up trying to work out that arrangement. 

But the [Metropolitan Airports Commission] said the public response was overwhelmingly negative, and some taxi companies feared that people opposed to the system would switch to other forms of ground transport instead of cabs.

Also, the MAC noted, back in May when discussions began, cabbies were refusing customers with alcohol an average of 77 times per month. But since then, the government has imposed new security rules that prohibit travelers from taking most liquids through security checkpoints.

That's led to a sharp drop in travelers carrying alcohol, so fewer are being refused service by taxi drivers.

So, Rob, did the market triumph here in the end?

And wouldn't there be some limits to the airport officials' ability to allow the market to sort this all out, in any event, because cabs are a form of public accommodation?  The following is a true story from a friend of mine.  Does bringing gender into the equation the way this cabbie did cross some line?  Or would you be in favor of a cab-signalling system with a rainbow of colors, such as:  green:  everyone's accepted; red:  no liquor-carrying passengers;  yellow:  no liquor-carrying women;  purple:  no women with exposed flesh?

I was returning from Italy with 3 children and my husband.  Flights were somewhat delayed, and we arrived at the cab line very late at night after going through customs.  There weren't a lot of cabs but there were, as is common when a big international flight arrives, many people in the cab line.  We had to wait an extra amount of time because we had 5 passengers and a lot of luggage and required a van.  Finally got one.  The driver loaded the luggage into the back, passengers piled in, then he said to my husband, pointing to me "not her."  He said what do you mean not her.  "Liquids."  As was obvious to anyone looking at us from the outset, I was carrying a wine-pack from the duty-free (a present for a friend who'd lent us some luggage, not that that matters, but the wine wasn't in a duty-free bag, it was in a duty-free box with the tops of the bottles visible.)  He argued with the taxi-control lady when she agreed that he couldn't take my children and husband but leave me standing there by myself!  He was yelling that it would require him to go to the back of the queue.  Obviously feeling that HE was being wronged by being denied the chance to make money by transporting my family away, he threw the luggage onto the pavement and huffed away.  When we finally did get a cab home I explained to my horrified children why what they had just witnessed was wrong legally as well as according to common sense.  In America we can welcome people of all faiths and cultures and we don't have to be all worried if "our" people don't have equal representation in every single walk of life.  There are rules concerning public accommodation and they protect all of us; normally you don't have to feel nervous if a group (like the Somalis in this case) effectively takes over a profession (cab driving in this case) because the law says you can still get a ride home. 

Lisa

TNR debate, pt. 3

Over at the New Republic, which is hosting an online debate about religion, democracy, liberalism, and the "Theocons," Ross Douthat's reply to Damon Linker's reponse is up.  Douthat writes:

I agree that modern liberalism is founded on (among other compromises) religious believers giving up their right to impose their faith on others "in exchange for the freedom to worship God however they wish, without state interference," as you put it. I just think you take an extremely pinched and ahistorical view of what this bargain should mean in practice.

The Constitution of the United States has very little to say about religion. This omission offers an implicit rebuke to those Americans who would like to have the government endorse their personal beliefs about the nature of the Almighty, and rightly so--but it offers a rebuke, as well, to secularists like yourself who are eager to tell their fellow citizens which of their personal beliefs ought to be relevant to their political activity. You can inform me as many times as you like that, in order to participate in liberal society, I must pretend that my views about God--and, by extension, about public morality, a just society, and so forth--are as irrelevant to politics as my views about Shakespeare. But your saying it doesn't make it so (or even possible), and I think you'll have an awfully hard time pointing to any passage in the Constitution that buttresses your case. Yes, Congress may make no law establishing a religion, but, unless you take the most maximalist interpretation of what the word "establish" is supposed to mean, the establishment clause tells us next to nothing about whether and how religious convictions can inform public policy on (to list just a few of the issues in our history where religious faith has had a profound impact, for better or worse or both) war and peace, slavery and integration, poverty and the social safety net, the environmental movement and the temperance crusade, abortion and marriage law, et cetera. . . .

Now, of course, there are limits to what kinds of legislation American majorities can pass, because the Constitution--and specifically the Bill of Rights--sets limits on how far a majority can go in imposing its convictions (whether religious, civic-republican, or something else entirely) on a minority. . . .  But these limits exist to protect the individual from the tyranny of any majority, whether religiously inspired or not. . . .  The Constitution discriminates against government actions--banning guns, searching homes without a warrant, restricting the freedom of worship. It doesn't discriminate against government motives.

