A few comments on the most recent exchanges over abortion and the Democrats:
We have been debating again whether the Democratic proposals (there are two—more on that in a second) are a sufficient move against abortion. That’s an important question. But it should not cause us to lose sight of another important question, whether safety-net proposals like these are a good and necessary move against abortion (sufficient or not). The proposition I'm talking about is that a variety of social supports—like increased funding for women’s and children’s health and nutrition, increased restrictions on pregnancy discrimination in insurance, increased funding of adoption and of child-care on college campuses, and so forth—will stop many abortions by increasing alternatives for women who face difficult situations of pregnancy.
This Wednesday, the Pregnant Women Support Act (PWSA), formulated and endorsed by Democrats for Life, will be introduced in Congress. The bill provides for the increased social supports above and others. Unlike last week’s Democratic proposal, the PWSA omits the funding of contraception as a means of preventing pregnancies and thus abortions, based on the division over the morality of contraception.
I cannot imagine why any pro-life member of Congress, Republican or Democrat, should not wholeheartedly support this bill. The only reason to oppose it from a conservative side would be on the basis of a knee-jerk hostility to government spending and regulation, overriding—in a telling and disturbing way—a commitment to preventing the deaths of some unborn children. Therefore, I hope and expect that large numbers of pro-life Republicans will join pro-life Democrats in support of the bill.
While some folks (including, I’m sure, some fellow MOJers) believe that Democrats for Life are engaged overall in a quixotic and counterproductive endeavor, I think we should note that it took this group to put forward a comprehensive package of safety-net measures to reduce abortions. Even though many pro-life conservatives support such measures, to my knowledge no such package ever came forth from the conservative side of the political aisle, probably because there’s a congenital suspicion of safety-net measures on that side. I’d submit that this tells us that—notwithstanding all the problems with the current Democratic Party on Roe and abortion restrictions—there is substantial value in having a pro-life voice working within the Democratic Party instead of bailing out (even leading aside whether Democratic positions are morally preferable on other issues). With respect to my friend and co-worker Rick, I think it would be unfair to diss Democrats for Life's work as "repackaging longstanding policy goals as efforts to reduce the number of abortions." CLARIFICATION AND UPDATE: After personal conversation, I understand that Rick's dismissal of the first Democratic proposal was not meant to include the safety-net funding elements that Democrats for Life's proposal will champion, but only the contraception funding because some would go to Planned Parenthood.
A few further comments:
(1) Note that the PWSA, like the Democrats for Life’s proposals in general, does not simply mean more central government. Many of its provisions support mediating institutions addressing abortion: for example, increased funding for sonograms at crisis pregnancy centers (which studies show convince many women not to abort), for adoption organizations, and for child care on college campuses.
(2) To support safety-net measures does not let Democrats off the hook on the abortion-restriction questions. (Democrats for Life, BTW, has not done so; it includes informed consent and parental notice in its proposal, and it has even applauded the South Dakota ban that many other pro-life leaders opposed as mistimed.) I understand the worry that some will use these measures to claim to be pro-life while they still support Roe or public funding of abortions. But it would be unfortunate to resist a measure that can reduce abortions—and help women in difficult circumstances—because of considerations about how it will be used politically. In fact, one can argue the other way too: strengthening the safety net may make it easier, in the long run and in swing states, to enact and (equally important) sustain legal restrictions on abortion because the collateral consequences on women will be cushioned.
(3) Those collateral consequences of legal prohibitions have to be acknowledged, because--do I have to do these reminders?--abortion does frequently arise in very difficult circumstances, especially for impoverished women who have a disproportionate share of abortions. Although there were exaggerations of pre-Roe back-alley abortions and deaths, certainly some occurred and some would occur again, disroportionately to the poor. Economically vulnerable women who give birth will also have real health and nutrition problems, may drop out of college permanently (thus heading toward economic dead-ends), and will risk losing whatever chance they had at health insurance—all problems that the safety-net proposal addresses. These consequences do not mean giving up on protecting the unborn. But they do demand a sober, honest recognition of the need for a strengthened safety net to address the increased needs.
The proposal will be on the table this week. Can anyone fail to support it?
Tom
As has been noted before on this blog, Kathleen Brady has a new paper, "Religious Group Autonomy: Further Reflections about What is at Stake", on SSRN. I re-read it, flying back from Villanova, and was struck again by how much it "moves the ball" on the relevant questions. She contends that freedom for religious organizations is "appropriate [not simply] because . . . [the] social benefits outweigh the costs."
Rather, freedom is important because we do not now and, indeed, never will have a complete understanding of what is socially beneficial and what is harmful (at least this side of the eschaton). Our understanding of which ideas and forms of life are truly progressive is always imperfect and in the process of development. Autonomy for religious groups is essential because these groups are an important source of alternative ideas that make development and improvement possible.
I agree. It strikes me that Kathy's last sentence is true not only because these groups are a "source" of alternative ideas, but also because, by virtue of their freedom, they play a structural, pluralism-guarding role, and enhance the ability of other entities and persons to develop and propose such ideas.