Yet that's precisely what you seem to think the "liberal bargain" is intended to do--to discriminate against religious motivations in politics in a way that it doesn't discriminate against, say, the motivations of a secular social engineer seeking an earthly utopia. Sure, you do offer a way out for religious believers who want to put their faith-based ideas into action: As long as they're willing to make nonreligious arguments for their ideas, you generously allow, they're welcome in the public square. . . .

But the fact remains that the advocates of racial equality didn't defend their ideals in secular-civic terms--or at least not nearly as often as they defended them in terms of the Christian morality that most of their fellow American shared. . . .

The same principle holds true if we move from specific political issues to the broader question of public philosophy. This is what you see as the crucial danger of the "theocon" project--that it doesn't just offer a laundry list of causes, but actively proposes a larger political philosophy for America, one grounded in the Catholic-Christian tradition. Again, while I understand that you disagree with and dislike Neuhaus's public philosophy, I'm baffled by the suggestion that religiously-grounded political worldviews are required by the liberal bargain to cede the field to their secular competitors. . . .

I know I'm harping on history a bit here, but I really thought that The Theocons's greatest weakness was its refusal to grapple with the complexities of the American past in any detail--as if Neuhaus and his compatriots had emerged from nowhere, rolling the apple of religious discord into a secular Olympus. If you had simply made the argument--which you did make, and make again in your response to my first post--that Neuhaus's Catholicism is ill-suited to serve as our national public philosophy, because not enough people are likely to accept it, then you might have persuaded me. . . .

But you couldn't just say that the "theocons" are out of step with America and leave it at that, because your alarmist thesis required you to have it both ways: Thus "theoconservatism" is somehow both wildly unpopular and primed to regulate every aspect of our daily life--out of touch with the public and somehow capable of keeping secular America "under siege." And, worse, you don't want to just argue with your political opponents; you want to remove them from public life entirely by accusing them of violating the bargain that supposedly holds our country together.

If you're the arbiter of what the liberal bargain means, then I want no part of it. The American experiment has succeeded for so long precisely because it doesn't force its citizens channel their "theological passions and certainties ... out of public life and into the private sphere." It forces them to play by a certain set of political rules, yes, which prevent those passions and certainties from creating a religious tyranny. But it doesn't make the mistake of telling people that their deepest beliefs should be irrelevant to how they vote, or what causes they support. The kind of secularism that you're promoting--and that Neuhaus and the rest of the "theocons" were originally reacting against--is an attempt to change those rules and impose greater restrictions on religious Americans than have heretofore existed. This isn't just blinkered, unfair, and contrary to the actual American tradition of how religion and politics interact; it's also dangerous to liberalism, because it vindicates those people--Christians and secularists alike--who have always said that faith and liberalism aren't compatible and that everyone need to choose between Christ and the republic, between God and Caesar. And, if you force Americans to make that choice, I'm not sure you'll be happy with the results.

Does Queens need more abortions?

Dawn Eden passes on a story about the proposed sale of two Catholic hospitals in Queens and about how a "provision in the deal requiring Catholic medical restrictions to remain in place at both facilities is causing consternation among reproductive health advocates."  Here is an excerpt:

[R]eproductive health advocates are lobbying the Department of Health to nix a part of the deal that would require Wyckoff to operate both facilities under Catholic medical restrictions currently prohibiting contraceptive counseling, abortions, sterilizations and other reproductive services.

"It's very clear to me that there is an unmet need for these reproductive services," said Lois Uttley, the director of The Merger Watch Project, a group supported by Planned Parenthood and The New York Civil Liberties Union, which monitors health care mergers involving Catholic hospitals.

Uttley acknowledged that is important for both hospitals to stay open, but said she would like to see "more services."

Uttley recently told the State Hospital Review and Planning Commission's Project Review Committee that the two Queens hospitals should relinquish their Catholic identity when and if they are taken over by Wyckoff, which is a public hospital.

"The two hospitals in question will no longer be Catholic hospitals," she said, adding that if the current plan is approved, it will represent "a most unfortunate missed opportunity to improve the health care of thousands of women and families who rely on these two hospitals for their health care needs."

Alice Berger, the vice president of Health Care Planning at Planned Parenthood, cited the diversity of Queens in reiterating Uttley's argument.

"The ethnic and racial diversity of these Queens neighborhoods, coupled with the need for comprehensive reproductive health services, indicates that these community hospitals should be made to broaden rather than restrict vital preventive services," Berger said.

What, exactly, is Ms. Berger saying?  "The ethnic and racial diversity" of Queens indicates a need for more abortion providers?

Pope Benedict loves MOJ

When I was a kid, I read many times "The Great Brain" series, by John D. Fitzgerald.  Basically, the books were about the lives and times of the Fitzgerald brothers -- including Tom, "the Great Brain" -- in late 19th century Utah.  Some of their adventures were colored by the fact that they were part of the very small Catholic community in an overwhelmingly LDS territory. 

In one of the books, Tom goes off to a Jesuit boarding school, where he chafes under the discipline.  When the headmaster-priest refuses to allow Tom to start a basketball team, that is the last straw.  Tom writes to the Pope.  Eventually, he receives a letter back from the Holy See.  (!!!)  The headmaster is overwhelmed and delighted -- so much so, that he does not ask questions when Tom suggests that, in the letter, the Pope endorsed the basketball-team idea.  Next thing you know, the school is awash in hoops fever.

Well.  Pope Benedict didn't exactly say anything about Mirror of Justice in his recent message to the World Congress for Catholic TV.  (He's still focusing on "old media").  Still, this (from ZENIT) seems pretty close:

The Church must not be afraid to use technology to spread the good news, said Benedict XVI to the World Congress for Catholic TV in Madrid. . . .

The note added that "the multiplicity of initiatives, in many cases evidence of the promptings of the Holy Spirit, today requires greater mutual collaboration in a true effort to enhance professional quality, so as to facilitate a more spirited dialogue between the Church and the world."

It further stated: "The new forms of communication offer a highly favorable framework for more active participation of the public together with the media, promoting the inclusion of less fortunate sectors of the public and adapting themselves in a particular way to the experience of communion that is at the very heart of the Church."

To accomplish this, added the message, "it is necessary, without fear of technology, with intrepid hope and faith, to promote a joyful, creative and professional presence in television," being "coworkers of the truth so as to offer the good news of our Lord in the multiple formats of audiovisual media, while also witnessing to the beauty of creation."

So, I say to my fellow MOJ-ers:  God and the Pope want you to blog!

Conscience and Democracy

In his recent post, Father Araujo argues that “The conscience of the faithful Catholic citizen, in its authentic form, is informed by objective truth as God has revealed and as the Church teaches.” Some on this site have argued, and Father Araujo also believes that an authentic conscience is not merely informed by Church teachings, but must conform itself to the teachings of the Magisterium. As Father Araujo continues, “’Our faith teaches that Catholics cannot, in good conscience, disagree with the Church on questions of morality.’” To fail to conform one’s conscience with the Magisterium, he suggests is not to be a faithful Catholic, and it is maintained that this is not only the current view of the Vatican, but the meaning of the Magisterium. Let us assume this to be correct.

For much of American history, anti-Catholicism was rampant because Catholics “took orders from a foreign power.” If Catholics were to accept the absolute power of the Magisterium (the overwhelming majority do not), is there any reason to believe that anti-Catholicism would not again become rampant? I suspect it would because the idea of freedom of (“subjective”) conscience is deeply embedded in the traditions of the country (it has also long been a part of Catholic tradition), and the idea of following the dictates of a foreign power seems undemocratic to most Americans.

This is not to say that “First Things” Catholics are wrong about freedom of conscience  (though I think they are); it is to say that it would be very difficult for them persuasively to maintain that their version of Catholicism is consistent with American democracy. On the other hand, the conception of conscience held by the overwhelming majority of American Catholics is fully consistent with American democracy. My understanding of what American Catholics believe is that appropriate respect and deference must be paid to the Magisterium, but respect and deference is not the same as absolute submission. It is the right and the duty of Catholics to follow their conscience, and, in doing so, they are faithful Catholics and good citizens.

The Iraqi Dead: 600,000 and Counting?