Patrick blogs, below, about the recent conference at Villanova on Pope Benedict and the re-evangelization of law, politics, and culture. Congratulations to Patrick, and to his Villanova colleagues, for arranging what was, for me, an inspiring and instructive conference.
Patrick notes that our fellow blogger, Amy Uelmen, presented a paper, "Reconciling Evangelization and Dialogue Through Love of Neighbor in Law, Politics, and Culture," which -- as Patrick reports -- "offered a searching account of how Benedict's call to social charity consists with the true message of Dominus Iesus about the unicity of salvation through Christ." Like everything Amy writes, the paper was generous, thoughtful, charitable (as in, full of "charity"), inspiring, and challenging. And, it now appears, it could not have been more timely.
I've been thinking a lot about what she said, about love, dialogue, and witness, as I sort through all the news and comment about the Pope's recent speech and the reactions to it. I hope she'll post it somewhere soon!
At Michael's suggestion, I read Juan Cole's "Pope Gets it Wrong" essay. Of course, I am not a historian. Still, for what it's worth, it does not seem to me that Cole really engages, let alone refutes, the Pope's speech. Assuming that, as Cole reports, Benedict was mistaken about the timing of "Surah 2" with respect to Muhammad's time in power, I still do not see how the Pope's speech itself -- which struck me, again, as learned, charitable, sincere, and important -- warrants an apology, or "better advisors." And, I still think that it is the overreaction to the speech -- and the reactions to the overreaction to the speech -- that are troubling, not the speech.
By the way, I do not think this matter takes us off our blog's "Catholic legal theory" focus. I take it that prominent in any Catholic legal theory will have to be a confidence in reason and its capacity to apprehend truths -- truths about who we are, what we are for, and even who God is. It seems to me that the point of the Pope's speech was to re-assert this confidence, and call others to it.
Checking back on Cole's blog, after thinking about his post on Benedict's speech, I came across this post, in which Cole contends that the "sensitivities" which, apparently, the Pope has ruffled by using a half-millennium-old quote in an academic speech, are "a feature of postcolonialism."
Muslims were colonized by Western powers, often for centuries, and all that period they were told that their religion was inferior and barbaric. They are independent now, though often they have gained independence only a couple of generations (less if you consider neocolonialism). As independent, they are finally liberated to protest when Westerners put them down.
An interesting take. How, I wonder, does the Siege of Vienna, or the Battle of Lepanto fit in? Or, the murder of Sr. Leonella Sgorbati, in front of a children's hospital in Somalia?
Cole also advises the Pope, saying ""[a]ll he has to do is quote Vatican II on Islam, which is still Catholic doctrine last I knew, and the whole issue would blow over." Not likely, I'm afraid. But, we can hope.
[This is from Joan Cole's blog, Informed Consent. Cole is a professor of history at the University of Michigan. Thought that MOJ-readers would be intrested. To see all the comments on Cole's post, click here.]
Pope Gets it Wrong on Islam
Pope Benedict's speech at Regensburg University, which mentioned Islam and jihad, has provoked a firestorm of controversy.
The
address is more complex and subtle than the press on it represents. But
let me just signal that what is most troubling of all is that the Pope
gets several things about Islam wrong, just as a matter of fact.
He
notes that the text he discusses, a polemic against Islam by a
Byzantine emperor, cites Qur'an 2:256: "There is no compulsion in
religion." Benedict maintains that this is an early verse, when
Muhammad was without power.
His allegation is incorrect. Surah 2
is a Medinan surah revealed when Muhammad was already established as
the leader of the city of Yathrib (later known as Medina or "the city"
of the Prophet). The pope imagines that a young Muhammad in Mecca
before 622 (lacking power) permitted freedom of conscience, but later
in life ordered that his religion be spread by the sword. But since
Surah 2 is in fact from the Medina period when Muhammad was in power,
that theory does not hold water.
In fact, the Qur'an at no point
urges that religious faith be imposed on anyone by force. This is what
it says about the religions:
' [2:62] Those who
believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures),
and the Christians and the Sabians-- any who believe in God and the
Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their
Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. '
See my comments On the Quran and peace.
The
idea of holy war or jihad (which is about defending the community or at
most about establishing rule by Muslims, not about imposing the faith
on individuals by force) is also not a Quranic doctrine. The doctrine
was elaborated much later, on the Umayyad-Byzantine frontier, long
after the Prophet's death. In fact, in early Islam it was hard to join,
and Christians who asked to become Muslim were routinely turned away.
The tyrannical governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj, was notorious for this
rejection of applicants, because he got higher taxes on non-Muslims.
Arab Muslims had conquered Iraq, which was then largely pagan,
Zoroastrian, Christian and Jewish. But they weren't seeking converts
and certainly weren't imposing their religion.
The pope was
trying to make the point that coercion of conscience is incompatible
with genuine, reasoned faith. He used Islam as a symbol of the coercive
demand for unreasoned faith.
But he has been misled by the medieval polemic on which he depended.
In
fact, the Quran also urges reasoned faith and also forbids coercion in
religion. The only violence urged in the Quran is in self-defense of
the Muslim community against the attempts of the pagan Meccans to wipe
it out.