The Wall Street Journal
October 11, 2006

Iraqi Death Toll
Exceeds 600,000,
Study Estimates

By NEIL KING JR.
October 11, 2006; Page A4

WASHINGTON -- A new study asserts that roughly 600,000 Iraqis have died from violence since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, a figure many times higher than any previous estimate.

The study, to be published Saturday in the British medical journal the Lancet, was conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health by sending teams of Iraqi doctors across Iraq from May through July. The findings are sure to draw fire from skeptics and could color the debate over the war ahead of congressional elections next month.

The Defense Department until 2004 eschewed any effort to compute the number of Iraqi dead but this summer released a study putting the civilian casualty rate between May and August at 117 people a day. Other tabulations using different methodologies put the range of total civilian fatalities so far from about 50,000 to more than 150,000. President Bush in December said "30,000, more or less" had died in Iraq during the invasion and in the violence since.

The Johns Hopkins team conducted its study using a methodology known as "cluster sampling." That involved randomly picking 47 clusters of households for a total 1,849 households, scattered across Iraq. Team members interviewed each household about any deaths in the family during the 40 months since the invasion, as well as in the year before the invasion. The team says it reviewed death certificates for 92% of all deaths reported. Based on those figures, it tabulated national mortality rates for various periods before and after the start of the war. The mortality rate last year was nearly four times the preinvasion rate, the study found.

"Since March 2003, an additional 2.5% of Iraq's population has died above what would have occurred without conflict," the report said. The country's population is roughly 24 million people.

Human Rights Watch has estimated Saddam Hussein's regime killed 250,000 to 290,000 people over 20 years.

The Lancet study, funded largely by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, said while the percentage of deaths attributed to the U.S.-led coalition has decreased over the past year, coalition forces were involved in 31% of all violent deaths since March 2003. Most of the deaths in Iraq, particularly in the past two years, have been caused by insurgent, terrorist and sectarian violence.

Overall, the study found 55% of deaths since March 2003 were due to violence. Of that subset, 56% resulted from gunshots; car bombs and other explosives accounted for 27%, and airstrikes caused 13%. The rest were due to other factors.

Paul Bolton, a public-health researcher at Boston University who has reviewed the study, called the methodology "excellent" and said it was standard procedure in a wide range of studies he has worked on. "You can't be sure of the exact number, but you can be quite sure that you are in the right ballpark," he said.

A similar, smaller study by the same team in 2004 put the number of deaths at the time at 9,000 to 194,000. That report drew fire for the breadth of its estimate. In part to offset such criticism, the researchers said they picked the largest sample possible for this survey, after considering the high level of danger involved in sending teams door-to-door in Iraq.

The study's lead researchers, Gilbert Burnham and Les Roberts of Johns Hopkins, have done studies in the Congo, Rwanda and other war zones. "This is a standard methodology that the U.S. government and others have encouraged groups to use in developing countries," said Mr. Burnham, who defended the study as "a scientifically extremely strong paper."

This study, "The Human Cost of the War in Iraq," puts civilian fatalities at 426,369 to 793,663 but gives a 95% certainty to the figure of 601,027.

Hamit Dardagan, co-founder of Iraq Body Count, a London-based human-rights group, called the Lancet study's figures "pretty shockingly high." His group tabulates the civilian death toll based on media reports augmented by local hospital and morgue records. His group says it has accumulated reports of as many as 48,693 civilian deaths caused by the U.S. intervention.

Mr. Burnham said the disparity between his survey and tabulations like Iraq Body Count are largely because of the heavy media and government focus on Baghdad and a few other cities. "What our data show is that the level of violence is going on throughout the country," he said.

Lt. Col. Mark Ballesteros, a Defense Department spokesman, said the Pentagon doesn't comment on reports that haven't been publicly released. Nonetheless, he said, "the coalition takes enormous precautions to prevent civilian deaths and injuries," adding that "the Iraqi ministry of health would be in a better position, with all of its records, to provide more accurate information on deaths in Iraq."