The pope says that in Islam, God is so transcendant that
he is beyond reason and therefore cannot be expected to act reasonably.
He contrasts this conception of God with that of the Gospel of John,
where God is the Logos, the Reason inherent in the universe.
But
there have been many schools of Islamic theology and philosophy. The
Mu'tazilite school maintained exactly what the Pope is saying, that God
must act in accordance with reason and the good as humans know
them. The Mu'tazilite approach is still popular in Zaidism and in
Twelver Shiism of the Iraqi and Iranian sort. The Ash'ari school, in
contrast, insisted that God was beyond human reason and therefore could
not be judged rationally. (I think the Pope would find that Tertullian
and perhaps also John Calvin would be more sympathetic to this view
within Christianity than he is).
As for the Quran, it constantly
appeals to reason in knowing God, and in refuting idolatry and
paganism, and asks, "do you not reason?" "do you not understand?" (a
fala ta`qilun?)
Of course, Christianity itself has a long
history of imposing coerced faith on people, including on pagans in the
late Roman Empire, who were forcibly converted. And then there were the
episodes of the Crusades.
Another irony is that reasoned,
scholastic Christianity has an important heritage drom Islam itself. In
the 10th century, there was little scholasticism in Christian theology.
The influence of Muslim thinkers such as Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) reemphasized the use of Aristotle and Plato in
Christian theology. Indeed, there was a point where Christian
theologians in Paris had divided into partisans of Averroes or of
Avicenna, and they conducted vigorous polemics with one another.
Finally, that Byzantine emperor that the Pope quoted, Manuel II? The Byzantines had been weakened by Latin predations during the fourth Crusade, so it was in a way Rome that had sought coercion first. And, he ended his days as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire.
The Pope was wrong on the facts. He should apologize to the Muslims and get better advisers on Christian-Muslim relations.
posted by Juan @ 9/15/2006 06:24:00 AM
Last Friday's first annual Scarpa Conference in Catholic Legal Studies, at Villanova, set a standard that will be hard to surpass in future years. Not a few attendees told me it was the best conference they ever attended. I risk immodesty only to signal that, once again, when we try hard to bring our Catholic tradition to bear on our contemporary questions about law, politics, the public square, the Church in America, and so forth, our efforts are blessed. There was a freshness to the work and conversation last Friday that would, I like to think, please our Holy Father, as would the joy that permeated the Mass of Our Lady of Sorrows that His Eminence Cardinal Dulles celebrated at the conclusion of the conference.
Cardinal Dulles's keynote address provided us with a vintage-Dulles history of the Church's recognition of a proper distance between the God's things and Caesar's, highlighing the ways in which Pope Benedict has reinforced that distance. In response, Bill Wagner (CUA) wondered whether the reservoirs of the creative minorities will be equal to their task of giving the state the moral compass that, on Benedict's account, it inherently lacks. Amy Uelmen's paper offered a searching account of how Benedict's call to social charity consists with the true message of Dominus Iesus about the unicity of salvation through Christ. My colleague Michael Moreland, in response, noted that not once does Deus Caritas Est characterize charity as a virtue. Rick Garnett's paper explored Benedict's recent work to bring to the next stage our understanding of what the true liberty of the Church, libertas ecclesiae, means and demands. It's not just about individuals and their consciences, but also and primordially about ecclesial society's freedom to govern and constitute itself. In response, my colleague Robert Miller developed both philosohical and theological arguments to show how religion is an inherently social act. My own paper attempted to trace the disintegration of the Leonine synthesis on the state, according to which the state enjoyed a certain sacredness inasmuch as it is a particpation of the divine rule. I suggest that John Paul II and, to an even greater event, Benedict XVI give us an instrumentalist state that does not receive a natural law on the basis of which to make positive law. Mark Sargent, my colleague and the Dean of Villanova Law, replied with a probing inquiry into what, if Benedict is right, holds civil society together and keeps it from enacting immoral laws. The day was an extended meditation on what the Augustinian elements in Pope Benedict's teachings invite us to hope for and do, and what they would deny us reason to hope for and legitimate freedom to do.
These one- or two sentence descriptions work an injustice to some truly excellent papers. But if they catch your eye, you can look forward to reading the papers in the Villanova Law Review this spring.
Saturday, September 16, 2006
A number of us have noted the Pope's (rich, learned, and very important) speech at Regensburg, and the angry reactions of some -- or, it appears, quite a few -- Muslims to it.
It seems to me, for what it's worth, that what is far more striking (and depressing) about the situation is not the Pope's possible "insensitivity" in using the 14th century quotation that he did but the terrifyingly infantile reaction by -- apparently -- so many to that quotation, and (as Rob notes) the numbingly obtuse reporting on the situation by our leading media outlets.
People are, I understand, burning the Pope in effigy and, yet again, threatening violence, because they cannot be bothered to read his speech with even marginal attentiveness and maturity, and, somehow, it's (yet again) the Pope who is the bad guy and expected to apologize? This is, I fear, a very bad situation.