Since 2004, the Pentagon has collected data on civilian deaths in incidents where coalition forces were involved. According to its August civilian-casualty report, those figures show that the daily civilian death rate has increased nearly sixfold, to almost 120 this summer from about 20 in early 2004. The Lancet study cites the Pentagon's numbers to back its own findings, saying the mortality-rate increases in both tabulations closely parallel one another.
_______________
mp

Extraordinary and Compelling

I don't agree with several of the moves Fr. Araujo makes in his excellent post below.  For example, in parsing Ratzinger's nota bene, he quotes from Ratzinger's reaction to a document by the US Bishops that was addressing, not the question of voting, but the question of how Catholics should behave when they hold public office.  These are very different questions.  While there is a logical gap between what is immoral and what should be illegal, there is an even greater gap between how one votes and what actually becomes illegal.  (Consider, for example, in the abortion context, the implications of George W. Bush's failed nomination of Harriet Myers for the Supreme Court; Reagan's nomination of O'Connor and Kennedy; and Bush Sr.'s nomination of David Souter for arguments that pro-life Catholics MUST vote Republican because of abortion.)  In light of these differences, it seems to me that statements made by the magisterium with regard to the behavior of public officials can not be applied unproblematically to the evaluation of the behavior of voters.

That said, I think that, conceding the reasonable point that not all issues are to be weighed the same, reaosnable Catholics can disagree about the weight to be given particular issues, including within that calculus their own assessment of the likelihood that their vote will result in legal change (see my point above about supreme court nominees) and their own assessment of the likely effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of legal change with respect to a particular issue.  While Fr. Araujo assumes that abortion should be the most weighty issue due to the gravity of its evil, it seems to me that the calculation is far more complicated than merely concluding that, because abortion is such an important moral question, it must be presumptively decisive in determining how to vote.  The fact that abortions are carried out in private and that they will therefore likely continue to occur in great numbers even if it is legally prohibited mitigates against the weight to be assigned to abortion in comparison to evils perpetrated directly by the state, such as the death penalty, waging of an unjust war or the advocacy of torture.  To be clear, I am not here taking a position that abortion is less significant than these other issues, but I do think the analysis is more complicated than merely weighing the gravity of the moral harm of abortion itself.  The voter is entitled to consider these other factors as well.

Even assuming that I agreed with Fr. Araujo that the circumstances that would justify voting for a pro-choice candidate must be "extraordinary and compelling," reasonable Catholics can obviously disagree about what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances (and I don't take Fr. Araujo to be arguing to the contrary).  For my part, I would have to say that I think the current circumstances merit that characterization under almost any definition.

A response to "the liberal bargain"

I would like to offer a short response to Michael’s inquiry Damon Linker’s perspective on “the liberal bargain” and whether, as Michael suggested, it disenfranchises the Catholic citizen.

I begin with the self-admonition that I may need to learn more about the origin of “the liberal bargain.” But, at first blush, it appears to be based on one type of social contract theory in which the participants have actually negotiated and mutually assented to this bargain.

So far so good, but the Linker thesis needs a bit more scrutiny. First of all a significant condition is attached—a condition that Damon Linker provides and requires. This, in my estimation, has an important effect on the nature of the bargain. Moreover, the condition appears to be beyond negotiation to such an extent that it negates the ability to bargain. The condition also is premised on an important assumption: that the believer, in this case the Catholic citizen, has the “ambition to political rule in the name of [one’s] faith.” In Linker’s view that has been expressed in the Linker-Douthat exchange, there seems to be no possibility that the Catholic citizen desires to participate in the work of the polis by proposing rather than imposing views that are based on the Catholic citizen’s beliefs, which are based on reason. Linker insists that the Catholic citizen’s views based on faith are irrelevant because they are inextricably tied to “theological questions and disputes.” Again, Linker makes an assumption that denies the possibility that reason—right and natural—has formed the Catholic citizen’s views.

What Linker has reserved and claimed for his perspective is apparently denied to those who hold particular religious views that differ from or disagree with his own.

I wonder what Linker thinks about the views of the ardent environmentalist or the zealous advocate for “equality”? Surely these individuals consider their political views as articles of a type of faith. So, could one use Linker’s argument to conclude that these views must also be declared “irrelevant”?

If Dr. Linker has made an offer in his version of “the liberal bargain,” it seems to be one that needs to be refused--at least by the Catholic citizen who employs reason to conclude that his or her views have much to contibute to the betterment of society and common life in the polis.   RJA sj